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CHAPTER 1. mXRODUCTION 
The large variability of real exchange rates since the collapse of the Bretton Wood 
system has motivated investigation about the validity of purchasing power parity (PPP). The 
important question is whether real exchange rate series have behaved according to the PPP 
theory of real exchange rates. According to the long-run version of PPP theory, the level of a 
real exchange rate is characterized by a white noise process. That is, any deviation of the real 
exchange rate from its constant equilibrium level should be completely random. Therefore, if 
the real exchange rate behaves as suggested by PPP theory, any deviation of the actual real 
exchange rate from its PPP level will reflect a deviation from its long-run equilibrium level. 
The attempt to study the validity of PPP theory has also been initiated based on the 
poor performance of modem structural models of exchange rate determination. As one 
important building block for these models, PPP has become the focus of studies to explain the 
failure of the models. 
Studies of PPP have give mixed results-some studies support PPP, and others show 
departures from PPP. Purchasing power disparities can be explained through structural and 
transitory departures. Whereas structural departures from PPP explain the cause of change in 
the equilibrium relative price, transitory deviations are usually the result of the differential 
adjustment speeds of prices in the goods and assets markets. The existence of nontradable 
goods and differences in productivity, growth, and market structure are examples of sources 
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of Structural deviation from PPP. In addition to these deviations, econometric 
misspesification can result in misleading PPP estimates. 
In light of the mixed empirical findings that consist of both acceptance and rejection of 
PPP, it is important to consider the time-series properties of such deviations and of the 
variables themselves. Some studies conducted before the development of the unit root test 
(Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and Nelson and Plosser's (1982) seminal paper, ignore the 
time-series properties of the variables examined. However, if these deviations are stationary, 
they have a temporary character, whereas nonstationary deviations from macroeconomic 
relationships have a permanent effect. This implies that when deviations are temporary, it is 
still possible to have a long-run relationship. This concept is relevant to the case of PPP as a 
long-run phenomenon (Mussa, 1979). 
The absolute and relative versions of PPP are specified as linear combinations of 
generally nonstationary variable. A linear combination of non stationary variables could be 
either stationary or nonstationary. If a combination of PPP forcing variables is stationary, 
however, a case for long-run relationship can be made. The variables are said to be 
cointegrated when a stationary relationship exists (Granger, 1981). The cointegration test 
was developed by Engle and Granger (1987), and some empirical studies have applied this 
method in testing the validity of PPP. 
A univariate framework of empirical study in the case of PPP may lead to 
misspesification because it ignores the international interdependency issue (Hakkio, 1984; 
Abuaf and Jorion, 1990). Hakkio (1984) has suggested that we estimate PPP using a system 
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estimation to account for correlation within countries. Abuaf and Jorion used generalized 
least squares, such as the seemingly unrelated regression estimation method, instead of the 
univariate framework used by Adler and Lehman (1983). The two studies reported different 
results using the same data. 
The availability of cointegration methods in multivariate analyses such as those 
developed by Stock and Watson (1988), Johansen (1988), and Johansen and Juselius (1990) 
allows further study of PPP. The issue of cointegration among both univariate and 
multilateral real exchange rates becomes possible to investigate. 
Recently, Enders and Hum (1991a, 1991b) developed the theory of Generalized-PPP 
based on the time-series properties of real fundamental macroeconomic variables, determining 
real exchange rate, and the international interdependency among a group of countries that 
leads to a currency area. The theory is consistent with standard open-economy 
macroeconomic models, and the condition for long run relationships among real exchange rate 
was derived. The Generalized-PPP relationship offers the notion that the real exchange rate 
between two countries is the weighted average of the real exchange rates of the other 
countries wdthin the currency area where the weights are not traditional "trade weights." 
Structural change is a major concern in economics. Such change is manifested as 
parameter shifts in the economic system. Within macroeconomics, the so-called Lucas 
critique argues for parameter changes. The idea is that the parameters of macroeconomic 
models will be determined by the expectations of economic agents involved in concerning 
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future economic policy. If policy changes, so do the expectations and related parameters. The 
significance of the change and when it occurred must be identified. 
In the regression model framework, the change in one or more of the parameters 
indicates structural change. Misspecification problems based on the problem of structural 
breaks have been related to the unit root test. Most empirical studies examining the validity of 
PPP or real exchange rates do not account for these structural breaks. The methods 
developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) and Phillips and Perron (1988) are not able to 
detect such problems (Henry and Neadle, 1990; Perron, 1989). All have argued that there is 
a need to develop alternative statistical procedures that can distinguish a process with a unit 
root from a stationary series around a deterministic function with a break. Perron (1989, 
1990, 1991) developed a formal statistical test of the null hypothesis for the unit root for such 
a problem in the spirit of "intervention analysis." This test, however, precedes the knowledge 
of structural break. In the case of unknown or even knovm policy change, identification of a 
structural break is important. 
The dynamic interaction among real exchange rates in a global economy has been 
studied using the vector autoregressive representation (VAR) method developed by Sims 
(1980), despite the fact that many economists have objections about VAR methods. One such 
objection addresses the availability of standard measurements such as confidence interval of 
impulse response and standard error in forecasting error variance decomposition, which leads 
to the question of result interpretations (Cambell and Mankiw, 1987; Cohrane, 1988). One 
reason for the lack of estimation measurement, as argued by Lutkepohl (1990), is the problem 
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of relevant asymptotic distribution of impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decomposition of the VAR model. The availability of such asymptotic distributions can 
facilitate the computation of standard error and test statistics. 
Most studies about PPP and real exchange rates have related to developed countries. 
The presumption that initiated this trend is that PPP works well in a relatively free market 
economy. However, the concept of PPP does not necessarily apply only to developed 
countries. The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)~Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand—practice relatively free trade. 
Besides, these countries represent rapidly growing economies with strong trading ties to 
industrial countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States. As a group, ASEAN 
members have considered regional trade arrangements in recent years. Industrial cooperation, 
even though limited, has been implemented. Recent initiatives for the existing ASEAN free 
trade area (ASEAN-FTA) have been negotiated intensively. Thus, there are strong 
justifications for further study of Generalized-PPP relationships among this group of 
countries. 
The primary objective of this research is to investigate the existence of Generalized-
PPP in the presence of structural change for the ASEAN countries, the ASEAN countries as a 
group and each major trading partner, and the major trading partners and each of the ASEAN 
countries. The second objective is to study the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP and 
the interrelationships among real exchange rates in the system. 
Chapter 2 reviews the Indonesian economy and discusses the implication of specific 
structural changes in Indonesia. The starting point for the structural changes described in this 
Chapter. Starting point of the change can be considered as a point of structural break for the 
Indonesian economy. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on PPP, Generalized-PPP, and related 
empirical studies. Chapter 4 reviews the unit root and cointegration tests in the presence of 
structural change. These method are then applied to investigate the validity of PPP and 
Generalized PPP. Chapter 5 presents an estimation of the short-run dynamics of Generalized-
PPP and analyzes the interrelationships among real exchange rates in the currency area. 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides some concluding remarks and discusses a topic for further 
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CHAPTER 2. THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Since declaring independence on August 17,1945, Indonesia has been governed by 
two regimes with widely differing approaches to pursuing economic development. The 
Soekamo government left with problems from Dutch and Japanense colonization, tried to 
reach full national integration in the beginning of its term and to obtain recognition from other 
nations. The Soekamo government focused on political rather than economic issues. The 
economy was regulated by strong government intervention, and the important roles given to 
stateowned enterprises served to reinforce a strong inward economic orientation. 
• •• #4 
The New Order government of President Soeharto faced severe economic problems 
when it came to power in 1966. These problems included a contracting economy, a large and 
inefficient public sector, high external debt, spiraling inflation, and falling levels of private 
investment. Annual per capita income was approximately US $50.00. The New Order 
government moved to restore Indonesia's economy. As the Soeharto government 
strengthened its position, a new set of economic priorities emerged in various policy 
statements. Together with the restoration of monetary and fiscal stability, the government 
encouraged foreign and domestic private investment, especially in the manufacturing and 
mining sectors. The Foreign Investment Law and Domestic Investment Law were 
implemented in January 1967 and November 1968, respectively. In addition, the government 
rejoined international institutions such as the United Nation, the International Monetary Fund, 
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and the World Bank, after having withdrawn from these organizations for several years during 
the Soekamo regime. 
Another important feature of Soeharto's New Order government has been the 
implementation of five-year development plans, called REPELITA {Rencana Pembangunan 
Lima Tahuri), starting in fiscal year (FY) 1969/70. Each plan is based on the Guidelines of 
State Policies, called Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara, and is adopted by the People's 
Consultative Assembly in their first meeting every five years after the national election. Each 
plan specifies development objectives, policies, programs, and projects for the next five-year 
period. The initial step for implementing a five-year plan is government submission of the 
annual budget, which should fit within the detailed operational plan for carrying out programs 
and projects. The process of submitting an annual budget allows annual review of 
development activities, projection of resources, and budget allocations for adjustments and 
improvements of the current five-year plan. The New Order government also introduced the 
harmonization of growth, equity, and stability, often referred to as the Trilogy of 
Development, to be the fiandamental principle guiding development policy. 
The New Order government's economic policies, combined with the effects of an 
increase in oil prices, led to a significant change in the structure of the Indonesian economy 
compared with the economic regime under the Soekamo government. These structural 
changes have also affected patterns of government expenditure, private expenditure, and level 
of investment, which reflect both the effects of foreign investment and high levels of foreign 
aid. 
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During the period in which President Soeharto has been firmly in control, both changes 
and continuities are striking. Because the changes are many, five examples will be explored. 
One of the most important economic changes in the first decade of Soeharto's regime was the 
rapid introduction and adoption of new technologies in a broad range of economic activities 
and the impact of these technologies. In agriculture, the advent of the Soeharto regime 
coincided with the green revolution, which has affected Indonesia mainly through its impact 
on rice cuhivation. In various non-agricultural pursuits, which have traditionally provided 
employment for the rural population, the impact of technological change has also been 
substantial. 
The second of the institutional changes was implementation of the rice intensification 
programs. Under the New Order government in the late 1960s and early 1970s, major 
emphasis was given to increasing rice production and improving marketing. The rice 
intensification programs included direct price and quantity control over both inputs and the 
rice output market. 
A third striking contrast between the Soekamo and Soeharto regimes is in the attitudes 
of government officials toward development priorities. In the period between 1958 and 1965 
under Soekamo, the balance of power in the economy began to shift to groups supporting 
rapid eradication of capitalism. The emphasis was on eliminating colonial institutions and 
transforming the economy toward socialism, where the public sector was dominant. In 
contrast, officials under the Soeharto regime have emphasized economic priorities such as 
increasing production and income. There is no more talk of the political transformation of 
10 
colonial institutions and no emphasis on purely redistributional policies such as land reform or 
nationalization of foreign-owned companies. Another important change in official attitudes 
concerns foreign investment. Since 1966, Indonesia has swung away from the inward-looking 
attitude that depends upon public enterprise and has endeavored to adopt at least some 
policies favoring private entrepreneurship. 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, the planning and implementation of economic policy in 
Indonesia was greatly hampered by recurrent balance-of-payment (BOP) problems. In the late 
1960s, inflows of foreign aid and investment eased Indonesia's position. Then, in 1972 and 
1973, a commodity boom followed the oil boom and dramatically changed the situation. This 
change in Indonesia's external position, which for several years has been one of comparative 
strength, marks the fourth major change from the Soekamo regime. The improvement in 
BOP in the beginning of the Soeharto regime has had important implications for long-term 
development. 
Lastly, the ability of Soeharto's New Order government to perform internal economic 
management is in fiill contrast to that of the previous regime. Extraordinarily unstable fiscal 
and monetary policies between 1958 and 1965 causedsubstantial long-term damage to the 
Indonesian economy by forcing economic agents to make decisions on a very short-term basis. 
With the help of foreign aid and the oil boom, the Soeharto government managed to build 
confidence in its ability to control monetary and fiscal policies ~ an important economic 
achievement. Much of this confidence is due to the very substantial backing received through 
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the Inter-Govemmental Group of Indonesia from the major industrial countries, and from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Following this review of the reforms introduced by Soeharto's New Order government 
in response to problems inherited from the Soekamo regime, changes that have occurred 
during the Soeharto regime will be discussed. The next section provides a detailed description 
of policy reforms undertaken to restructure the Indonesian economy in response to the 
economic recession in the 1980s. The subsequent section reviews Indonesia's economic 
performance and focuses on the effects of policy reforms on the economy. The final section 
of this chapter presents a summary and some conclusions. 
Policy Changes During the Soeharto Regime 
After experiencing rapid grov^rth in income, consumption, and investment during the 
1970s stemming from the oil and gas boom, Indonesia faced a much worse external 
environment beginning in 1983. The decline in oil prices caused grave problems in the 
Indonesian economy because oil and gas accounted for 82 percent of export earnings and 71 
percent of government revenue in FY 1981/82. In addition, the worldwide recession in the 
early 1980s affected the Indonesian economy because most of Indonesia's debt was in 
currencies that appreciated against the US dollar. The depreciation of the US dollar, 
combined with lower oil and gas prices, contributed to the rapid increase in Indonesia's debt 
service burden. 
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In response this challenge, the government implemented a broad range of 
macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment measures starting in 1983. The 
measures can be divided into two broad types of policies. The first dealt with the issue of 
restoring financial stability. In this case, the govenmient implemented austere macroeconomic 
policies. The second policy reform dealt with sustaining the momentum of development over 
the medium to longer term. Within this policy reform, the government adopted a program to 
restructure the economy in order to reduce its heavy dependence on oil and gas as a source of 
foreign exchange and budgetary revenues and to improve Indonesia's economic efficiency, 
while at the same time to moving toward an export-oriented economy. 
The specific policy reforms, however, can be categorized into four groups. First, an 
active exchange rate management policy has been adopted to restore BOP stability and to 
sustain growth over the medium term. Major devaluations were taken and the flexibility of the 
exchange rate was improved by moving the system to a more actively managed float. A 
number of strong fiscal policy reforms were adopted to constrain public expenditure, mobilize 
public revenue, and reduce the overall budget deficit. These monetary and financial policy 
reforms were implemented to accommodate inflationary pressures, prevent capital flight, 
mobilize financial resources, and improve the efficiency of the use of financial resources. 
Series of trade and other structural reforms, such as investment regulation, were introduced to 
help diversify sources of foreign exchange earnings and to make possible a recovery of 
economic grov^h over the medium term. 
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Exchange Rate Management 
The dependence of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings and government revenue 
receipts on oil and gas exports brought with it two major problems. First, the instability of 
international petroleum prices caused instability in export earnings and government revenue, 
leading to significant problems of short-term macroeconomic adjustment. Second, domestic 
absorption of oil and gas export earnings produced structural problems within the Indonesian 
economy. To contend v^ath these problems, one of the major policy adjustment components is 
exchange rate policy. 
As a small open economy that has adopted a policy of fi'ee capital movement since 
1971 and implemented fi'ee currency convertibility of the rupiah since 1968, Indonesia has 
experienced changes in the exchange rate system and adjustments in exchange rate. These two 
factors are central to explaining the structural change in Indonesia's cconomy. 
Change in the Indonesian Exchange Rate System 
The choice of an exchange rate system depends upon a country's conditions. Enders 
and Lapan (1987) haved argued that monetary policy as well as the rate of inflation, wage 
rigidity, and openness of the country influence the choice of system. With respect to country 
openness, flexible exchange rates are considered better for a relatively closed economy, 
whereas fixed exchange rates are deemed preferable for a small open economy. 
In their study of changes in foreign exchange rate systems in developing countries, 
Edwards and Santealla (1993) found that most developing countries continue to adopt a fixed 
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exchange rate system, despite the collapse of the Bretton Wood system in 1973. These 
countries are mainly pegging their currencies to a specific country's currency within the spirit 
of an optimum currency area. During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, some developing 
countries moved from a fixed exchange rate system to more flexible systems such as a 
managed exchange rate system. This movement was associated with the debt crisis in 1982. 
Indonesia has experienced both fixed and managed floating exchange rate systems. 
From 1971 until 1978, the value of the rupiah was pegged to the US dollar in a fixed 
exchange rate system. The system moved to a tightly managed float in November 1978, and to 
a more flexible but still managed float in March 1983. The current system, introduced in April 
1988, combines a managed float with a gradual adjustment of the rate with respect to the US 
dollar. 
The rationale behind the change from a fixed to a tightly managed floating system in 
November 1978 was to curb the rate of inflation. From August 1971 to November 1978, the 
rupiah was pegged to the US dollar in fixed value and was twice devaluated. The high 
inflation rate in Indonesia before November 1978 caused a decline in the rupiah's purchasing 
power. In the context of fi-ee capital mobility, Indonesia was forced to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate system. Instead of moving to a flexible exchange rate system, Indonesia chose 
to move to a tightly managed floating system. Amt (1978) has argued that the motivation 
behind this change was the prospect of BOP. It was projected that BOP could be turned 
around, moving fi-om a huge surplus to stationary or even declining in international reserves. 
Another argument (Dick, 1979) states that the change was a basis for developing a more 
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export-oriented economy. Evidence for the latter argument was not clear because the change 
was not followed by other policy changes; however, the plan might have been discontinued 
after the second oil shock (increasing oil prices) in FY 1979/80. 
The movement to the flexible managed floating system in March 1983 was motivated 
by experience from using the previous system. The tightly managed floating system was 
considered a failure in reducing inflationary pressure from the second oil shock in FY 1979/80 
(Amt, 1983). Reasons for this change hace been argued by McCawley (1983) as follows. 
First, the stability of the Indonesian exchange rate against major currencies that move freely 
since the collapse of the Bretton Wood system in 1973 is substantially determined by major 
countries and has little to do with the external condition of Indonesia. Following the 
argument of a optimum currency area, it could be better for Indonesia to tie the rupiah to a 
trade-weighted basket rather than to any one of the major currencies alone. 
The second consideration concerns to the objectives for managing Indonesia's 
exchange rate. McCawley has argued that Indonesia was attempting to to maintain an 
appropriate level of international reserves to provide assistance to industries producing 
tradable goods and to stabilize domestic prices. In pursuing these objectives, the flxed and the 
tightly managed floating systems appeared not to be effective. Experience showed that the 
levels of foreign exchange reserves changed with high variability and the level of 
competitiveness for tradable goods fluctuated substantially. Another factor was that the oil 
boom was fueling Indonesia's economy with inflationary pressures. 
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Exchange Rate Adjustment 
The exchange rate has traditionally been considered an important government policy 
instrument for macroeconomic stability as well as a tool for supporting trade policies. Despite 
debates on the effectiveness of currency depreciation, devaluation is frequently viewed as a 
method of improving a country's competitiveness. Improvement in the attractiveness of 
traded goods causes the level of exports to rise, the level of imports to fall, the trade balance 
or current account to improve, and domestic employment to increase. The other view is that 
devaluation generates redistribution of wealth among countries, which leads to an inflow of 
international reserves. This shift is based on the impact of the develuation on the value of 
portfolio-holding of wealth such as money, bonds, and stocks. 
Indonesia devaluated the rupiah three times within a decade after adopting the 
managed floting system, despite the flexibility of the system. The first devaluation occured in 
November 1978 simulateously with the change in the system. The rupiah was devaluated 
from US $1 equals Rp. 415 to US $1 equals Rp. 625. The second devaluation occured in 
March 1983 and was introduced concurrently with the movement to the more flexible 
managed float. The rupiah was devaluated from Rp. 703 to Rp. 970 per US $1. The third 
devaluation was undertaken in September 1986, when the rupiah was devaluated from Rp. 
1,134 to Rp. 1,644 per US$1. 
The rationale for the November 1978 devaluation included several objectives. The 
first objective was to improve non-oil and non-LNG (liquified natural gas) foreign exchange 
earnings. This objective was associated with the OPEC decision in December 1977 to reduce 
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oil production as a way to control oil prices. Domestic demand for oil increased, indicating 
that the heavy dependence on oil and LNG foreign earnings as a main source for financing 
Indonesia's development should be reconsidered. Second, the competitiveness of tradable 
goods had declined until late 1978, following the first oil shock in FY 1973/74. This condition 
was consistent with the so-called Dutch Disease effects of absorbing growing petroleum 
revenues (Warr, 1992). Thus, the improvement of non-oil and non-LNG exports as a source 
of foreign exchange earnings faced the same problems. The third objective was to adjust the 
decline in the purchasing power of the rupiah as a consequence of the fixed exchange rate 
system in use prior to this devaluation, and the final objective was to remedy BOP (Arat, 
1978). 
Dick (1979) has argued that this devaluation was undertaken for reasons in addition to 
the conventional BOP considerations. According to Dick, the devaluation was intended to 
encourage structural change, which would provide a higher grov^rth rate of employment by 
simulating primary non-oil and non-LNG exports, thereby protecting Indonesia's infant 
manufacturing sector from import competition and encouraging development of an export-
oriented economy. Thus, the devaluation was intended to forestall BOP difficulties through 
the growth of non-oil and non-LNG exports. 
Despite an adjustment for moving to the more flexible managed floating system, the 
BOP considerations seem to have played a greater role in motivating the March 1983 
devaluation. Indonesia had experienced heavy external pressures in the two years prior to the 
devaluation caused by world oil prices and the international recession. Another factor that 
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contributed to this devaluation was the effectiveness of the November 1978 devaluation. 
Much of the improvement in the real exchange rate was lost, mostly through accelerating 
inflation, within twelve months. The rest was lost in the following two years. The 
competitiveness of tradable goods declined and returned to 1978 levels. 
In addition, government budget considerations may have motivated the devaluation. 
Falling oil prices caused a drastic decline in government receipts from the oil sector. Because 
there was no other quick alternative to compensate for this loss, the government was forced 
to devaluate the rupiah before the budget for FY 1983/84 was implemented on April 1, 1983. 
Preventing more capital outflow may also have contributed to this devaluation. In March 
1983 before the devaluation, OPEC decided to cut crude oil prices. In addition to the OPEC 
decision, projections of oil export volume indicated a downward trend. Both developments 
were expected to adversely affect foreign exchange earnings and government revenues. This 
expectation was based on the level of capital outflow during the weeks prior to the 
devaluation. 
It was argued that the September 1986 devaluation took into consideration the current 
and projected BOP. A sharp decline in Indonesia's oil production was expected to continue 
following the third oil shock (oil price dropped) in 1986. The decline in terms of trade was 
expected to deteriorate further. The high cost of the economy and the lack of international 
competitiveness were other factors that motivated this devaluation. The budgetary 
implications of the devaluation were not clear; the increase in oil and LNG revenue in terms of 
the rupiah was offset by the increase in debt service and debt repayment obligations. 
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Fiscal Policy Changes 
During the Soekamo regime, the Indonesian fiscal system was mostly influenced by 
foreign trade revenue. World trade conditions for Indonesian export commodities, which 
were mostly agricultural, caused foreign trade revenues to decline as a percentage of total 
government revenue. Unable to make up for the loss, the government was forced into deficit 
financing to maintain the desired level of expenditures. This policy led to a process of 
cumulative inflation and disintegration of the monetized economy. 
Viewing the system of the previous regime as a failure, the New Order government set 
goals that pursued overall objectives regarding stable growth and development. Booth and 
McCawley (1981) have summarized these goals as follows: (1) balanced budget policy was 
adopted in the sense that total expenditure would not exceed total revenue fi"om both 
domestic and foreign sources, including foreign aid in terms of loans and grants; (2) 
government saving (i.e, domestic revenue minus routine expenditure) were to increase over 
time to enable gradual reduction of foreign aid in financing development expenditure; (3) the 
wide progressive tax base was implemented; (4) productive development expenditure was 
given a higher priority than was routine expenditure or subsidy for state enterprises; and (5) 
budgetary policy was to allow maximum use of domestic resources (including labor) in 
expanding domestic output. 
The realization of these goals, however, was both aided and impeded by the oil boom 
during the 1970s. Revenue diversification was not reconciled. The oil tax revenue increased 
domestic revenue and enabled a growing proportion of development expenditures to be 
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funded from these revenues. The very rapid growth in oil revenues, however, discouraged 
collection of non-oil domestic revenues such as income and sales taxes. 
The decreasing oil revenue as a result of decreasing world oil prices and increasing 
domestic demand for oil forced adjustment of fiscal policies in Indonesia. The adjustment 
policies have taken into consideration the following basic issues: diversification of revenues 
and efficiency and pattern of expenditure. 
Tax Reform Policies 
The pre-reform tax system in Indonesia was implemented v^dthout fiandamental change 
from Indonesia's independence until the early 1980s. This system was considered inadequate 
to mobilize domestic revenues. According to Booth (1986) which were reported by Asher 
and Booth (1992), some characteristics of this tax system were (1) a low ratio of non-oil tax 
revenue to gross domestic ptoduct (NOTR/GDP), (2) inconsistent enforcement complexity 
and ambiguities in tax laws, regulation, and procedures, and (4) wide dispersion in effective 
rates among activities of sectors and products leading to inefficiency in allocation of resources 
and lack of fairness among individual taxpayers. This system was also highly centralized. 
As mentioned, improving domestic government revenues became a necessity for 
solving the problem of decreasing domestic revenues from the oil tax. Tax reform was needed 
both to reach this goal and to overcome the deficiencies of the pre-reform tax system. Three 
years after initiating the tax reform process, the Indonesian Parliament approved three tax 
laws in December 1983: (1) the General Tax Provisions and Procedures, (2) the Income Tax 
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Law, and (3) the Value-Added Tax on Goods and Services, and Sales Tax on Luxury Goods 
(VAT Package). The new income tax law was implemented in January 1984, and the VAT 
Package was implemented in April 1985. Laws regarding the land and building tax, and the 
stamp duty were passed in 1985 and implemented in January 1986. Some modifications have 
been enacted since implementation, especially in the VAT Package. 
In general, the objectives of the tax reform were to overcome the weaknesses of the 
pre-reform tax system. The first specific objective was to improve the role of domestic 
revenue through tax by increasing the NOTR/GDP ratio. The second objective was to 
improve the efficiency of the tax law and of the administrative tax system charged with the 
transfer of resources to the public sector. The third objective was to reduce tax-induced 
distortions in the allocation of resources. Lastly,the reforms were meant to ensure that the 
poor would not be made worse off, although the program was not designed to improve 
income distribution. 
The main instrument for achieving the first objective was the VAT Package, with the 
expectation that the income tax and the land and building tax, together with improvements in 
tax administration, would significantly contribute to raising the NOTR/GDP ratio in the 
medium term. 
To achieve the second objective, the new tax laws were designed to be simple and fi-ee 
of ambiguity. Definitions of taxable objects and subjects with quantified criteria were included 
in the laws, and the statutory bases were clearly identified. The legal bases for various taxes 
were defined quite broadly, and exemptions and exclusions were minimized. In contrast to the 
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old system, the new system introduced self-assessment by transfering to taxpayers the primary 
responsibility for filing a tax return, determining tax liability, and paying taxes. Enforcement is 
undertaken mostly through selective auditing and internal checking. Computerization of tax 
administration and extensive training schemes have been adopted. 
The third objective was to be achieved by broadly defining the income tax base and 
eliminating all income-tax-based fiscal incentives. The VAT Package was expected to reduce 
input taxation. Consistency in tax administration was expected to lead to a reduction in tax-
induced distortions. The fourth objective was to be achievedby keeping nominal rates low; 
eliminating exemptions enjoyed by high-income groups; and using exemption levels, especially 
for the income tax and the land and building tax, to keep the poor outside the tax net. 
Patterns of Expenditures 
To achieve economic development and maintain stable prices, budgetary policy was 
guided by the principle of a dynamic and balanced budget. In response to decreasing oil and 
gas revenues, the government took steps to increase domestic revenues, especially from the 
non-oil sector, by intensifying tax collection and expanding the base source of revenues. On 
the expenditure side, the government took steps toward tightening budgetary policy, while 
maintaining the ongoing development efforts initiated in the preceding years. 
The first step was to rephase large capital- and import-intensive projects in May 1983. 
The objectives of this policy were to save foreign exchange reserves, avoid a budget deficit, 
and improve BOP. This policy continued major cutbacks in government real capital spending 
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and the tight control policy on the use of non-concessional import-related credit in place since 
1984. In addition, the government did not adjust civilian services basic salaries between FY 
1985/86 and FY 1988/89 to control routine expenditures. Moreover, the government took 
actions to restrain new investment in public enterprise. 
Monetary and Financial Policies 
In the period when Soekamo governed, the Indonesian banking system channeled new 
currency into the economy. In addition, a budget deficit resulted from maintaining the desired 
level of expenditure while government revenue declined. The central bank—Bank of 
Indonesia- used tight direct control in dealing with state banks. The economy was 
characterized by very high inflation rates, which peaked at 595 percent in 1965. 
The New Order government set about rebuilding the banking system and opening up 
the economy. Two main objectives were to stop inflation through tight fiscal/monetary 
control and to create a banking system that could have an active role in supporting 
development. Because one goal was to improve the role of financial intermediaries, the 
central bank switched from a tight direct to an indirect monetary control policy. The removal 
of all foreign capital controls in 1971, after freely converting the rupiah starting in 1968, was a 
part of the reforms. Since then, Indonesia has adopted monetary and financial policies 
consistent with free capital mobility. 
The indirect monetary control policy was challenged by the economic recovery effort 
in the late 1960s. The strong pressures, however, came from the huge inflow of oil foreign 
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exchange earnings in FY 1973/74. Under pressure from the large increase in reserves, the 
expansion of bank credit was excessive, even though the requirement for a liquid asset ratio 
was high at 30 percent. The pressure led the central bank to move from indirect to direct 
monetary control policy by implementing a new system incorporating a credit ceiling in April 
1974. After this reform, the development of monetary and financial policies was dampened by 
the role of foreign exchange earnings from oil and LNG. The external shocks in the early 
1980s from the world oil market and international recession brought about the reevaluation of 
the systems. 
A series of monetary policy and financial restructuring began on June 1, 1983. The 
first reform was a continuation of earlier in exchange rate management and fiscal policy 
reforms. The following section discusses the reforms, with emphasis on monetary policy 
change, the money market, and capital market development. 
Monetary Policy Change 
Monetary policy in Indonesia can be classified into two financial regimes characterized 
by different monetary objectives and the use of different policy instruments. The first regime 
covered the period 1974-82. This regime of direct monetary control policy, which was 
dominated by the new credit ceiling and central bank intervention on credit allocation, was 
associated with the high economic growth period led by oil and LNG, and timber exports. 
Financial development, however, did not improve. 
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The second regime related to economic restructuring, for which the monetary reform 
started in June 1983. This regime was characterized by an indirect monetary control policy in 
which development of new monetary instruments based on market operation was introduced. 
This period was associated with a decline in oil and LNG foreign exchange earnings, a 
reorientation of production toward exports, and relatively high economic growth. In contrast 
to the first regime, the financial system under this regime was highly developed. 
Monetary Policy Instruments Monetary instruments are subject to adjustment in 
pursuing monetary objectives when conditions within the economy change. To show the 
occurrence of structural change in the Indonesian economy, monetary instruments are 
reviewed next. 
Credit Ceiling and Credit Policy. The credit ceiling was the dominant monetary 
policy instrument firom 1974 until mid-1983. The instrument was introduced with the 
issuance of the central bank credit policy for state-owned commercial banks. Accompanying 
the credit ceiling, Bank of Indonesia allocated the maximum credit that could be extended to a 
particular economic sector to the state-owned commercial banks. For some economic 
sectors. Bank of Indonesia provided so-called liquidity credit, with interest subsidized for both 
state-owned and private commercial banks. The rationale for using the credit ceiling as a 
means of controlling money supply growth was related to the ineffectiveness of the high-level 
reserve requirement in controlling commercial bank lending expansion. 
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On June 1, 1983, the credit ceiling was removed as a monetary instrument policy. To 
prevent the expansionary effects of the removal of the credit ceiling, the central bank decided 
to reduce the liquidity credit. Sixty percent of the liquidity credit outstanding in March 1983 
would not be allowed for renewal. Furthermore, the reform permitted state-owned 
commercial banks to determine their loan allocations. 
Further policy reform that included changes in credit policy was introduced in January 
1990. With respect to credit policy, the changes are as follows. Liquidity credit would be 
reduced and then phased out starting March 1, 1990. The use of the credit ceiling became 
more specific. The export credit that was introduced to encourage exports was lifted and 
phased out beginning April 1, 1990. This change was related to a GATT reqilirement. The 
reform also required all national banks to allocate a minimum of 20 percent of their loan 
portfolios to small business within one year. The policy replaced subsidized credit programs 
that were abolished through the reform itself Furthermore, the reform required foreign banks 
to allocate 50 percent of their credit portfolios to finance export-oriented activities. 
A new monetary control policy was also introduced. The central bank set legal 
lending limit rules for credit extended by commercial banks. The rules set the amount of 
credit extended by banks to affiliate companies, bank insiders, or single debtors at not more 
than 25 percent of total credits. The policy was intended to provide wide access for credit, 
prevent fiind concentration, and ensure security by diversifying the source of the risks. 
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The Reserve Requirement By moving to a direct monetary control policy in 
1974, reserve requirements became redundant for domestic credit purposes because credit 
ceilings effectively constrained bank lending. Then, in January 1978, the monetary authorities 
reduced the reserve requirement to 15 percent from the previous 30 percent. This policy was 
also implemented to compensate the bank for the loss of deposit interest. With open capital 
movement, the reserve requirement served merely as a control for fiinds placed abroad. To 
prevent capital outflow, the central bank offered to pay interest on excess reserves held up to 
an amount equal to the reserve requirement. The effectiveness of this policy was questioned, 
however, because the real interest rate in Indonesia at that time was negative. 
A very liberal policy regarding this instrument was taken during the rebuilding of the 
banking system in December 1988. The monetary authority further reduced the reserve 
requirement to a unified ratio of 2 percent (from 15 percent) for demand deposits and to 5 
percent for time and regular savings deposits. In addition, Bank of Indonesia imposed a 2 
percent reserve requirement for non-bank financial institution (NBFI) liability. This policy 
was issued when the money market started to develop. In this respect, it seems that the 
monetary authorities did not rely on this instrument to control growth of money supply. The 
instrument was mostly used in the first five years of indirect monetary control policy, together 
with other monetary instruments such as open market operations. 
Interest Rates In the period 1974-82, Indonesia adopted a dual interest rate 
structure. The system was adopted because the government did not allow state-owned 
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commercial banks to set interest rates for deposits or loans, whereas private commercial banks 
were not subjected to these regulations. Under normal conditions, the policies provide some 
advantages to private banks. However,with no deposit insurance, security considerations, and 
the low-level banking habit, the movement of private savings into private banks was 
prevented. During the period, the central bank adopted a policy to keep interest rates low. 
Bank of Indonesia engaged in policies such as direct interest rate subsidiesthrough liquidity 
credit. These policies were associated with the excessive foreign exchange earnings from oil 
and LNG exports in the early 1970s. 
The oil boom in this period had a significant effect on money supply in the Indonesian 
economy. The increase in government revenues due to oil price increases improved the 
government's ability to borrow funds from abroad. This period could be called the period of 
easy money. Another effect of the huge foreign exchange earnings was the conversion of 
foreign-exchange-financed government expenditures, which increased money supply. Overall, 
circumstances did not encourage private fund mobilization through the banking system and 
instead led to private savings in the form of gold, land, and foreign exchange. 
When the price of oil and other export commodities began to fall in the early 1980s, 
the monetary and financial sectors were unable to respond to support development and 
mobilize private fimds. This situation forced the government to reform monetary and financial 
policies. As part of the financial reform package on June 1, 1983, the central bank lifted most 
interest rate controls on state-owned banks, which allowed state-owned commercial banks to 
choose their deposit and loan interest rates. The removal of the dual interest rate system 
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created an incentive for commercial banks to compete for public. The new environment was 
expected to generate savings in the form of the rupiah. Based on this interest rate 
liberalization, Binhadi and Meek (1992) have concluded that monetary policy was focused 
operationally on short-term domestic interest rates. 
Discount Window Facilities Underthe Soekamo regime, the central bank had 
little need to use discount windows when commercial banks experienced temporary reserve 
shortages. Instead, Bank of Indonesia provided liquidity credit to counter this reserve 
problem. As Ahmad (1993) has argued, Bank of Indonesia transferred its function from 
lender of last resort to lender of first resort during the period 1974-82. 
By February 1984, Bank of Indonesia introduced two new discount window facilities 
to deal with reserve shortages in its movement back to lender of last resort. The first facility 
provided credit for liquidity purposes, initially for a period of two weeks, for amounts up to 5 
percent of each bank's deposits. The initial discount rate, set at 17.5 percent, was considered 
a penalty rate to discourage refinancing of maturing liquid credits; however, assistance could 
be renewed at a higher interest rate for a total of four weeks. The second window facility was 
created to encourage banks to make term loans. This facility provided a two-month initial 
term limit to defend against inadequate deposit growth and permitted extensions at higher 
rates for a maximum of four months. Access, however, was limited to 3 percent of a bank's 
deposits. Banks that borrowed fiinds at either window had to submit their promissory notes 
to Bank of Indonesia as evidence of indebtedness (Binhadi and Meek, 1992). The aims of this 
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policy were to encourage banks to increase their dependence on deposits and discourage their 
reliance on the central bank. In addition, exessive use of these facilities signalled bank failure 
or poor management. 
Open Market Operation The absence of domestic government securities in 
Indonesia's economy and undeveloped money and capital markets caused ineffective use of 
open market operation. Use of this instrument dealt mostly with foreign exchange rate market 
interventions. For purposes of controlling money growth, open market operation played a 
relatively small role in the presence of the credit ceiling in the period 1974-82. 
When the monetary authorities decided to move from direct to indirect monetary 
control policy in June 1983, they left no effective instrument for controlling the growth of the 
money supply, except by increasing the reserve requirement. Instead of using this alternative, 
the central bank improved the effectiveness of its operation by introducing new money market 
instruments such as central bank certificates, known as Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (SBI), in 
February 1984, and new money market security such as a bank-endorsed instrument known, 
as Surat Berharga Pasar Uang (SBPU), in February 1985. With more instruments. Bank of 
Indonesia could have a more active operation. 
EfTectiveness and Competition in the Banking System Commercial banks, 
especially state-owned banks, faced no competitive challenges as a result of highly direct 
monetary control policies in the period 1974-82. Moreover, they had no incentive to improve 
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even their operational efficiency. The only way to compete in the financial market was 
through interest rates. The system also created barriers to entry that isolated the urban, or 
formal credit market from the rural or informal credit market. Too few banks served too 
many consumers. The only financial intermediary servicing the more developed rural areas 
was the village unit of Bank Rakyat Indonesia, a state-owned commercial bank that 
specialized in small agricultural credit and support for government projects in rural areas. 
During this period, state-owned banks dominated credit markets, and private banks found 
themselves able to serve only a relatively small market of private borrowers, in part because 
state-owned enterprises were restricted from investing in private banks. 
The economic problems that Indonesia faced demanded far more active and effective 
monetary policies. In response to this challenge, the government introduced a broad set of 
financial reforms on October 27, 1988. A main objective of these reforms was to promote 
competition within the banking system. The new regulations allowed new entry and 
expansion of bank activities and gave more banks autonomy in decision making. The reforms 
provided new opportunities for engaging in practically all aspects of financial activities. As 
new licensing for domestic banP.s was opened, foreign banks that had been operating in 
Indonesia were permitted to open branches in major provincial cities. The licensing 
requirements for new joint ventures between foreign and domestic banks were also relaxed. 
The reforms removed most regulations that benefited state-owned commercial banks. 
For instance, state-owned enterprises were now allowed to place up to 50 percent of their 
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deposits with private national commercial banks. This new environment forced commercial 
banks to improve their operational efficiency and their ability to attract customers. 
Central Bank Supervision The rapid expansion of banks, branches, and assets 
after the first monetary and financial policy reforms increased the importance of Bank of 
Indonesia's supervision as a means of ensuring the soundness of banks, especially in an 
economy with no deposit insurance. The quality of a bank's portfolio and the adequacy of its 
management became the concern of the monetary authorities. Part of this concern arose fi^om 
the competitive attitudes within the banking system resulting fi^om the removal of interest rate 
and credit control, combined with the new entry regulations. 
In response to these new challenges. Bank of Indonesia introduced regulations on 
supervision on February 28,1991. An important element of the reform was the new 
guidelines for capital adequacy linked to the Bank for International Settlement standards. With 
these guidelines. Bank of Indonesia mandated higher risk-adjusted capital requirements to be 
phased in during 1992 and 1993. First, banks were required to have capital equal to 5 percent 
of their risk-weighted assets by March 1992, increasing to 7 percent by March 1993. By the 
end of December 1993, banks had to fulfill an 8 percent capital adequacy requirement. Other 
important elements included: (1) new levels of mandatory provisioning based on asset quality; 
(2) new public reporting requirements; (3) a prohibition on lending for securities trading and 
limits on margin trading in the foreign exchange market; (4) limits on a bank's net open 
position on its swaps v^th Bank of Indonesia to 20 percent of equity; (5) tightening of lending 
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limits to include on- and ofF-balance sheet items; (6) minimum experience requirements for 
bank directors;and (7) a minimum soundness rating before opening new domestic or foreign 
branches. 
Because the financial system had been restructured, the banking law enacted in 1967 
could no longer accommodate bank development. In response, the government passed a new 
banking law in October 1992. 
Money Market Development 
There aresignificant differences in the Indonesian money market between the periods 
1974-82 and 1983- to the present. In addition to the three money market instruments 
introduced in the first period, three new money market instruments were introduced in the 
second period. Not only do the number of money market components differ, so do the 
activities of the markets themselves. In the process of economic restructuring, two financial 
reforms had a significant influence on the Indonesian money market. The first reform was 
introduced in June 1983, followed by a second stage of policy changes in February 1984 and 
February 1985, when SBIs and SBPUs were created. These instruments were expected to be 
used by the central bank in open market operation to reduce or increase bank liability after 
removal of the credit ceiling. 
The second reform was introduced in October 1988. Even though this reform was 
intended to liberalize banking operations, the money market was included with respect to 
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money market instruments and participants. To analyze the changes in the money market, the 
six money market instruments are reviewed in the following sections. 
Negotiable Certificates of Deposit The first instrument in Indonesia's money 
market is the negotiable certificate of deposit (NCD), introduced in 1971. The NCD is issued 
in bearer form and is legally transferable to another party prior to maturity. Lack of a 
secondary market for NCDs, however, eliminated the possibility of transfer from party to 
party prior to maturity. The tight interest rate controls adopted by the central bank in the 
period 1974-82 gave NCDs an even less important role in the market. 
The reform implemented on June 1, 1983, brought a new perspective to this market 
instrument. Interest liberalization measures encouraged competition among financial 
institutions licensed to issue NCDs. Before October 27, 1988, a limited number of private 
national commercial banks were authorized to issue NCDs, but NBFIs such as investment 
finance companies (IPCs) and development finance companies (DFCs) were not yet licensed. 
Eligibility to issue NCDs was part of the October 1988 reform, which liberalized the issuance 
of NCDs by eliminating the licensing requirement for all banks and for NBFIs as well. 
Furthermore, the reform empowered state and private savings banks and private development 
banks to issue NCDs. The new maturity for NCDs allowed in the reform ranged from thirty 
days to twenty-four months. The limit on the amount of NCDs issued by a bank that other 
banks could hold was removed. However, the new tax on interest received by depositors 
subjected interest on NCDs to a 15 percent withholding tax. 
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The Interbank Money Market One of the main functions of money markets is to 
provide a source of short-term funds to those needing quick liquidity. The interbank call loan 
market, started in April 1974, fulfilled this function. Excluding Bank of Indonesia, the four 
groups of banks in the banking system- state-owned and private national commercial banks, 
foreign banks, and regional banks —participated in the interbank call loan market. As is the 
case for NCDs, there is no broker participation in this market. All interbank lending is 
negotiated directly by the parties involved and transacted through Jakarta Clearing House. 
Interest rates in the call loan market have been freely set by market forces and have generally 
been quite volatile. The only restriction in the market was the ceiling on interbank loans 
equivalent to 15 percent of a bank's non-bank liabilities. 
the June 1983 reform affected the development of this market instrument. The 
elimination of most interest rate controls on state-owned commercial banks improved 
mobilization of funds in the economy. All banks competed to improve their deposit position 
to support their lending fund requirement. However, private depositors preferred to put their 
savings in state owned commercial banks, which were considered safer in the absence of 
deposit insurance. In contrast, borrowers preferred to borrow from private banks, which had 
quicker and simpler lending procedures. The imbalance between deposit mobilization and 
lending capability of both types of bank significantly influenced the market. State-owned 
banks became net lenders and private and foreign banks become net borrowers. The October 
27, 1988, reform removed the interbank loan ceiling. 
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The Commercial Paper Market Commercial papers (CPs) in the Indonesian 
money market are NBFI papers. NBFIs here include DFCs and IPCs. DFCs are intended to 
assist various types of development processes, while IFCs perform similar activities to those 
of a merchant bank. The issuance of CP was established in 1976, and the CP market has been 
largely unregulated since it was established. The sequence of financial reform, however, has 
had indirect effects on the market. As a source of NBFI fiinds, the CP market decreased in 
importance when the government introduced SBPUs in February 1985 and allowed some 
NBFIs to accept deposits based on the October 1988 reform. 
The Surat Berharga Bank Indonesia Market The first of the three money market 
instruments established in the period of the economic restructuring from 1983 to the present 
was the SBI market. It became operational in February 1984. The SBI, or Bank of Indonesia 
Certificate, is the central bank's debt paper. Some deficiencies in the market, however, still 
needed to be removed. There was no secondary market for SBIs. Moreover, SBIs could not 
be redeemed prior to maturity. These weaknesses were removed when the central bank 
appointed Firoconvest, an NBFI, as a market maker for SBIs in August 1985. Other 
improvements were accomplished through reforms. For instance, along with the reduction of 
the reserve requirement from 15 percent to 2 percent in October 1988, the central bank 
required all commercial banks to purchase a specific amount of 3- and 6-month SBIs at fixed 
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interest rates to offset 80 percent of the funds released. Before this policy, implemented in 
July 1987, the SBI operation system was changed from a trading system to an auction system. 
The issuance of SBIs was based on several considerations. First, the lack of an active 
domestic asset to absorb excess liquidity in commercial banks led commercial banks to keep 
foreign exchange assets against the risk of a possible devaluation of the rupiah. The second 
was the need for instruments for open market operation. With this instrument, banks could 
now absorb excess reserves at their own initiative. The third consideration was to expand the 
money market toward the process of financial deepening. Overall, it could be argued that the 
absence of government domestic debt is one of major reasons for creating this instrument. 
The Surat Berharga Pasar Uang Market After almost a year of issuing SBIs, 
Bank of Indonesia faced the need for a more flexible instrument for conducting open market 
operations to inject reserves into the banking system. Excessive capital outflow in September 
1984 caused the money market to experience reserve drain shocks. This incident was 
considered an indication that SBIs did not work as an effective instrument for open market 
operation. In response, a new bank-endorsed instrument known as SBPU, which could be 
purchased to supply reserve, was introduced on February 1, 1985. Another consideration in 
creating the SBPU was to broaden the interbank money market and provide a better money 
market infrastructure. 
As money market securities, SBPUs are CP, endorsed either by banks or by NBFIs, 
that are discountable at Bank of Indonesia. SBPUs could be one of the following: (1) a 
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promissory note issued by customers of eligible banks or NBFIs to finance a specific 
transaction; (2) a promissory note issued by eligible banks or NBFI to borrow in the interbank 
money market; (3) a draft or banker acceptance drawn by customers and accepted by eligible 
banks or NBFIs; or (4) a draft drawn by one business and accepted by a customer of a bank or 
NBFIs. Firoconvest was appointed to create a market for this instrument. Like the SBI 
system, the SBPU operation system was changed fi-om a trading system to an auction system 
on July 23, 1987. One difference between the SBPU and the CP markets is that the SBPU 
market has been influenced by the central bank with respect to the amount of SBPUs held and 
rediscounted at Firoconvest. Other differences are that SBPUs are endorsed by a bank or 
NBFI, while CPs are not, and that CPs are not used for monetary control purposes, while 
SBPUs are used as an open market operation to influence bank reserve and are not subject to 
a reserve requirement. 
The Repurchase Agreements Market The activity of the repurchase agreements 
(RPs) market in the Indonesian money market started in 1983. The nature of RP markets is 
similar to the market in the United States and in other East Asian countries. State-owned 
commercial banks rarely participate in this market. The main borrowers are DFCs, IPCs, 
private banks, and foreign banks. Bank of Indonesia participates in the market through its 
open market operation. The operation of this market has been affected by the introduction of 
SBIs and SBPUs; they both are additional instruments for RPs. 
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The RP market is not subject to heavy official regulation. The reserve requirement 
imposed on NBFIs in October 1988 had a significant effect on this market. Bank of 
Indonesia's monetary policy, whether pursuing a tight or easy money policy, influences the RP 
market. 
Other Development Policy To support the development of the money market, the 
government regulations and reforms, included liberalization of private overseas borrowing. 
The objective of these policies was to bring money market activity from overseas foreign 
exchange markets to domestic rupiah money market activities. 
Even though a free capital movement policy was sadopted in 1971, the government 
still imposed upper limits on overseas borrowing for private business. In March 1989, the 
government decided to lift the ceiling and replace it with a daily net open position limit of 25 
percent of financial institution capital. This regulatiormiandated that the amount of total 
foreign exchange held can not be more than 25 percent of the financial institution's capital. 
The regulation was accompanied by a change in foreign exchange transactions, from same-day 
settlement to two-day settlement. Combined with the gradual adjustment in exchange rate 
between the rupiah and the US dollar, the reforms were expected to reduce short-term 
movement in and out of foreign exchange as a means of liquidity management by banks. 
This liberalization of private overseas borrowing, however, opened the possibility of 
speculation in the money market, in part because of high interest rates in Indonesia. To limit 
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and direct overseas borrowing for productive investments, the government reimposed the 
ceiling on offshore borrowing for public enterprises, including state-owned commercial banks. 
Capital Market Development 
The effort to encourage the development of the capital market in Indonesia, located in 
Jakarta (the capital city), was started in the late 1970s when the government set up agencies 
called Badan Pengembangan Pasar Modal (Bapepam) to manage and regulate the stock 
exchange, and Danareksa, a government-owned corporation, to underwrite new issuances 
and offer investment units to the public. The primary objectives of this effort were to increase 
public participation in the capital market and to broaden Indonesian ownership of foreign joint 
ventures operating in Indonesia. Unfortunately, the capital market was inactive from 1980 
through 1988. 
The government took steps to activate the capital market with a package of measures 
in December 1987 as part of economic restructuring. This reform allowed foreign investors to 
participate in buying and selling of up to 49 percent of the capital issued in the capital market. 
Price controls on the exchange were lifted and regulations were introduced including licensing 
requirements for brokers, dealers, and others in capital market supporting professions. The 
regulations also included clearer procedures for the issuance of new stocks and authorized 
over-the-counter trade. Moreover, financial institutions were allowed to issue shares to the 
public. 
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The second set of regulations was introduced in December 1988. Besides setting 
important capital market provisions, private securities exchanges were allowed. The priority 
to underwrite 50 percent of all new issuances was removed from Danareksa, and joint-
venture firms in newly authorized financial services were authorized to have up to 85 percent 
foreign participation. In November 1989, private securities companies were admitted to 
underwrite new issuaces. 
Trade Policy and Investment Regulation 
Dombush (1990) has argued that two factors are needed to move from stabilization 
toward growth. First, the adjustment-induced pricing of resources has to be competitive by 
international standards. Second, incentives should be available to save and to keep savings at 
home. With these two factors in place, development will depend on building confidence in the 
domestic economy. One factor that can bring this confidence is a positive perception of the 
domestic production and investment climates. 
Economic restructuring seems to have moved the Indonesian in the direction 
suggested by Dombush. Trade policy reformsand deregulation in investment procedure, 
complemented by macroeconomic stability, have greatly contributed a major role in promoting 
broad-based growth and diversification in the economy. A series of trade reforms and 
deregulation measures were introduced to eliminate the high-cost economy and to enhance 
international competitiveness of domestic tradable goods. In addition, the investment 
deregulations were introduced to encourage both foreign and domestic investment by 
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providing new incentives and opening more sectors for new investment. Both major changes 
in trade and investment policies are reviewed in the following section. 
Trade Policy Change 
Indonesian trade policies have played a role in supporting both an inward- and 
outward-oriented economy. The first task for the Soeharto government upon taking power 
was to restructure the economy, moving away from an inward-looking economy. As 
Indonesia experienced plentiful supplies of foreign exchange earnings from oil and gas, some 
policies remained to protect domestic industries. Trade polices such as nontarifF barriers 
(NTBs) and tariffs were used extensively for protection purposes. Raising government 
revenue was not a major objective. 
The drastic decrease in foreign exchange earnings from oil and gas exports forced 
Indonesia to move away from its high dependence on oil and gas foreign exchange earnings 
for development purposes. To support an export-oriented economy, trade policy reforms 
were introduced. The government gradually moved toward using tariflFs as the primary tool 
for protecting domestic industry. This move is the centerpiece of trade reform in Indonesia. 
Some changes were introduced to encourage non-oil and non-LNG export, and others were 
adopted to restrict exports of raw materials and to encourage domestic processing firms and 
protect natural resources. 
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NontarifT Barriers NTBs have had two purposes in Indonesian trade policy; to 
protect domestic industries and to reduce or discourage imports. NTBs that fulfilled the first 
purpose were adopted during the oil boom period, 1973-82. NTBs implmented for the latter 
purpose were introduced mostly at the end of the oil boom and continued to the period 1983-
86. Most quantitative restrictions on imports in Indonesia were imposed through import bans, 
import licensing, explicit quotas, and deletion programs. Such policies, however, contributed 
to rising costs in the economy. As a result, Indonesia's tradable goods could not compete in 
the international market. 
As part of Indonesia's economic restructuring, gradual removal of NTBs in favor of 
tariffs was introduced in a series of seven reforms implemented between October 25, 1986, 
and July 1992. On October 25, 1986, there were more than 1,700 tariff items under NTBs, 
covering 40 percent of total import value and about 68 percent of manufactured production. 
By July 1992, the government had removed 239 tariflF items under NTBs and reduced the 
number of NTBs to 464 tariff items, covering about 13 percent of total import value and 
about 31 percent of manufactured production (GATT, 1991; Republik Indonesia, 1993). 
The high costs within the economy were the main factor for removing NTBs. The 
policy had three beneficial effects on the pattern of incentives. First, the movement toward 
tariffs as a means of protecting domestic industry substantially increased the transparency of 
the trade regime. Second, by rectifying efficiency, the policy improved the terms of trade. 
Lastly, the policy encouraged domestic production of previously imported goods, especially 
input materials, to become more cost and quality conscious. On the other hand, the policy 
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was expected to support domestic export production by reducing import prices and delivery 
time, and improving the quality of input materials. 
Tariff Changes With the relaxation of licensing restrictions, tariffs began playing a 
more important role in determining the level and pattern of imports. To open the economy, 
the government made some adjustments in tarification in a series of reforms between 1985 and 
1992. Tables 2.1. and 2.2. summarize the tariff changes from 1985 to 1990. 
In response to a GATT-sponsored initiative to convert all member countries to a 
standard system for classifying traded goods, a second important change in the tariff scheme 
was announced on January 1, 1989, in which Indonesia moved from the Customs Cooperative 
Council Nomenclacture (CCCN) classification system to the harmonized system. One 
objective of moving to this new system was to continue within the basic structure of the tariff 
schedule. With this change, the government took the opportunity to reduce the number of 
tariff positions with specific duties from 498 under the 1988 CCCN schedule to 19 under the 
1989 harmonized system. Most of the specific duties were replaced with advalorem rates in 
the 50 percent to 60 percent range. However, the adverse consequence of this new system 
was increased useof import surcharges and split tariffs in the system. 
Export Incentives The most important trade reform with regard to export 
incentives was the creation of a duty exemption and drawback facility in the May 6, 1986, 
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Table. 2.1. The Structure of Indonesian tariffs. 
Tariff Rates Total Tariff Items 
(percent) 1985 (CCCN) 1989 (HS) 
0 278 714 
5 1130 2094 
10 571 753 
15 235 406 
20 607 893 
30 785 1634 
40 424 571 
50 4207 581 
60 150 1371 
80 
100 !7 86 
200 2 29 
Specific charge 521 19 
Total 4927 9154 
Source: GATT (1991). 
Table. 2.2. The structure of import duty tariff for industrial products 
Import Duty Tariff Total TarifiF Items 
(percent) Before May 1990 After May 1990 
0 - 1 0  2956 2908 
15-20 1036 1116 
25-30 1431 1706 
35-40 447 1284 
45-60 1505 88 
>60 103 74 
Total 7431 7176 
Source: GATT (1991). 
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reform. To administer the scheme, the government created a new government body, known 
as Pusat Pengelolaan Pembebasan dan Pengembalian BeaMasuk, in the Ministry of Finance. 
The drawback facility was initially limited to firms that exported at least 85 percent of 
production. This restriction was eased by the December 1987 reform in which the export 
requirement was reduced to 65 percent of production. With this reform, the scheme was also 
expanded to incorporate foreign-aided public sector projects. 
Another important policy component of export incentives was the condition of a pre-
shipment export finance guarantee and export credit insurance. These measures were 
available to all firms involved in non-oil and non-LNG exports. With this policy, the 
government provided an interest rate subsidy to encourage exports. In line with the financial 
sector reforms and as a consequence of signing the GATT Code on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties in early 1985, the government was forced to remove its export 
certificate incentive scheme by April 1986. 
Export Restrictions and Control In contrast to the removal of NTBs on imports, 
export restrictions and control have been expanded since the mid-1980s. The government 
extended export bans in 1988. As a consequence, export restrictions covered about 27 
percent of total tradable goods by 1989, while export control covered about 75 percent of 
mining output including oil and gas, 18 percent of agricultural products, and 13 percent of 
manufacturing products excluding oil and gas. Overall, three-quarters of Indonesia's 
merchandise exports are regulated in some way (GATT, 1991). 
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Export restrictions in Indonesia have been implemented in the form of bans or 
prohibitions, licensing arrangements, quotas, and taxes. The restrictions have had significant 
effects on the structure of price incentives and the allocation of resources, particularly in 
natural-resources-based industries such as forestry. In addition to the export restrictions, 
Indonesia also applies export controls (e.g., export quality control in primary industry). 
Another policy regarding export restrictions affected by the reform was the export 
identification number. The December 1987 reform lifted this licensing requirement. Since 
then, the only legal identity needed to export is the possession of a trading license (SUEP) 
issued by the Ministry of Trade. Because the license is only available to domestic companies, 
however, other firms must have business licenses issued by the relevant government 
department. 
Investment Deregulation 
Investment regulations in Indonesia are based on two investment laws that reflect the 
classification of investment in Indonesia. The foreign investment law, enacted in January 
1967, applies to all firms wdth less than 100 percent domestic equity, operating under the 
jurisdiction of the Capital Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM). The second law is the 
domestic investment law, enacted in November 1968. These laws offer a wide range of 
incentives for both foreign and domestic investors, mostly incentives are in the form of 
reduced or eliminated taxes such as duty exemptions on approved capital imports and raw 
materials. 
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In addition to these two laws, the government issued the Investment Priority List for 
the first time in February 1977. The list had a significant impact, especially on foreign 
investment. Another important step was the simplification and centralization of administrative 
procedures in October 1978 whereby BKPM offered "one-stop-service." 
Indonesia has experienced two types of investment climate concerning both domestic 
and foreign investments. In the period 1974-82, government policy made fewer efforts to 
invite foreign investments, possibly because of the massive supply of foreign exchange 
earnings fi"om oil exports. As Pangestu (1991) has indicated, four factors discouraged foreign 
investment to Indonesia during this period. First, ownership regulations required that foreign 
investment firms transfer a 51 percent equity share to domestic investors within ten years. 
Second, the "closed sectors" list was expanded, which reduced the number of sectors open to 
foreign investors. Third, the government reduced tax incentives such as the tax holiday 
policy. Lastly, regulation regarding the employment of expatriates became more restrictive. 
The new era of investment regulation was introduced in response to the change in 
foreign exchange earnings from oil and gas. Indonesia moved to a more liberal approach. The 
first reform was introduced in 1985 and primarily concerned administrative procedure. The 
second reform, introduced in May 1986, brought about fundamental change from the foreign 
investment perspective. This reform included (1) treating foreign investment firms with 75 
percent local participation (or 51 percent if a public company) like domestic investment firms 
with regard to access to state banks and domestic distribution rights; (2) making foreign 
investment firms that export at least 85 percent of their production eligible to invest in all 
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sectors; (3) allowing the equity requirement of 20 percent for the local partner to be paid in 
installments over the first five years (for high risks or high-technology projects, the local 
equity requirement could be reduced as" low as 5 percent; (4) allowing reinvestment of the 
foreign investment firm's profits in their owned activities or in domestic investment firms as far 
as the sector is open to investment; (5) giving foreign investment companies that make 
additional investment an extension on their foreign investment licenses; and (6) reducing the 
minimum investment requirement of US $1 million for some activities such as consultancies 
(Hill, 1988). 
The expectation was that foreign investment would contribute more to economic 
development, and new incentives announced on December 24, 1987, made Indonesia more 
attractive for foreign investment. Foreign investment companies with the majority of shares 
owned by Indonesians or with 20 percent of the company shares in the local stock exchange 
would be treated as domestic companies. For instance, they would have the same access to 
state-owned bank credit as domestic companies. Divestment rules were relaxed and time 
limits for domestic majority ownership were extended to 15 years, in some cases 20 years, 
compared with the previous 10-years limits. Jointventures in bonded zones would be 
permitted and could be continued with 95 percent foreign ownership for the lifetime of the 
project if the production was mostly for export purposes. 
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The Indonesia Economy Adjustment Progress and Structural Change 
The following sections focus on Indonesian economic and policy performance. The 
first section reviews the performance of fiscal adjustment with an emphasis on the 
performance of tax reforms and the pattern of government expenditures. The second reviews 
the performance of monetary and financial policies. The third section reviews the 
performance of BOP and international trade policies. The overall purpose of the discussion is 
to show the structural changes in the Indonesian economy induced by policy changes. 
Fiscal Policy Performance 
The uncertainty of oil and gas foreign exchange revenues brought about some 
rethinking of the central government's budget policy. Fluctuations in oil and gas prices in the 
early 1980s forced the government to restructure fiscal policies. Major reforms in the tax 
system were implemented in 1984. On the expenditure side, a tight budget policy was 
implemented in 1983. 
On the revenue side, the performance of fiscal policy measures was considered 
asuccess. The overall NOTR/GDP ratio improved. Table 2.3 presents measures of the 
performance of fiscal policies in generating government revenue firom FY 1969/70 through FY 
1990/91. These measures show that the structure of overall central government revenues 
changed in FY 1983/84. Even though oil and gas revenues were still dominant, they started to 
decline in FY 1983/84. Revenue share from oil and gas decreased fi^om 57 percent in FY 
1982/83 to 52 percent in FY 1983/84with respect to total government revenue and from 14 
per cent in FY1982/83 to 12 per cent in FY 1983/84 with respect to GDP at current prices. 
NOTR relative to total government revenue was down in FY 1982/83, but has gradually 
improved since then. The NOTR/GDP ratio, however, declined in FY 1982/83, remained 
stable in FY 1983/84, and then increased in FY 1985/86. This trend shows the result of the 
tax reform started in 1984. Development receipts show an increasing trend starting in 
FYl 982/83 and continue at that level for both total revenue and GDP. Maintaining the 
Table 2.3. Components of central government revenue, 1969/70-1990/91. 
Fiscal OGR NOTR DR OGR NOTR DR 
Year (% of Total Revenue) (% of GDP at current prices) 
1969/70 19.66 53.15 27.19 2.42 6.55 3.35 
1970/71 47.13 21.43 25.94 3.06 7.51 3.70 
1971/72 24.97 44.72 24.05 3.83 7.82 3.69 
1972/73 30.80 39.97 21.08 5.05 7.89 3.49 
1973/74 32.62 41.06 17.40 5.66 8.67 3.02 
1974/75 48.20 29.25 11.68 8.94 7.44 2.17 
1975/76 45.66 27.28 17.98 9.87 7.86 3.89 
1976/77 44.32 25.59 21.24 10.57 8.22 5.07 
1977/78 45.23 27.86 17.95 10.24 8.34 4.06 
1978/79 43.55 28.68 19.53 10.15 8.61 4.55 
1979/80 52.73 22.75 17.10 13.30 7.61 4.31 
1980/81 59.89 19.86 12.74 15.45 7.06 3.29 
1981/82 61.97 18.71 12.28 15.97 6.64 3.16 
1982/83 56.90 21.48 13.51 13.64 7.09 3.24 
1983/84 51.98 20.19 21.20 12.26 6.32 5.00 
1984/85 53.81 21.17 17.94 11.62 6.10 3.88 
1985/86 48.82 26.91 15.65 11.51 8.37 3.69 
1986/87 28.95 40.05 26.27 6.18 9.56 5.61 
1987/88 37.27 35.52 22.84 8.07 8.64 4.94 
1988/89 28.87 38.22 30.28 6.70 9.48 7.03 
1989/90 29.48 41.07 24.70 6.72 10.44 5.63 
1990/91 35.82 37.01 20.03 8.96 11.04 5.01 
Note. OGR stands for Oil and Gas Government Revenue, and 
DR stands for Development Receipts. 
Source; Republik Indonesia. 
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momentum of development is a possible reason for increasing the role of development 
receipts. This implies that borrowing compensated for the decrease in the role of oil and gas 
revenues, which was necessary because the government was committed to keeping a 
"balanced" budget. 
Table 2.4 provides greater detail on the performance of the tax system reform and the 
effect of trade policy reform on government revenues. Income tax revenue dominated other 
tax revenues until FY 1984/85, and even then it still had a major role in NOTR. The role of 
income tax was replaced by the VAT Package in FY 1985/86 as expected and designed. The 
land and building taxes declined in the first year of implementation of the law, but 
havegradually increased since then. Concerning the NOTR/GDP ratio and the previous 
discussion, the role of NOTR in the revenue structure has increased significantly and is 
expected to continue to increase. The figure on international trade taxes such as tariffs, 
import duties, and export taxes reflects Indonesia's import-export performance. The import 
tariff revenue started to decline in FY 1982/83 and fell drastically in FY 1985/86, before 
increasing and remaining level. The most dramatical change is shown by the export tax 
revenues started in FY 1982/83. Import duties began to decrease in FY 1985/86, whichcould 
be interpreted as an effect of the major trade policy reform started in May 1986. It is clear, 
then, that the turning point in the change in revenue structure occurred in FY 1983/84. The 
central shift in the structure of NOTR is the movement to the VAT Package as a dominant 
source of government revenue. This revenue-side shift was accompanied by a change in the 
expenditure pattern. 
53 
Table. 2.4 Components of non-oil tax renenues, 1969/70-1992/93. (percent of NOTR) 
Fiscal Income VAT/b Tariff Import Export Land and Others /d 
Year Tax/a Duties Tax Building Tax /c 
1969/70 24.60 17.73 33.01 18.36 4.23 0.06 2.00 
1970/71 22.15 17.62 30.66 16.45 11.10 0.04 1.99 
1971/72 26.17 17.88 26.71 15.55 10.82 0.08 2.81 
1972/73 27.17 19.14 22.49 14.53 10.05 4.73 2.06 
1973/74 9.25 24.17 29.42 14.16 15.74 4.59 2.67 
1974/75 30.94 21.07 22.00 10.19 9.63 3.90 2.26 
1975/76 34.62 21.70 19.69 11.01 6.97 4.06 1.94 
1976/77 33.15 22.96 22.34 11.34 5.35 3.84 1.02 
1977/78 34.91 22.04 19.88 12.60 5.63 3.85 1.09 
1978/79 34.95 19.63 16.72 14.32 9.41 3.85 1.12 
1979/80 35.22 14.64 14.08 14.51 17.29 3.32 0.94 
1980/81 38.46 15.93 15.49 15.14 10.55 3.18 1.24 
1981/82 42.09 16.44 16.51 16.75 3.96 3.06 1.18 
1982/83 44.76 18.56 13.69 16.27 2.16 2.95 1.61 
1983/84 43.98 18.91 12.68 17.60 2.37 3.30 1.17 
1984/85 40.30 18.34 11.07 18.22 1.90 3.77 2.40 
1985/86 34.96 35.16 9.18 14.26 0.76 3.39 2.29 
1986/87 29.70 37.93 12.56 13.81 1.03 2.49 2.49 
1987/88 30.34 38.62 10.69 12.59 2.09 3.13 2.54 
1988/89 33.16 37.83 10.01 11.67 1.31 3.56 2.45 
1989/90 35.58 37.84 10.29 9.57 l.il 3.83 1.79 
1990/91 34.26 37.84 12.61 9.72 0.22 4.11 1.23 
1991/92 39.82 37.10 8.87 9.24 0.08 3.64 1.26 
1992/93/e 37.89 38.24 10.54 8.46 0.21 3.43 1.23 
/a. Until 1983/84 consists of income tax, corporate tax, and witholding tax 
Until 1984/85, consists of sales tax and sales tax on import. 
/c. Until 1985/86, consists of iuran pembangunan daerah and property tax. 
/d. Consists of stamp duties. 
/e. Budget. 
Source: Republik Indonesia. 
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The Indonesian government adopted a dynamic budget policy, while maintaining a 
balanced budget policy. On the expenditure side, the ratio of total expenditure to GDP has 
shown little change, even though a tight budget policy was implemented in May 1983 in 
response to the change in oil and gas revenues. A significant change, however, occurred in 
the government expenditure pattern, starting in FY 1983/84. 
Table 2.5 shows that both non-debt routine and departmental development 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP have fallen since FY 1983/84, while debt routine and 
project development expenditures have risen significantly. The decline in departmental 
development expenditures reflected the tight budget policy. The change in non-debt 
Table.2.5. Components of central government expenditure 1975/76-1992/93 
(percent of GDP), 
Fiscal Routine Expenditure Development Expenditure 
Year Non Debt Debt Department Regional Project Other 
1975/76 9.92 0.62 3.05 1.85 3.73 2.43 
1976/77 9.32 1.22 3.81 1.84 5.00 2.62 
1977/78 10.09 1.20 3.91 1.92 3.88 1.62 
1978/79 9.71 2.35 3.74 1.89 4.34 1.26 
1979/80 10.55 2.14 4.62 1.71 4.11 2.18 
1980/81 11.04 1.73 5.57 1.78 3.15 2.52 
1981/82 11.19 1.72 5.04 2.10 3.08 2.62 
1982/83 9.63 2.05 5.44 1.82 3.21 1.81 
1983/84 8.12 2.71 4.15 1.86 4.98 1.76 
1984/85 7.41 3.09 3.87 1.70 3.80 1.72 
1985/86 8.91 3.43 4.61 1.55 3.62 1.45 
1986/87 8.29 4.93 1.95 1.43 3.70 1.04 
1987/88 7.45 6.59 1.11 1.07 4.36 1.07 
1988/89 6.90 7.70 1.31 1.05 5.59 0.67 
1989/90 7.40 7.13 1.50 1.03 5.03 0.71 
1990/91 8.40 6.77 2.45 1.52 4.30 0.55 
1991/92 7.39 5.91 2.63 1.74 3.89 1.32 
1992/93 7.32 5.92 3.06 1.96 3.97 0.40 
Source; Bank of Indonesia. 
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expenditures seems to compensate for the rise in debt routine expenditures. One factor that 
contributed to the rise in debt service expenditure and debt repayment was the March 1983 
devaluation. In contrast to the declining expenditures, the project development 
expenditurecontinued to increase. Changes in spending patterns show the impact of reform on 
goverment personal expenditures. Basic salaries of government employees were frozen fi-om 
FY 1985/86 to FY 1988/89. In addition, four economic sector projects—industry, mining and 
energy, transmigration and environmental—suffered a decline in budgetary allocations. Budget 
shares allocated to agriculture, irrigation, and education were not affected. 
The effects of fiscal measures on the central government's budget deficits are 
summarized in Table 2.6. The table shows that the government succeeded in maintaining the 
balanced budget policy. The roles of foreign aid and borrowing continued to increase, despite 
the increase in government savings. The most significant increase occurred in FY 1983/84. 
These figures can be explained as follows. The Soeharto government continued to show a 
strong commitment to the balanced budget policy, both during the oil boom and in the much 
tighter fiscal climate. The decline in world oil prices in the 1980s led to a sharp decline in 
revenue accruing to the government from oil taxes. To compensate for the drastic decline in 
revenue, the government was forced to increase foreign borrowing and aid in order to keep a 
balanced budget. The key feature of the balanced budget policy is to manage any deficit or 
foreign loans at an acceptable level and to avoid printing money to finance the deficit. Foreign 
loans were intended to act as a supplement to government saving, not to be a major source of 
financing for development expenditures. 
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Table.2.6. Central Government Budget Summary, (Rp. million) 
Fiscal Domestic Routine Government Development Foreign Balance 
Year Revenue Expenditure Saving Expenditure Aid 
a b c= a-b d e f=c+e-d 
1969/70 243.7 216.5 27.2 118.2 91.0 0.0 
1970/71 344.6 288.2 56.4 169.6 120.4 7.2 
1971/72 428.0 349.1 78.9 195.9 135.5 18.5 
1972/73 590.6 438.1 152.5 298.2 157.8 12.1 
1973/74 967.7 713.3 254.4 450.9 203.9 7.4 
1974/75 1753.7 1016.1 737.6 961.8 232.0 7.8 
1975/76 2241.9 1332.6 909.3 1397.7 491.6 3.2 
1976/77 2906.0 1629.8 1276.2 2054.5 783.8 5.5 
1977/78 3535.4 2148.9 1386.5 2156.8 773.4 3.1 
1978/79 4266,1 2743.7 1522.4 2555.6 1035.5 2.3 
1979/80 6696.8 4061.8 2635.0 4014.2 1381.1 1.9 
1980/81 10227.0 5800.0 4427.0 5916.1 1493.8 4.7 
1981/82 12212.6 6977.6 5235.0 6940.1 1709.0 3.9 
1982/83 12418.3 6996.3 5422.0 7359.6 1940.0 2.4 
1983/84 14432.7 8411.8 6020.9 9899.2 3882.4 4.1 
1984/85 15905.5 9429.0 6476.5 9951.9 3478.0 2.6 
1985/86 19252.8 11951.5 7301.3 10873.1 3572.6 0.8 
1986/87 16140.6 13559.3 2581.3 8332.0 5752.2 1.5 
1987/88 20803.3 17481.5 3321.8 9477.4 6158.0 2.4 
1988/89 23004.3 20739 2265.3 12250.7 9990.7 5.3 
1989/90 28739.8 24331.1 4408.7 13834.3 9429.3 3.7 
1990/91 39546.4 29997.7 9548.7 19452 9904.6 1.3 
1991/92 41584.8 30227.6 11357.2 21764.2 10409.0 2.1 
1992/93 /a 46508.4 33196.6 13311.8 22912.0 9600.2 0.0 
/a Budget 
Source: Republik Indonesia 
beginning of the Soeharto regime that were dampened by the oil boom in 1973-82. These 
reforms were considered a success in terms of mobilizing funds, stabilizing the economy, and 
improving efficiency within banking system. The resuh was a burst of growrth in the economy. 
Structural change occurred in the financial sector as a result of the reforms. Table 2.7 
shows the trends in the monetary ratios from 969/70 through 1992/93. The structure of the 
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money supply changed in FY 1983/84. The composition of domestic liquidity (M2) 
significantly changed. Narrow money declined fi-om 60 percent ofM2 to 51 percent, while 
quasi money increased fi-om 40 percent to 49 percent in the same period. Subsequently, the 
Ml/GDP ratio stabilized and quasi money increased and dominated Ml in influencing M2. 
This can be seen fi-om the growth of Ml and M2, which moved in different directions. The 
changes seem to result from the financial reforms that removed credit and state-owned 
commercial bank interest rate ceilings,and encouraged competition in the banking system. 
The monetization of Indonesia's economy roughly doubled over the first twenty-three 
years of the first long-term (25-years) development program. This is indicated by the 
improvement of Ml, which is used mostly as a means of payments. The Ml/GDP ratio 
increased by about 200 percent during the period. On the other hand, the ratio of quasi 
money to GDP in the same period rose from 2.02 percent to 36 percent. The incremental 
increase in quasi money contributed to most of the growth in domestic liquidity. Quasi money 
consists of time and savings deposits that are primarily longer-term deposits. Its growth 
reflects the improvement in financial savings held in form of claims on the domestic banks. 
However, the growth does not explain the repatriation of claims held abroad. 
High financial growth is expected when economic growth performance is high. The 
quasi money growth, however, does not show a strong relationship with economic growth in 
Indonesia. Cole and Slade (1992) have argued that the high financial growth Indonesia 
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Table: 1.1. Domestic Liquidity (%). 
End of Domestic Liquiditv^ Money Supply/c Quasi Money 
Period /a Total Change Outstanding %of Change Outstanding %of 
(%ofGDP) (%) (%ofGDP) Total (%) (%ofGDP) Total 
1969/70 9.79 67.80 7.77 79.30 61.10 2.02 20.70 
1970/71 11.28 37.30 8.34 74.00 28.20 2.93 26.00 
1971/72 14.92 50.10 9.80 65.70 33.30 5.12 34.30 
1972/73 16.83 40.20 11.61 69.00 47.20 5.21 31.00 
1973/74 17.81 56.20 11.61 65.20 47.90 6.20 34.80 
1974/75 14.79 31.70 9.59 64.80 31.00 5.20 35.20 
1975/76 17.89 36.20 9.89 63.20 39.00 5.76 36.80 
1976/77 18.39 25.80 11.74 63.70 27.10 6.65 36.30 
1977/78 17.21 15.10 11.09 64.50 16.30 6.12 35.50 
1978/79 18.27 26.90 12.31 67.40 32.60 5.96 32.60 
1979/80 18.12 39.60 11.86 65.40 35.60 6.26 34.60 
1980/81 17.40 36.20 11.47 65.90 37.30 5.92 34.10 
1981/82 18.79 28.40 12.54 66.70 29.90 6.25 33.30 
1982/83 20.45 20.60 12.32 60.30 8.90 8.13 39.70 
1983/84 20.29 28.70 10.37 51.20 9.20 9.92 48.90 
1984/85 21.67 23.40 10.01 46.20 11.60 11.65 53.80 
1985/86 24.95 24.30 10.82 43.30 16.50 14.14 56.70 
1986/87 27.78 17.90 11.21 40.40 9.80 16.57 59.60 
1987/88 28.63 25.20 10.14 35.40 9.80 18.50 64.60 
1988/89 31.08 23.90 10.56 34.00 18.90 20.52 66.00 
1989/90 38.43 45.70 13.23 34.40 47.60 25.20 65.60 
1990/91 41.03 26.00 11.92 29.10 6.40 29.11 70.90 
1991/92 44.38 24.20 12.03 27.10 15.90 32.35 72.90 
1992/93 47.95 22.30 11.92 24.90 12.20 36.03 75.10 
/a. Fiscal year ends March 31. 
lb. Consists of Ml and Quasi Money, known as M2 
/c. consists of Currency and Demand Deposit, known as M1. 
/d. consists of Time and Demand Deposits as well as foreign currency deposits 
held by domestic private sector. 
/e. included valuation adjustment of foreign currency deposits amounting to Rp.99 billion, 
/f included valuation adjustment of foreign currency deposits amounting to Rp.620 billion, 
/g. included valuation adjustment of foreign currency deposits amounting to Rp. 1447 
billion 
Source: Bank Indonesia and Central Bureau Statistics. 
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experienced during the oil boom was mainly a result of economic recovery from a long period 
of mismanagement and deterioration. Because the higher financial growth occurred when 
economic growth slowed down, they concluded that Indonesia's financial growth was more a 
result of financial policy measures than of overall economic growth. This implies that savings 
Table.2.8. Factor Affecting Money Supply (Rp. billion). 
End of Net Central Claims on Quasi Net Money 
Period/1 Foreign Government Entities Money Other Supply 
Assets Enterprises 
and 
Individual 
Items Movement 
1973/74 154 -25 470 -180 -165 254 
1974/75 1 23 450 -138 -193 243 
1975/76 -755 17 1273 -277 142 401 
1976/77 445 -387 719 -195 -194 388 
1977/78 590 -293 308 -135 -174 295 
1978/79/a 808 -291 1606 -191 -1243 689 
1979/80 2578 -1180 809 -650 -560 997 
1980/81 2292 -1820 1837 -687 205 1417 
1981/82 -22 -164 2349 -684 -217 1561 
1982/83 /b 229 486 3039 -1492 -1658 604 
1983/84 3299 -2335 2636 -2836 -88 674 
1984/85 2935 -3004 3465 -2755 292 933 
1985/86 1071 1142 3834 -3234 -1326 1487 
1986/87/c 2344 -1475 5568 -3298 -2114 1025 
1987/88 2359 1820* 8200 -6043 -5210* 1126 
1988/89 -179 -120 11931 -6124 -3125 1707 
1989/90 -712 -85 29667 -13054 -8670 7146 
/ I .  F isca l  year  ends  on  March  31 .  
/a. Included an increase from valuation adjustment of balances denominated in 
foreign exchange due to November 15,1978 rupiah devaluation. 
/b. Included an increase from valuation adjustment of balances denominated in 
foreign exchange due to March 30, rupiah devaluation. 
/c. Included an increase from valuation adjustment of balances denominated in 
foreign exchange due to September 12,1986, rupiah devaluation. 
*. The significant change was due to the reconciliation of the foreign loan unused 
by the Government amounting to Rp. 1725 billion which was initially recorded at 
the Government sector, but since September 1987 transferred to net other items. 
Source; Bank of Indonesia. 
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from rising incomes during tlie high economic growth period were presumably invested 
abroad. 
The positive change in quasi money played a more significant role affecting money 
supply starting in FY 1983/84 (Table 2.8). Since then, however, claims on entities, 
enterprises, and individuals have become important expansionary components. The 
expansionary effect of this domestic sector dominated net foreign assets in the creation of 
money. This trend can be interpreted as a result of overall reforms in response to 
macroeconomic imbalances and attempts to spurt economic growth through an export-
oriented economy. 
Despite intensive monetary and financial reforms implemented since June 1983, the 
Indonesian banking system remains highly concentrated, although some progress has been 
achieved to correct this situation. Table 2.9 reflects the development of four groups of 
commercial banks in Indonesia for FY 1978/79 through FY 1989/90. On the basis of assets, 
the share held by private national commercial banks began to increase in FY 1982/83 and has 
continued to increase significantly since then. In contrast, the share of assets held by state-
owned commercial banks and foreign banks decreased, and the share held by regional 
development banks remained unchanged. 
The same pattern of change occurred for loan share in the banking system. Private 
national commercial banks showed an important development after FY 1983/84. Loan share 
Table. 2.9. Total share of assets, loans, and funds by groups of Banks (percent). 
End of Group of Banks 
Period /a State Owned Private Nationall Regional Foreign Banks 
Commercial Banks Commercial Banks Development Banks 
Asset Loans Funds Asset Loans Funds Asset Loans Funds Asset Loans Funds 
1978/79 78.7 81.4 75.7 9.3 8.7 10 3.3 1.9 4.3 8.7 8.0 10.0 
1979/80 79.0 80.1 76.6 8.9 9.9 9.6 3.5 2.1 4.3 8.6 7.9 9.5 
1980/81 79.8 78.9 77.8 9.4 10.7 9.6 3.9 2.8 4.6 6.9 7.6 8.0 
1981/82 79.6 78.5 76.1 9.9 11.0 11.0 3.6 3.2 3.8 6.9 7.3 9.1 
1982/83 77.0 78.4 70.7 11.2 11.9 13.2 3.2 3.2 3.5 8.6 6.5 12.6 
1983/84 74.8 74.4 69.5 13.9 15.5 16.3 3.5 3.1 3.6 7.8 7.0 10.6 
1984/85 73.4 73.9 66.6 15.3 17.5 18.5 3.5 2.9 3.9 7.8 5.7 11.0 
1985/86 72.1 71.7 65.3 17.6 20.5 21.8 3.4 2.9 3.5 6.9 4.9 9.4 
1986/87 71.3 71.7 66.0 19.5 21.0 22.8 3.0 2.9 2.9 6.2 4.4 8.3 
1987/88 68.9 69.0 63.4 22.3 23.8 26.4 3.1 2.9 2.9 5.7 4.3 7.3 
1988/89 69.0 70.5 63.7 23.1 23.0 27.3 2.9 2.5 2.9 5.0 4.0 6.1 
1989/90 63.2 66.4 52.5 58.7 27.2 39.9 2.4 2.6 3.7 5.8 3.8 3.9 
/a. Fiscal year ends March 31 
Source: Bank of Indonesia 
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of regional development banks remained unchanged, while that of the other two groups 
decreased. With respect to fund mobilization, the.share held by private national commercial 
banks increased significantly after FY 1983/84. The share held by the other three groups, 
however, decreased slightly. Despite significant improvement in the position of private 
national commercial banks, state-owned commercial banks still dominated the other three 
types of banks in terms of assets, loans, and fijnds. The performance of private national 
commercial banks signalled that thisgroup of banks adjusted quickly to the new environment 
with a more competitive attitude after the reforms. The state-owned commercial banks 
adjusted slowly. Their management style still operated in the bureaucratic mode, despite rapid 
accumulation of deposits as interest rates increased (Cole and Slade, 1992). 
The number of banks and offices increased quickly after the October 1988 reform. 
Prior to this reform, financial regulations increased competition among banks to expand 
lending and attract deposits. Interest rates rose quickly after the March 1983 reform. The 
growth of total bank credit slowed. In contrast, credit development for the manufacturing and 
trade sectors moved in a positive direction. By the end of 1983, total bank credits for the 
manufacturing sector had increased by about 48 percent, excluding the effects of the rupiah 
devaluation of March 1983, and by about 54 percent if the devaluation is accounted for, 
compared to 27 percent in previous years. The same level of performance can be seen in the 
trade sectors. These results point to the success of the reforms and incentives introduced by 
the govenmient to encourage non-oil and non-LNG exports, especially manufactured 
products. 
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As discussed, the absorption of credit by the economic sectors moved with positive 
growth but at a decreasing rate. This fact could hqve created a new problem in Indonesia's 
financial system because the slow absorption rate of credit could create excess liquidity. In 
the presence of high rates of saving, this position could force banks to take high-risk loans as 
the only alternative in an economy with no government bonds and an unattractive capital 
market. In this case, two considerations were faced by the authorities. The first was the need 
to create a non-inflationary monetary instrument for liquidity management purposes. The 
second was the problem of bank failure. The government responded to the latter concern by 
introducing regulations with the objective of strengthening bank supervision through the 
central banks, while the monetary authorities introduced SBIs and SBPUs to solve the first 
problem. 
The development of the money market was significant. The valueof CDs issued by 
banks recorded a significant jump in June 1983 fi-om Rp. 102 billion to Rp. 245 billion, even 
though this value decreased slightly after October 1985. The SBI market developed quickly. 
This change was significant, especially after the government required all banks to place 80 
percent of their liquidity released from the decline in the reserve requirement fi^om 15 percent 
to 2 percent into SBIs. The creation of a secondary market for SBIs and SBPUs made them 
more appropriate as monetary instruments,especially SBIs. The progress in transactions using 
SBIs as a monetary instrument is impressive. In FY 1985/86, two years after their 
introduction, SBI issuances in gross terms amounted to Rp. 6,186 billion, an increase of 202.4 
percent compared to the previous year. SBIs outstanding at the end of March 1986 totalled 
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Table.2.10. Funds Raised Annuily through New Issues of Bonds and Equity Shares in 
the Capital Market 
Issues (Rp.million) 
Year Shares /a Bonds Total 
1977-83 117205 94718 211923 
1984 13951 60000 73951 
1985 490 100000 100490 
1986 769 150000 150769 
1987 411 131000 131411 
1988 57481 320000 377481 
1989 3678217 671500 4349717 
1990 11805117 385000 12190117 
Source: Cole and Slade, 1992. Table. 3.5 
Table. 2.11. Indicator of Stock Market Growth 
End December 1987 End December 1990 
Market Composite Index 
Jakarta Stock Exchange 82 418 
Number of Brokers/Dealers 39 211 
Number of Security 
Companies 0 63 
Number of Firms Listing 
Jakarta Exchange 24 126 
Bursa Paralel 0 6 
Number of Bonds Listed 
Jakarta Exchange 26 53 
Bursa Paralel 0 3 
Source; Cole and Slade ,1992. Table. 3.6 
Rp. 1 ,394 billion, or an increase of 473.8 percent compared with those outstanding at the end 
of March 1985. The increase in SBI issuances can not be attributed only to the efficiency of 
banks in managing liquidity, but also to the increase in the frequency of issuances by the 
central bank and the creation of the secondary money market. 
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As mentioned, the capital market in Indonesia grew veiy slowly during the eight years 
after its reactivation for mobilizing long-term funds on August 1977. Response to the reforms 
introduced in December 1987 and December 1988 was outstanding. The number of business 
entities that offered stocks to the public jumped from 24 to 126 firms. Tables 2.10 and 2.11 
summarize the trend in rising fiinds through new issuances of bonds and equity shares in the 
capital market annually from1977 to 1990. 
Balance of Payment and International Trade 
The BOP consists of two accounts that reflect each other— the current account and the 
capital account—and either can be used to analyze BOP issues. However, the current account 
position is mostly used as a BOP measure in policy making. In that sense, the BOP target can 
be formulated as a target for the current account. In this section, both accounts will be 
analyzed. 
The Current Account 
Table 2.12 present the BOP for Indonesia for FY 1969/70 through FY 1992/93. 
Indonesia's current account measures of all imports and exports of goods and services 
generally fluctuated during this period. The first large current account deficit occurred in FY 
1981/82 when the current account fell by almost 231 percent to a deficit of US $2790 million. 
The current account then declined by 152 percent in FY 1982/83. The decrease in exports 
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because of declining oil prices and the increase in imports and the services deficit caused this 
external imbalance. 
The March 1983 devaluation and the fiscal policy that rephased government projects 
are among the most significant policy initiatives implemented to solve these problems. The 
March 1983 devaluation was intended to improve non-oil and non-LNG exports and to 
discourage imports at the same time, while the fiscal policy was aimed at reducing imports. 
Both policies were considered a success in reducing external pressure and improving the 
current account, which grew by 41 percent in FY 1983/84. The positive effects of the two 
policies were reflected in the current account until FY 1985/86. This success was also a result 
of the monetary and financial reforms that controlled inflation rates and the trade policy 
measures enacted in May 1985. 
The second current account crisis occurred in FY 1986/87 as a consequence of the oil 
price shock. This shock caused a dramatic (44 percent) decrease in oil and LNG export value 
to US $6,966 million. This condition forced the rupiah devaluation in September 1986. The 
devaluation was also considered successful because its intended effect was felt for about five 
years. 
A current account deficit reflects excessive imports of goods and services over exports 
in a particular period. Considering these three components of the current account, a structural 
break occurred on both the export and the import sides. This structural change resulted from 
policy reforms covering macroeconomic policies, trade policy, and the introduction of new 
private incentives. 
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Table. 2.12 . Indonesia Balance ofPayement, 1974/75 -1992/93. (US.$. million) 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 1977/78 1878/79 
A. Goods and Services 
1. Merchandise, Net 12265 '12555 16386 18726 19796 
Exports, f.o.b. 7168 7146 9213 10860 11353 
Oil and LNG 5153 5273 6350 7353 7374 
Non-oil and Non-LNG 2033 1873 2863 3507 3979 
Imports,f.o.b -5097 -5409 -7173 -7866 -8443 
Oil and LNG -1275 -930 -1753 -1490 -1711 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -3822 -4479 -5420 -6376 -6732 
2. Services -2227 -2591 -2842 -3684 -4065 
Oil and LNG -1240 -1205 -887 -1418 -1653 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -987 -1386 -1955 -2266 -2412 
3. Current Account -138 -854 -802 -690 -1155 
Oil and LNG 2638 3138 3710 4445 4010 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -2776 -3992 -4512 -5135 -5165 
B. S.D.Rs 64 
C. Capital Account 440 843 1695 1521 1968 
(Excluding Reserves) 
Official Inflows 660 1995 1823 2106 2208 
Program Aid 180 74 147 157 94 
Project Aid 480 1921 1676 1949 2114 
Miscellaneous Capital, Net -135 -1075 38 176 392 
Official Debt Repayment -89 -77 -166 -761 -632 
D. Total (A.3 through C) 302 -11 893 831 877 
E. Net Error and Omissions -311 -353 108 -180 -169 
F. Monetary Movements 9 364 -1001 -651 -708 
G. Memorandum 
1. Exports/GDP 27.85 23.46 24.72 23.68 25.95 
2. Imports/GDP 19.75 17.76 19.25 17.15 19.30 
3. Openess 22.69 20.85 22.22 21.55 24.49 
Source: Republik Indonesia and Central Bureau Statistics 
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Table 2.12. Continued 
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 
A. Goods and Services 
1. Merchandise, Net 29233 37127 40905 37168 36120 
Exports, f.o.b. 18511 22885 22994 18672 19816 
Oil and LNG 12340 17298 18824 14744 14449 
Non-oil and Non-LNG 6171 5587 4170 3928 5367 
Imports,f.o.b -10722 -14242 -17911 -18496 -16304 
Oil and LNG -2672 -3681 -4916 -4365 -3489 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -8050 -10561 -12995 -14131 -12815 
2. Services -5591 -6512 -7873 -7215 -7663 
Oil and LNG -2693 -3016 -4147 -3213 -3589 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -2898 -3496 -3726 -4002 -4074 
3. Current Account 2198 2131 -2790 -7039 -4151 
Oil and LNG 6975 10601 9761 7166 7371 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -4777 -8470 -12551 14205 -11522 
B. S.D.Rs 65 62 
C. Capital Account 680 1708 3852 5880 5974 
(excluding Reserves) 
Official Inflows 2690 2684 3521 5011 5793 
Program Aid 239 118 50 21 84 
Project Aid 2451 2566 3471 4990 5709 
Miscellaneous Capital, Net -1318 -361 1140 1795 1191 
Official Debt Repayment -692 -615 -809 -926 -1010 
D. Total (A.3 through C) 2943 3901 1062 -1159 1823 
E. Net Error and Omissions -1253 -1165 -2050 -2121 247 
F. Monetary Movements -1690 -2736 988 3280 -2070 
G. Memorandum 
1. Exports/GDP 36.01 31.57 26.9 20.61 23.19 
2. Imports/GDP 20.86 19.65 20.95 20.41 19.08 
3. Openess 27.66 22.28 20.08 19.93 21.28 
69 
Table 2.12. Continued. 
1984/85 1985/86 1986787 1987/88 1988/89 
A. Goods and Services 
1. Merchandise, Net 34328 31164 25148 31295 34135 
Exports, f.o.b. 19901 18612 13697 18343 19824 
Oil and LNG 13994 12437 6966 8841 7640 
Non-oil and Non-LNG 5907 6175 6731 9502 12184 
Imports,f.o,b -14427 -12552 -11451 -12952 -14311 
Oil and LNG -2797 -2474 -2095 -2355 -2072 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -11630 -10078 -9356 -10597 -12239 
2. Services -7442 -7892 -6297 -7098 -7372 
Oil and LNG -3381 -3480 -2287 -2726 -2508 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -4061 -4052 -2010 -4372 -4864 
3. Current Account -1968 -1832 -4051 -1707 -1859 
Oil and LNG 7816 6483 2584 3760 3060 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -9784 -7955 -4635 -5467 -4919 
B. S.D.Rs 
C. Capital Account 2726 2360 4575 3235 2614 
(excluding Reserves) 
Official Inflows 3519 3432 5472 4575 6588 
Program Aid 52 38 538 1296 882 
Project Aid 3467 3394 4887 3279 5706 
Miscellaneous Capital, Net 499 572 1232 1709 -211 
Official Debt Repayment -1292 -1644 -2129 -3049 -3763 
D. Total (A.3 through C) 758 528 524 1528 755 
E. Net Error and Omissions -91 -498 -1262 57 -1432 
F. Monetary Movements -667 -30 738 -1585 677 
G. Memorandum 
1. Exports/GDP 22.75 21.35 17.14 24.21 23.52 
2. Imports/GDP 16.49 14.4 14.33 17.1 16.98 
3. Openess 20.05 18.64 20.13 26.53 28.98 
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Table.2.12. Continued. 
1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 
\. Goods and Services 
1. Merchandise, Net 41204 51171 54517 60645 
Exports, f.o.b. 23830 28143 29714 33395 
Oil and LNG 9337 12763 10706 10420 
Non-oil and Non-LNG 14493 15380 19008 22975 
Imports.f.o.b -17374 -23028 -24803 -27250 
Oil and LNG -2529 -3580 -3143 -2765 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -14845 -19448 -21660 -24485 
2. Services -8055 -8856 -9263 -9900 
Oil and LNG -2897 -3173 -3001 -3171 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -5158 -5683 -6262 -6729 
3. Current Account -1599 -3741 -4352 -3755 
Oil and LNG 3911 6010 4562 4484 
Non-oil and Non-LNG -5510 -9751 -8914 -8239 
B. S.D.Rs 
C. Capital Account 2405 6780 5551 5308 
(excluding Reserves) 
Official Inflows 5516 5006 5600 4972 
Program Aid 1037 718 127 175 
Project Aid 4479 4288 5473 4797 
Miscellaneous Capital, Net 575? 5856 4133 4992 
Official Debt Repayment -3686 -4082 -4182 -4656 
D. Total (A.3 through C) 806 3039 1199 1553 
E. Net Error and Omissions -558 263 -218 -118 
F. Monetary Movements -248 -3302 -981 -1435 
G. Memorandum 
I. Exports/GDP 25.18 26.23 25.51 26.36 
2. Imports/GDP 18.36 21.46 21.29 21.51 
3. Openess 31 32.46 34.91 37.46 
71 
Table 2.13 summarizes the performance of Indonesian exports from FY 1969/70 to 
FY 1991/92. The role of the two major components of Indonesia's exports—oil and LNG and 
non-oil and non-LNG— started to change in FY1983/84. Non-oil and non-LNG exports rose 
at a rate of 37 percent and increased in share of total export value to 27 percent, up from 21 
percent in previous year. In contrast, the growth of oil and LNG export value was negative 2 
percent. This pattern changed in FY 1987/88, when the value of non-oil and non-LNGexports 
dominated over the value of oil and LNG exports. Based on these data, it can be stated that 
Table. 2.13. Value and components of Indonesia Exports (US.$. million) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Oil and LNG Non-oil and Non-LNG 
Total Agricultural Manufactured/a Mining Other 
1969/70 384 532 187 311 33 1 
1970/71 443 722 303 362 56 1 
1971/72 590 1177 406 321 450 1 
1972/73 965 1049 576 414 56 2 
1973/74 1708 1755 934 709 106 6 
1974/75 5153 2080 1016 859 201 5 
1975/76 5273 1815 849 841 122 3 
1976/77 6350 2876 1358 1378 136 4 
1977/78 7353 3792 2144 1480 153 15 
1978/79 7374 3922 2022 1778 99 22 
1979/80 12340 5883 3093 2602 153 36 
1980/81 17298 5819 2624 2898 246 51 
1981/82 18824 4282 1449 2577 205 51 
1982/83 14744 3963 1291 2427 170 74 
1983/84 14449 5410 1501 3430 171 308 
1984/85 13994 5927 1502 4118 199 108 
1985/86 12437 6051 1481 4355 200 15 
1986/87 6966 6576 1702 4622 237 14 
1987/88 8841 9414 1687 7438 280 8 
1988/89 7640 12048 2035 9627 375 11 
1989/90 9337 13870 1907 11430 531 2 
1990/91 12763 15229 2181 12360 687 2 
1991/92 10997 19165 2182 15945 1036 2 
Source; Republik Indonesia 
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Figure 2.1. Value and Components of Indonesian exports (US $ million). 
Indonesia became much less dependent on oil and LNG in its foreign export earnings in FY 
1983/84. Figure 2.1 presents the performance of export value, by export component. 
The way to improve non-oil and non-LNG exports is to promote export of 
manufactured products. In this respect, it is vk^orthwhile to analyze the structure of non-oil 
and non-LNG exports. This component consists of agricultural commodities, manufactured 
products that are included as agricultural-based manufactured products, and mining products 
excluding oil and LNG. Table 2.14 presents the policy measures affecting the performance of 
these sectors. The export of manufactured products contributed to the improvement of non-
oil and non-LNG exports, whereas the role of mining remained static and the role of 
agriculture decreased. It is noteworthy that growth in manufactured products was not stable, 
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growth in the agricultural sector tended to decline, and growth in the mining sector increased. 
Moving from NTBs to tariffs as a way of protecting domestic production is the basic 
policy in trade reform. As shown Table 2.14, non-oil and non-LNG imports absorb 
mostlyforeign exchange earnings and continue to grow. Both the March 1983 reforms and 
the fiscal policy that rephased government projects contributed to a decrease in the value of 
imports for FY 1983/84 through FY 1986/87. The contractionary effect of the 
September1986 devaluation, however, is not clear from the total import value. It seems that 
Table 2.14. Components of Non-Oil and Non-LNG Exports, 1969-91. 
Fiscal Agricultural Manufactured/a Mining Others 
Year (per cent) (per cent) (per cent) (percent) 
of total change of total change of total change of total change 
1969/70 35.15 58.51 6.19 0.15 
1970/71 41.92 61.96 50.19 16.49 7.74 69.91 0.15 37.50 
1971/72 52.25 34.06 41.28 -11.53 6.37 -11.45 0.09 -36.36 
1972/73 54.95 42.04 39.51 29.26 5.33 12.93 0.21 214.29 
1973/74 53.20 62.01 40.40 71.14 6.05 89.98 0.35 177.27 
1974/75 48.81 8.76 41.26 21.05 9.67 89.45 0.26 -11.48 
1975/76 46.78 -16.40 46.32 -2.09 6.74 -39.21 0.15 -48.15 
1976/77 47.22 59.95 47.91 63.91 4.73 11.20 0.15 50.00 
1977/78 56.55 57.90 39.02 7.41 4.03 12.43 0.40 259.52 
1978/79 51.57 -5.68 45.35 20.16 2.53 -35.19 0.55 42.38 
1979/80 52.56 52.91 44.22 46.29 2.60 54.59 0.61 67.44 
1980/81 45.09 -15.16 49.81 11.40 4.23 60.64 0.87 40.56 
1981/82 33.83 -44.78 60.19 -11.07 4.79 -16.62 1.19 0.40 
1982/83 32.58 -10.88 61.25 -5.82 4.30 -17.01 1.87 46.06 
1983/84 27.75 16.29 63.40 41.30 3.15 0.12 5.69 314.96 
1984/85 25.34 0.04 69.48 20.07 3.35 16.42 1.83 -64.79 
1985/86 25.43 -1.40 71.97 5.74 3.31 0.81 0.25 -89.25 
1986/87 25.89 14.96 70.29 6.15 3.61 18.59 0.21 -8.05 
1987/88 17.92 -0.88 79.01 60.92 2.98 18.16 0.09 -40.15 
1988/89 16.89 20.61 79.90 29.42 3.11 33.70 0.09 39.02 
1989/90 13.75 -6.30 82.41 18.73 3.93 41.64 0.01 -85.96 
1990/91 14.32 14.35 81.16 8.14 4.51 29.34 0.01 12.50 
1991/92 11.39 0.09 83.20 29.00 5.41 50.89 0.01 -16.67 
Source : Ministry of Finance. 
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the effects of the September 1986 devaluation generally complemented the government's 
export policy. Onthe other hand, the drawback policy taken before the devaluation reduced the 
effectiveness of this devaluation. 
Table 2.15 summarizes the effects of the reforms on non-oil and non-LNG imports. It 
is clear fi-om this table that the exchange rate management and fiscal policies were effective in 
curbing imports in order to improve the current account position. The significant effects of 
Table 2.15. Total value and components of imports, 1969/70-1991/92. 
Fiscal Total Consumer Goods Basic Material and Capital Goods 
Year Auxiliaries 
(USSmillion) (% of Total) (% change) (% of Total) (% change) (% of Total) (% change) 
1969/70 819.1 22.06 48.80 29.14 
1970/71 1006.3 17.70 -19.77 47.26 -3.15 35.04 47.72 
1971/72 1189.9 13.19 -25.45 47.26 -0.01 39.55 33.47 
1972/73 1808.6 16.24 23.08 43.70 -7.52 40.06 53.95 
1973/74 2881.0 18.89 16.30 43.66 -0.09 37.45 48.93 
1974/75 3905.4 16.87 -10.65 46.50 6.50 36.63 32.57 
1975/76 4400.2 11.79 -30.10 48.89 5.13 39.32 20.95 
1976/77 5441.2 15.28 29.51 39.63 -18.93 45.09 41.82 
1977/78 5514.4 21.33 39.65 39.63 -0.01 39.04 -12.26 
1978/79 6154.4 19.55 -8.38 42.51 7.27 37.95 8.48 
1979/80 6891.3 17.03 -12.88 46.27 8.86 36.70 8.29 
1980/81 9108.5 17.56 3.14 44.94 -2.88 37.50 35.05 
1981/82 12000.3 14.19 -19.18 46.18 2.75 39.63 39.24 
1982/83 13765.3 10.34 -27.17 44.45 -3.74 45.21 30.87 
1983/84 11397.2 7.91 -23.53 47.75 7.43 44.34 -18.79 
1984/85 10831.1 5.57 -29.52 53.09 11.17 41.34 -11.4 
1985/86 8811.8 5.28 -5.25 55.90 5.30 38.82 -23.61 
1986/87 10161.7 5.55 5.16 55.11 -1.41 39.33 16.85 
1987/88 11559.6 4.85 -12.68 55.35 0.44 39.80 15.1 
1988/89 13140.1 6.18 27.37 55.85 0.91 37.97 8.45 
1989/90 15957.2 6.02 -2.52 55.47 -0.70 38.51 23.18 
1990/91 21356.9 5.27 -12.46 49.83 -10.17 44.90 56,04 
1991/92 23940.1 7.01 33.10 46.76 -6.15 46.23 15.39 
Source; Republik Indonesia. 
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these policies were felt in the import of capital goods and consumption goods. The 
performances of all three import major component^ do not show significant change after the 
September 1986 devaluation. The structure of non-oil and non-LNG imports, however, 
changed beginning in FY 1983/84, when the share of con.sumer goods decreased to 8 percent 
and then stayed in the range of 5 percent to 7 percent thereafter. However, raw material and 
intermediate goods accounted for 47 percent to 56 percent of total import value until FY 
1991/92. The improvements in the terms of trade caused by the March 1983 devaluation and 
shifting fi-om NTBs to tariffs seem to have been effective in reducing the growth of import of 
consumer goods and basic materials and auxiliaries. The increase in capital goods imports 
could be a consequence of improvement in foreign and domestic investment as a result of new 
investment regulations that attracted both foreign and domestic investors. While the structure 
of the export and import sectors changed, the services sector of the current account did not 
reflect any effect of the reforms. This sector continued to grow and contribute more pressure 
to the current account position. Non-oil and non-LNG services grew steadily and even 
surpassed the role of both the oil and LNG imports and the services sectors because debt 
services is one of the components of this subsector. The sector is expected to continue to 
grow in the immediate future. 
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The Capital Account 
The other side of BOP is the capital account. Indonesia's capital account excluding 
foreign reserves consists of official inflow, official debt repayment, and miscellaneous capital 
that consists of direct investment and government enterprises capital. Overall, the capital 
account improved steadily. The oflficial inflows of program aid and project aid held a major 
share, while miscellaneous capital fluctuated and did not play a significant role until FY 
1990/91. External pressure will continue to build up the current account and the capital 
account. Government and private external debt will become a major factor in the future. The 
influence of government external debt on BOP comes in two channels. For debt services, it 
will show up in the non-oil and non-LNG services sectors in the current account, and debt 
repayment will appear as official debt repayment in the capital account. 
As part of the miscellaneous capital in the capital account, direct investment increased 
in importance. The new incentives and opening of new fields for direct investment introduced 
in 1985 provide good prospects. The significant growth of direct investment, started in FY 
1987/88, has registed a 116 percent increase, to US $544 million. Japan and the United 
States have been major investors for a long time, and newly industrialized countries such as 
South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have begun to play significant roles in Indonesia's 
investment environment. Figure 2.2 shows the progress of government efforts to attract 
direct investment to Indonesia. 
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Figure 2.2. Value of direct investment approved (US $ million) 
Economic Growth 
One way to examine the economic growth in one country is through that 
country'seconomic performance as reflected in real economic growth presented in GDP. 
The growth rate of Indonesia's individual sector components of GDP reflect changes in their 
respective performances. Table 2.16 presents a summary of sectoral grov/th rates for the 
period 1973-90. The figures, however, consist of grov^h rates for the period 1973-83 
counted at 1973 constant prices and for the period 1984-90 counted at 1983 constant prices. 
These figures are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, the trends of growth can be 
indicated. In the period 1984-90, there was a decline in the growth rate of all sectors, even 
though it was small in some sectors such as agriculture and significant in others such as 
mining. 
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Table 2.16 Sectoral Growth Rate, 1973-90 (percent) 
Industrial Origin Based on 1973 Based on 1983 constant price /a Contribution to 
constant price overall growth rate 
1973-81 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1973-81 1984-90 
Agriculture 3.49 2.11 2.81 4.15 4.22 2.55 2.22 5.35 3.69 2.77 1.23 0.78 
Mining and Quarrying 3.59 -12.07 -2.98 6.29 -9.58 5.35 0.35 -2.89 5.82 4.28 0.37 0.21 
Manufacturing 14.17 1.20 2.99 22.05 11.19 9.29 10.61 12.05 9.03 12.30 1.72 1.95 
Utilities 14.07 17.78 22.64 3.22 11.39 19.09 15.54 10.53 12.15 17.88 0.08 0.06 
Construction 12.97 5.42 3.69 -4.42 2.60 2.24 4.21 9.50 • •36.52 14.24 0.66 0.30 
Trade 7.38 5.68 3.20 2.19 5.05 8.57 6.75 9.05 9.95 8.31 1.29 1.08 
Transport and 
Communication 13.77 5.91 14.37 8.42 0.99 4.04 5.76 5.55 11.51 9.99 0.6 0.35 
Banking and Other 14.56 11.69 8.14 18.79 7.02 15.55 1.89 6.28 14.29 11.65 0.21 0.38 
Dwelling 12.07 5.01 2.92 2.38 2.05 3.42 4.27 4.08 4.18 4.21 0.32 0.10 
Public Administration 12.77 3.62 14.35 4.99 7.64 6.31 7.34 7.68 5.86 4.60 0.95 0.48 
Other Services 2.39 1.57 7.74 3.87 2.03 3.72 3.74 4.90 5.60 5.01 0.08 0.15 
GDP 7.51 2.24 4.58 6.74 2.47 5.95 4.76 6.02 7.54 7.37 7.51 5.84 
/a. In 1989, The Indonesia government released a revised national account series for the period 1983-88. 
Source: Central Bureau Statistics; Sundrum,1988.Table 4. 
This study recognizes that an analysis of sectoral growth rates is not enough to explain 
overall trends in economic growth. A sector's contribution to overall growth depends not 
only on its growth rate but on its relative size as well. The rapid growth of any sector will not 
have much effect on the overall growth rate if that sector contributes only a small share to 
GDP. But even a low rate of growth will have a relatively greater effect if that sector is large. 
For this reason, it is useful to present the sectoral patterns of growth in terms of the 
contribution each sector makes to the overall growth rate. Table.2.16 indicates a change in 
the pattern of sectoral contribution to overall growth. The average sectoral contribution 
Table. 2.17. Expenditure Components of GDP, 1973-1990/a 
(percent) 
Fiscal Year Private Government GDFCF Export-import 
consumption consumption 
expenditure expenditure 
1973 70.95 10.60 17.89 0.56 
1974 75.03 8.82 19.81 -3.66 
1975 74.42 10.96 21.62 -7.00 
1976 73.96 11.00 21.44 -6.40 
1977 72.52 11.77 22.86 -7.15 
1978 72.71 12.95 24.60 -10.26 
1979 77.38 13.23 23.96 -14.58 
1980 79.40 13.34 25.93 -18.67 
1981 85.86 13.61 26.70 -26.17 
1982 86.80 14.41 29.51 -30.72 
1983 89.56 13.70 30.53 -33.79 
1984 67.70 11.55 25.31 -4.57 
1985 66.97 12.18 26.57 -5.71 
1986 64.56 11.81 27.37 -3.74 
1987 64.61 11.42 27.97 -4.00 
1988 54.24 9.93 25.21 10.63 
1989 52.52 10.20 26.57 10.71 
1990 53.75 9.82 28.73 7.70 
/a. Series from 1973 to 1983 are based on 1973 constant price; all others are 
based on 1983 constant price. 
SourcesiSundrum 1986,Table 4 and Table 5 for series 1973-83; Central Bureau Statistics 
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declined for the period 1984-90 compared to the average rate for 1973-81, following the 
decline in GDP growth. The average contribution of agricuhure to overall growth declined 
from 1.23 percent in 1973-81 to 0.78 percent in 1984-90. The trade sector contribution was 
down 0.21 percent, while the mining contribution fell from 0.37 percent to 0.21 percent 
during the same period. In contrast, the manufacturing and banking sectors showed 
improvements in their contributions to overall growth. On average, these sectors improved 
their respective contributions from 1.72 percent in 1973-81 to 1.95 percent in 1984-90, and 
from 0.21 percent in 1973-81 to 0.31 percent in 1984-90. 
Not only are the sectoral growth trends in both periods different, so are the sectoral 
patterns of the category's expenditure. All components of expenditure decreased, except for 
gross domestic fixed capital formation. Drastic change occurred for private consumption 
expenditure (PCE) and government consumption expenditure (GCE). PCE declined from 
89.56 percent in 1983 to 67.70 percent in 1984 and ultimately to 53.75 percent in 1990. GCE 
declined from 13.70 percent in 1983 to 11.55 percent in 1984, and to 9.82 percent in 1990. 
In contrast, trade balance plus change in stock continued to increase their use of resources 
over time. The summary of expenditure components of GDP is presented in Table2.17 
Summaiy and Conclusions 
In the early 1980s, the Indonesian economy faced strong external pressure that led to 
an economic restructuring process starting in 1983. Three factors contributed to the shocks. 
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First, the decline in oil prices created a huge problem for the economy through its effects on 
export earnings and government revenues. Second, the worldwide recession in the early 
1980s caused a decrease in demand for Indonesia's tradable goods. These two factors 
contributed to the deterioration of Indonesia's terms of trade. Lastly, depreciation of the US. 
dollar, especially against the Japanese yen, contributed to the rapid increase in Indonesia's 
external debt. All these factors caused a deterioration of the BOP with severe impacts on the 
current account position. 
In restructuring the Indonesian economy, the government implemented a broad range 
of policy reforms to restore economic stability and sustain the momentum of development 
over the medium to longer term. The foundations of the reforms were exchange rate policy 
and monetary and financial policy reforms. With these reforms, the government expected to 
diversify sources of foreign exchange earnings and budgetary revenues, improve the 
economy's efficiency, and move toward an export-oriented economy. The main objective, 
however, was to achieve macroeconomic stability. The reforms were considered successful, 
but they brought about structural change in the Indonesian economy. The adjustment 
performance in fiscal, financial, and trade components and econonnic growth trends indicates 
that this change occurring in FY 1983/84. Because the exchange rate policy reform is one of 
the basic foundations of the overall reforms, it can be concluded that March 1983 was a 
turning point in Indonesian economic structural change. 
In the immediate future, Indonesia will continue to face strong external pressure 
concerning its external debt position and the need for foreign exchange earnings and will need 
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additional efforts to achieve high economic growth. Exchange rate policy will play an even 
more important role than in the past. The position of the rupiah against major currencies such 
as the US dollar, Japanese yen, and German deutsche mark, and against others currencies such 
as the Korean won and ASEAN country currencies will have a significant impact on 
Indonesia's external debt position and macroeconomic imbalance. The other important role is 
related to international inflation transmission to the Indonesian economy. Therefore, it is 
important to study the Indonesian real exchange rate in the context of the optimum currency 
area argument, especially with Indonesia's managed floating exchange rate system. 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Theory of Purchasing Power Parity 
The three concepts of purchasing power parity (PPP) are usually used in explaining 
why goods in one country should cost the same as identical goods in another country. The 
law of one price explains the relationship of exchange rates with the prices of individual goods 
in different countries. Absolute PPP explains the relationship of exchange rates with overall 
price level, whereas relative PPP explains the relationship of exchange rates with inflation 
rates in different countries. 
The law of one price states that the cost of identical goods should equalize in all 
countries, assuming the absence of trade restrictions and transportation costs. The concept of 
pure international trade states that autarkic price differences between countries exist because 
of technological or factor endowment differences, given that the regular conditions are 
satisfied. When trading in a perfectly competitive sense, the market forces the law of one 
price to be held. In reality, however, this is not as simple as it may sound. For example, the 
cost of transporting goods fi-om one country to another limits the potential profit from buying 
and selling identical goods at different prices. In addition, tariffs and other trade restrictions 
drive a wedge between the prices of identical goods in different countries. Therefore, instead 
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of focusing on a particular good or service when applying the concept of PPP, it is necessary 
to extend the law of one price in terms of general price level. 
The extension of the law of one price to general price level takes the form of the 
strong, or absolute, version of PPP such that: 
EP' = P (3.1) 
where E denotes the number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currencyand P* 
and P are the foreign and domestic price, respectively. This extension requires that the 
domestic price index function has the same functional form as the foreign price index function 
and the same goods enter each country's market basket. The theory, therefore, assumes the 
existence of a price index. Let P/ be the price of the good in domestic currency and P/* be 
the price of the good in foreign currency; then, the two price indices can be defined as: 
P = flPr and r = n/;-'' (3.2) 
i I 
where a, and a* represent system of weights with ^oCj = ^a* = . These indices are 
justified using consumer theory by assuming that the consumer devotes a constant fraction a/ 
of his or her budget to the good, which is given independently of relative prices. So the 
level of welfare or utility function between consumers depends on their purchasing power. 
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The PPP theory asserts that changes in the bilateral exchange rate over any period of 
time are determined by the changes in the two countries' relative prices. Because aggregate 
price level and exchange rate are both endogeneously and simultaneously determined, 
however, PPP can be viewed as an equilibrium relationship rather than as a theory of 
exchange rate determination. In addition, if the law of one price holds for all goods and if 
price levels in different countries are constructed in the same way, the absolute version of PPP 
should hold. 
The absolute version of PPP can be accepted as a theoretical statement in a 
hypothetical economy. Objections arise when it is applied as an empirical proposition. 
Transportation costs and other obstacles to trade do exist, and hence the location of delivery 
matters. The prices of a given good will not necessarily be equal in different locations. These 
price differences do not indicate market failure. Market efficiency could be obtained, 
provided that the price system can incorporate all the costs of trade obstacles. Trade 
impediments do not suggest market inefficiency; however, restrictions on trade and imperfect 
competition make it possible for spatial price differentials to exist. Price levels in different 
countries are calculated using imperfect price indices, which are based in different years, 
include different market baskets of goods, and weight the various components of the market 
baskets differently. 
Actually, a necessary condition for the absolute version of PPP to hold is the validity 
of the law of one price. Idsar (1977) studied the most disaggregated groupings of 
manufactured goods for which prices are available and found that for the period 1970-75, the 
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law of one price fails to hold. Even in commodities markets, where goods are more 
homogeneous than in industrial goods markets, the law of one price is not valid in the short 
run, though it tends to be so in the longer run. All these facts show the limitation of the 
strong, or absolute, version of PPP. 
The weak, or relative, version of PPP states that it is no longer necessary for exchange 
rates to equal the ratio of price indices instantaneously; exchange rate can simply remain at a 
constant ratio. By incorporating transportation costs and other obstacles to trade in the 
concept of PPP, the relationship of exchange rates torelative prices between two countries can 
be written as: 
where (p is any constant that represents the existence of the obstacle to trade or transportation 
cost. In terms of percentage change, the equation can be written as: 
E = (p— (3.3) 
A A A • 
e - p - p  (3.4) 
where denotes percentage change and e, p, and/7*are the log of E, P, and P,' 
respectively. 
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As a statement of the weak, or relative, version of PPP, equation (3.4) states that the 
percentage change in the exchange rate equals the.percentage change in the relative price 
ratios between two countries. This relative version of PPP can also be interpreted as the rate 
of inflation differentials between two countries being balanced by corresponding changes in 
the exchange rate. The relative version of PPP, therefore, depends on the condition of the 
homogeneity postulate of monetary theory. The constancy of real variables under the 
assumption of money neutrality assures that once the economy has adjusted, the changes in 
exchange rate match inflation. Bailie and McMahon (1989) have argued, however, that the 
hypothesis of money neutrality is hard to accept in the short run because of institutional 
rigidities and imperfect dissemination of information. 
Both the absolute and relative versions of PPP can be expressed in terms of the real 
exchange rate, r,, as follows: 
(3.5a) 
or 
R t = e , - P t + P * ,  (3.5.b) 
where R is the log of the real exchange rate. 
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This form defines the real exchange rate in terms of purchasing power between two 
consumption baskets. It can be seen from (3.5a) that the absolute version of PPP can be 
expressed as = 1 for all t, while in the case of the relative version of PPP, the real exchange 
rate is constant over time, that is, j = rt = r. In addition, it is clear that the change in the 
real exchange rate could come from the change in the nominal exchange rate or from the 
change in the inflation differential. 
Purchasing Power Disparities 
The doctrine of PPP may be expressed as the prediction that price levels should be 
equal across countries when compared by means of equilibrium exchange rate. However, 
there are several explanations and much evidence against this hypothesis. Ballasa (1964) 
showed that structural deviations from PPP are to be expected by emphasizing the importance 
of nonmonetary factors in the process of price determination. In the Ricardian framework, he 
argued that the currency of the higher productivity level countries will appear to be 
overvalued in terms of PPP because higher-income countries have higher relative productivity 
in producing traded goods. In addition, under the assumption of constant marginal rates of 
transportation, the relative price of nontraded goods will be higher in the country with higher 
productivity levels than in the country with lower productivity levels. By making use of the 
trade expenditure function, Neary (1988) supports the conclusion that structural deviations 
from PPP are to be expected because higher-income countries have higher relative 
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productivity in the production of traded goods. He states that if international productivity 
differences are smaller in the production of nontraded goods, the element of the difference 
between the two countries in average propensities to produce nontraded goods at constant 
prices is likely to be small or even negative. This concept implies that the higher-income 
country v^nll have a higher real exchange rate. This effect will be reinforced, however, if 
nontraded goods are superior in demand because country-specific factors such as tastes vary 
relatively little over time. 
Real factors can induce systematic deviations from PPP. Dorabusch, Fisher, and 
Samuelson (1977), in the context of the Ricardian framework with a continuum goods, found 
that shifts in labor force grov^h, real demand for foreign goods, commercial policies, and 
technology changes will all affect the movement of the real exchange rate under a flexible 
exchange regime. Each of these real shifts is assumed to take place given a nominal quantity 
of money in each country and constant expenditures of velocities within the context of the 
quantity theory of money. More precisely, they state that a uniform increase in traded goods 
productivity will raise the wages in that sector, which implies a national wage level increase. 
With no productivity gains in the nontraded goods sector, the price of nontraded goods will 
increase and then the relative price will increase. 
In the case of an equilibrium model of exchange rate determination, Stulz (1987) has 
shown that the existence of nontraded goods makes it possible to explicitly address issues with 
regard to the determination of the real exchange rate. He found that real exchange rate levels 
follow the Martingale process when the means and variances of growth rates of stocks of 
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nontraded goods are constant and identical across countries. The variance of the real 
exchange rate can be larger than the variance of the nominal exchange rate in the presence of 
significant output shocks in the production of nontraded goods. In addition, the changes in 
real exchange rates are shown to be positively correlated to the changes in nominal exchange 
rates. 
Another way of explaining departures from PPP besides structural deviation are by 
considering transitory deviations from PPP, Transitory deviations from PPP are usually the 
result of the differential speed adjustment of prices in assets and goods markets. This 
deviation is relatively persistent and often large. Such deviations could arise fi-om divergent 
speeds in the adjustment of exchange rates compared with wage and price adjustments when 
there is a shock to the economy. In this case, the exchange rate is viewed as an asset price 
and wages are determined in long-term contracts. If a shock to the economy exists (e.g., a 
monetary shock), the asset market adjusts relatively faster than the goods market. This 
argument is used by Dombusch (1976) in explaining the phenomenon of exchange rate 
overshooting. He has shown that an increase in money supply initially causes real and nominal 
exchange rate depreciation. Over time, the real rate converges to its original level and the 
proportional change in the nominal rate approaches the percentage change in the money 
supply. This means that the real exchange rate deviates fi"om its long-run equilibrium in the 
short run as a result of a monetary shock. 
The validity of the relative stickiness of price can depend upon the presence of goods 
market imperfection and the existence of long-term labor contracts. Imperfect competition in 
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the goods market is important because it eliminates the validity of the law of one price and the 
other arbitrages. In addition, the way a firm makes a decision in setting relative price matters 
makes a difference. 
Related to these issues, Dombusch (1985) has suggested that the extent of price 
adjustment depends on market structure, product substitutability, and the level of market 
integration. In the context of an imperfect competitive market with linear technology and 
labor as the only input, he argued that the independent relationship between the real exchange 
rate and the exchange rate relies on the relative number of home and foreign firms in the 
market and the rigidity of wages in response to changes in output and profitability, regardless 
of the neutrality of money in the economy. Because these condition are plausible in the short 
run, the relative national price rate deviates from its long-run levels in the short run. In the 
case of a monopolistic market structure with linear technology and labor as the only input, 
firms can set prices as fixed and common mark-ups over wages. Hence, the real exchange 
rate can be expressed in terms of relative national wage rates. Assuming wages are rigid, 
flexible exchange rate movement can cause the real exchange rate to deviate fi-om its long-run 
level in the short run. 
Moreover, Dombusch (1989) argued that in the Ricardian fi-amework for an industrial 
country, an improvement in a country's relative efficiency leads to real exchange rate 
appreciation. Gain in productivity reduces unit labor costs at the competitive margin and 
thereby leads to an incipient expansion in output and employment. Excess demands for labor 
at home (and the excess supply abroad) bring about a change in the relative wage and hence in 
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the competitive margin. The real exchange rate appreciates because wages in the home 
countiy rise in the domestic goods sector and fall in the foreign countiy. The wage increase 
raises the costs and prices of nontraded goods in the home country while lowering them 
abroad where there was no progress. Another source of real appreciation is a transfer 
received by the home country, which can be considered as borrowing from abroad. The 
mechanism works as follows. The transfer increases real aggregate demand in the home 
country. Part of the increased spending goes to traded goods and is offset by reduced foreign 
spending. This leads to excess demand for home goods and labor, which raises the relative 
wage and hence the relative price level in the countiy receiving the transfer. 
The existence of nontraded goods provides a reason for rejecting the validity of 
absolute PPP. In this light, an illustrative model and the role of the relative price of nontraded 
goods on internal and external equilibrium will be discussed to show the role of nontraded 
goods in formulating and determining PPP. 
An Illustrative Model 
Consider a small open economy with two goods: nontraded and traded. In this 
economy, domestic price level is defined as a weighted average price of traded and nontraded 
goods such that; 
p , = r p ^ t  (3.6a) 
and 
P , = P ]  +( l - r )A  (3.6b) 
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where and p'^ are the log of the price of the nontraded and traded goods, respectively; and 
p, (= p^ - pf) is the relative price of the nontraded goods. A corresponding expression 
holds for the prices in the foreign country. 
Assuming that commodity arbitrage is held only in traded goods, PPP can be stated as: 
p f=pr  +  e ,  (3 .7 )  
where e, is the level of the domestic currency price of the foreign currency. 
Combining (3.6a) and (3.6b) into (3.7) and letting y = y results in a relationship such 
that: 
e t=p , -p '  -{^ - r ){p , -  p ! )  (3 .8a )  
and 
(3.8b) 
These equations state that absolute PPP will hold as long as the relative price of the nontraded 
goods is the same in both countries. Because this relative price generally is not equal, it can 
be said that absolute PPP is mostly not valid. However, the relative version of PPP will hold 
as long as the relative prices of the nontraded goods in both countries does not change. This 
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implies that a shock in the relative priceof the nontraded good can cause a departure from 
PPP. In a more specific way, it can be stated that if (p, - p*,] is nonstationary, the real 
exchange rate will also be nonstationary, so that PPP will fail as a long-run relationship. 
To understand the behavior of the relative price of the nontraded good, consider a 
dependent economy situation as depicted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. In both figures, PQ is the 
production possibility curve of traded and nontraded goods. Therefore, point A represents the 
most profitable combination for producing both types of goods at their relative prices. The 
line TU is total expenditure. The slope of this line is also determined by the relative price of 
traded and nontraded goods. The maximum amount of traded and nontraded goods that can 
be purchased which this level of expenditure is OT and OU. In Figure 3.1, the line RS 
represents a revenue line in which the level of expenditure equals the fiill employment 
production function, given home and world prices. The slope of RS is determined by the 
relative price of traded and nontraded goods. The indifference curve / represents consumer 
preferences between traded and nontraded goods. Point B indicates how much traded and 
nontraded goods will be demanded, given expenditure TU and their relative prices. 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the economy is in a situation of external disequilibrium. 
Consumption takes places at point B. The market for the nontraded goods clears because 
demand and supply of nontraded goods are equal. Excess demand for traded goods can be 
fulfilled by importing AB = RT units of traded goods. Consequently, the economy experiences 
a BOP deficit. 
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Figure 3.1. The disequilibrium economic condition in a dependent economy. 
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Figure 3.2. The equilibrium economic condition in a dependent economy. 
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The trade deficit is temporary in nature. The economy will always adjust until both 
internal and external equilibrium are reached (i.e.,lpng-run equilibrium requires that net 
imports equal zero). The dynamic adjustment of the economy is such that the wealth 
reduction associated with the trade deficit leads to a reduction in expenditure levels. In 
addition, the external excess demand raises price which causes the price of traded goods to 
rise relative to the price of nontraded goods. Let the initial expenditure-consumption line be 
g i v e n  b y  l i n e  O B .  L o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  m u s t  o c c u r  o n  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t y  c u r v e  ( P Q )  
somewhere along line segment AC. 
Figure 3.2 represents the equilibrium condition. The economy reaches its long-run 
equilibrium point when A and B have the same position in which the equilibrium relative price 
of nontraded goods is reflected by the slope of line TU. At this point, the economy is in 
equilibrium under the following conditions: (1) full employment income equals total 
expenditure; (2) the demand and supply of nontraded goods are equal (i.e., internal balance); 
(3) demand and supply of traded goods are equal (i.e., external balance); and (4) the marginal 
rate of consumer substitution equals the marginal rate of product transformation. 
The equilibrium relative price of nontraded goods, which is constant and does not 
change over time, is rare and an extraordinary coincidence (Salter, 1953 ; Edwards, 1989) 
Changes in demand, the world price, and overseas capital inflow can cause internal and 
external equilibrium. In addition, as can be inferred fi-om Figure 3.1 and 3.2, a rise in the 
relative productivity of traded goods, which is long-run in nature, vwll be associated with a 
relatively high price of nontraded goods. Given equationds (3.8a) and (3.8b), an increase in 
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the domestic relative price of nontraded goods will cause an appreciation of domestic 
currency in terms of the nominal and real exchange rates, respectively. 
From the discussion above, it is clear that when there are changes in any of the other 
variables that affect the country's external and internal equilibrium, there will be changes in the 
equilibrium real exchange rate as a result of economic adjustment. The equilibrium real 
exchange rate will not only be affected by current fundamentals, but also by expected future 
evolution of the fundamentals. These results lead us to the question of the effects of a shock 
these in fundamentals on PPP in the short run as well as in the long run. 
Many studies have discussed this issue. Edwards (1988), for examples, examined the 
case of a small open economy. He found that nominal shocks do not affect the long-run 
relationship of real exchange rates, but that real shocks do. In the present study, the two-
country model of Dombusch (1976) was chosen to explain the effects of nominal and real 
shocks on the long-run relationship of real exchange rates. 
Consider the two-country version of Dombusch's overshooting model. For simplicity, 
assume that the domestic and foreign countries have identical structural economic parameters. 
The economy, then, can be presented as shown in the following model: 
The Eflects of Nominal and Real Shocks on Purchasing Power Parity 
(3.9) 
98 
(3.10) 
(a - A*) = - p , + p ' ) + ( p [ y t  - y ' )  -  H ' ,  - (3.11) 
(A.I - A.i) - (A - p*) = «•(( A - A*) - (y, - y')) (3.12) 
where A e, m, p .and;' are the natural logarithms of excess demand, nominal exchange rate, 
money stock, price, and real income, respectively; t and /+1 are time subscripts; and asterisk 
and bars on top of variables denote foreign and long-run variables. All parameters in the 
model- 7], A, y, S, (p, r, ;r~are positive. 
Equation (3.9) is the relative real money equilibrium condition. This equation states 
that relative money supply is equal to relative money demand which is positively related to 
relative real income and an inversely related to the world interest differential, t] and A are the 
relative real income and interest elasticities of money demand, respectively. The relationship 
of the interest differential to the expected rate of currency appreciation is represented by 
(3.10). This relationship states that the interest differential is positively related to the 
expected rate of currency appreciation, but negatively related to the nominal exchange rate. 
As stated in the relationship of relative aggregate demand for goods, (3.11), relative aggregate 
demand varies positively with the real exchange rate and real income, but negatively with the 
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interest differential. Finally, (3.12) states that the relative inflation differential is positively 
related to relative excess demand and inversely related to the relative real income. 
We now consider the effect of nominal and real shocks on the economy in the short-
run. By inserting equation (3.10) into (3.9) and solving for the effects of domestic money 
supply and relative money supply on the relative price, we obtain: 
We can also find the effect of an increase in real income on both nominal exchange rate and 
relative price, as follows: 
= 1 (3.13) 
(3.14a) 
and 
-7/ (3.14 
In the long run, e, = e ,  = ( p ,  -  p ' )  =  ( p -  p ' ) ,  then by inserting (3.10) 
into (3.9), we get the long run equilibrium relative price level [ p - p * )  \  
b) 
100 
{p-p ' )  =  ( "^ , - fn^ -v (y t -y^  (3 .15)  
Taking the derivative of the relative price in (3.15) with respect to money supply and real 
income, the effect of rising domestic money supply and relative money supply is unity, while 
the effects of rising domestic real income and relative real income are a negative constant. 
Formally, 
^ [ p ~ p * )  ^ [ p ~ p ' )  
^ ' • = \  ( 3 . 1 6 a )  
and 
d i p - p * ]  ^ i p - p ' )  
Having the relationship of (3.9), (3.11), (3.12), and (3.15) and applying the condition for 
long-run equilibrium, the system is solved with respect to the long-run equilibrium (nominal) 
exchange rate as: 
e = { p - p ' ) + { ^ - Y ^ y > - y ' )  (3.17) 
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Plugging (3.15) into (3.17), the effect of an increase in domestic and relative money supply on 
the long-run exchange rate is found to be unity, while the effect of an increase in domestic and 
relative income is ambiguous. Formally, they can be presented as: 
and 
de 
= 1 (3.18a) 
de 
- y ' )  
l -«7^  
- r j  (3.18b) 
Given equation (3.18a), (3.9) and (3.10), the effects of change in domestic money supply and 
relative money supply on nominal exchange rate in the short-run can be presented as: 
I ^ ^ 
= 1 + — (3.19) 
Recall the expression of PPP in terms of the real exchange rate in a previous section, 
such that: 
R , = e , - p , + p ' ,  (3.5a) 
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Considering all the relationships in the system, this real exchange rate can be written in 
implicit function as; 
R = R(e, m, p, y, . . ) (3.20) 
The effect of domestic nominal and real shocks on real exchange rate in the short run 
can be solved as: 
de, y{p,-p'^ 
3n, 3n, dm, 
^  = - l ->0  (3 .21a )  
an. Ay 
and 
dz, d [ p , - p ' )  
dy, dy, dy, 
'- = 71 (3.21b) 
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The resuhs suggest that a nominal shock causes real exchange rate depreciation, whereas a 
real shock has an ambiguous effect on real exchange rate in the short run. 
In the long run, the effects of nominal and real shocks on real exchange rate are quite 
different from those in the short run. The effects of nominal and real shocks on real exchange 
rate in the long run can be formally presented as: 
From the results above, it can be concluded that the nominal shock does not affect the long-
run real exchange rate, whereas the real income change causes the long-run real exchange rate 
to depreciate. 
dm, dm, dm. 
dR (3.22a) 
and 
(3.22b) 
The Theory of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity 
The large variability in real exchange rates since the collapse of the Bretton Wood 
system and the poor performance of modem structural models of exchange rate determination 
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are two factors that have motivated investigation about the validity of PPP. Some studies 
support PPP, while others show a departure from PPP. The latter has been studied with 
varying approaches. For instance, Vaubel (1978) attemped to explain it through the theory of 
optimum currency areas. He argued that the optimum currency area theory provides the basic 
factor behind the need for exchange rate adjustment. This argument relates to Mundell's 
(1961) article on optimum currency areas where he stated that when two regions experience 
the same type of real disturbance in the economy, they constitute the domain of a currency 
area. This is to say that the real exchange rate between the countries comprising the currency 
area should be stationary. 
Vaubel argued that there is a practical problem in identifying regions or countries as a 
single currency area. He then offered four criteria for the determination of a currency area. 
First is factor mobility between the countries or regions. The criterion arises from Mundell's 
argument that real exchange rate deviation from its long-run value tends to become smaller, 
the factor mobility becomes higher. The second criterion is the diversification of external 
transactions. Countries whose external transactions are highly diversified will face small PPP 
deviations. Vaubel supported this criterion with the argument that if trade and capital 
movements among the members of a group of countries are highly diversified, the law of large 
numbers reduces the probability and size of change in each country's terms of trade as well as 
terms of finance. The third criterion is fiscal integration. The degree of fiscal integration is 
reflected in the net effect of export demand on BOP and on real exchange rate. Lastly is the 
openness criterion. Openness concerns the macroeconomic efficiency of nominal exchange 
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rate changes. The more open that the potential country members are to each other, the more 
likely that real exchange rate changes will be smaller. This approach, however, faced 
difficulty in the availability of appropriate measures for every criterion. 
Recently, Enders and Hum (199la, 199lb) developed the theory of Generalized-PPP. 
This theory is based on the time-series properties of real fundamental macroeconomic 
variables in determining real exchange rates and international interdependency among groups 
of countries that lead to a currency area. Enders and Hum argue that there is no need for 
bilateral real exchange rates to follow stationary process as suggested by PPP. Instead, 
bilateral real exchange rates should follow nonstationary processes because fundamentals are 
mostly nonstationary variables. However, the theory offers that bilateral real exchange rates 
whose fundamentals are sufficiently interrelated will share common stochastic trends, even 
though bilateral real exchange rates themselves are nonstationary variables. These arguments 
are summarized in the basic tenants of Generalized-PPP, which are stated as follows; 
(1) The real fundamental macroeconomic variables determining real exchange rate 
(i.e. the forcing variables) tend to be nonstationary so that, in general, the real 
rates themselves will be nonstationary. 
(2) Within a currency area, the real fundamentals themselves will share common 
trends. In an appropriately defined currency area, the forcing variable will be 
sufficiently interrelated that real exchange rates will share a reduced number of 
common trends. Given that a vector of bilateral real rates share common trends, there 
exists (at least one) linear combination of the real rates which is stationary; thus, real 
rates will be cointegrated. 
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An Illustrative Model' 
To study the relationships between the fundamental variables that underlie 
Generalized-PPP, it is beneficial to develop a three-country version of Dombusch's 
overshooting model. The model is appropriate for studying exchange rate movement, the 
degree of price flexibility, and thus PPP. Consider that each country in the three-country (/, k, 
I) world presents the economy (as for country j), as follows: 
'"/r (3-23) 
= ^jyj' + j^k^l (3.24) 
Pj,*^ - Pj, = - yj ,  ] (3.25) 
Rjs, = +Ps,-Pj, s = k,l (3.26) 
^j t  ~ht  (3 .27)  
All variables except interest rates are in natural logs, and country subscripts j, k, and / run 
from lto3. C(,/,77, z and n are all positive constants. 
'it is directly drived from Enders and Hum (1991, a, b) 
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The interpretation of the economy model above can be explained as follows: (3.23) 
represents a country j money market equilibrium in which the domestic money stock (mj^ is 
equiproportional to the domestic price level (pjf), positively related to the level of domestic 
income, and negatively related to the nominal interest rate (/y/). The income and interest 
elasticity of money demand are (p and X, respectively. 
In the country j goods markets, aggregate demand is represented by (3,24). This 
equation shows that the domestic demand for domestic goods {dj^ varies positively with 
domestic and foreign output levels (yjj^ and j^/) and relative commodity prices or real 
exchange rates {Rjk and Rji), and negatively with the domestic nominal interest rate (ij). The 
marginal propensity to consume is Uj , whereas the foreign marginal propensities to import 
from j are and /j,. The prices and interest elasticity demand for domestic output are 
Vjk^ and respectively. Equation (3.25) is the price adjustment equation that shows 
how the price level responds to the excess demand pressure. Price level will fall (rise) if 
excess demand is negative (positive). Relative commodity prices, or real exchange rates, are 
defined as the domestic currency price of foreign goods relative to the price of domestic 
goods which are presented in (3.26). Only two real rates are determined independently in this 
model because - Rua and Rj^, = -R^j,, and triangular arbitrage guarantees that only 
two nominal exchange rates are self-reliant because and . 
Interest rate parity links nominal exchange rates and interest rates in the assets 
markets. This is presented in the uncovered interest parity relation. Equation (3.27) presents 
two independent interest rate parity conditions in this model. From (3.27), the uncovered 
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interest parity equates the interest rate differential with the expected rate of appreciation of 
the currency. £/(.) is the mathematical expectatipn operator, conditional on available and 
relevant information at time t. 
To solve the model, first combine equation sets (3.24) and (3.25). The resulting three 
equations, the three money market equilibrium conditions from (3.23), the two interest rate 
parity conditions from (3.27), and any two definitions of real exchange rate from (3.26), all 
yield ten independent equations. Given the initial condition, it is possible to get solutions to 
the three prices and interest rate sequences (pj,) and (ij,), and the two real and nominal 
exchange rate sequences ) and (e^„) in terms of the income and money supply processes. 
With respect to real exchange rates, assume initial conditions such that 
0 = -^13,0 = 0- The model, then, gives two general solutions for the two independent real 
exchange rates that are linear in the income and money supply processes. These can be 
presented in matrices form as follows: 
R. 
•I2f 
R 
= H yi, + G "hi (3.28) 
where H and G are (2 x 3) matrices with elements (Z,) and (Z,), which are 
polynomials in the lag operator L. It is sufficient to note at this point that all real income and 
money supply processes are nonstationary without specifying the processes themselves. The 
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presentation of the solution in (3.28) has several meaningful implications for testing PPP. 
Consider G„„{L), and let g„„{q) represent coeflfiqient q of the polynomial G„„{L). The 
nature of the model becomes such that^: 
Equation (3.29) implies that money supply shocks do not have permanent effects on real 
exchange rates even though they follow nonstationary processes. This means that real 
exchange rate will behave as a nonstationary processes because (L) has no restrictions. 
Moreover, for finite demand elasticities tJj, where s = k,l, the real shocks will have permanent 
effects on real exchange rates. This is to say that PPP will not generally hold. 
To finish solving the model, consider the stochastic difference equation (3.28). The 
particular solution to this equation will provide the conditions for the long-run behavior of the 
real exchange rate series. However, an easier way to understand the long-run properties of 
this system is by considering the case for which all Kj approach infinity. To solve the system 
for the effects of permanent income shocks on real rates, impose the long-run properties on 
the model such that: 
(3.29) 
^js l  ) - 0 (3.30a) 
2 The equation (3.7), intuitively, is the condition for long run money neutrality. 
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and 
(3.30b) 
For the long run solution, drop the time subscript and let / be the only world long run interest 
rate. By applying Rj, = Rj,^ - /?^and Rj,^ = , (3.29), (3.30a) and (3.30b) into (3.28), the 
system can be written as follows: 
^712 Vn 
^23 
732 ~^3. 
-^1 i?l2 1-a ,  -a,2 -"13 
-^2 ^,3 = -"21 1 -
-^ /• --a3i "^32 ^~®3- .y3J 
(3.31) 
The solution for ^,2 is; 
+«12>'2 +«13;'3) 
where 
flu = (1 - «1)[ 723 h + ( 731 + 732 ) ^2 ] + "12 [ 7l3 h + ( 731 + %2 ) ^"1 ] + «31 [ 723 ^1 " 7l3 h ]> 
^^12 ~ "" ^2)[7I3^3 "^(731 732 )^l]~ ®I2[723 h (Vsi 732 ) ^ 2 ] "^ ^32 [ 723 ^1 ~ 7l3^2]> 
^13 ~ ®23 [ 7i3 ^3 •'" ( 731 + 732 ) ^ 1 ] ~ *^13 [ 723 ^3 ( 731 732 ) ^ 2 ] "*• (^ ~ *^3 )[ 723 ^1 ~ 7l3 ^2 ]> 
Q= 7'I[7/2I(731 732)"*" 723731]"^ ^2[7I2(731 7l3 732]"'' ^3[7l3(721 723)"'" 7l2 723])®-
I l l  
Without giving numerical value to the parameters, the signs ot a,, ,a,2, and a,3 are ambiguous. 
A condition for a,, > 0 and < 0 is = r^rj^y. 
The fundamental result, however, is that the real exchange rate processes have linear 
relationships with the nonstationary real income processes. This is to say that the highest 
order of integration of the elements in the vector of income processes becomes the order of 
integration of the system. However, real exchange rates will not have a linear relationship 
unless restrictions are applied on the income processes. The optimum currency area 
r 
arguments assume that the stochastic trends in forcing variables, = \y\,y2^yi\ ^ 
interrelated, despite the economic differences among the countries in the true currency area 
(Mundell, 1961). The notion is that currency areas are determined to be in a true economic 
region if they experience the same types of real economic shocks. 
The key to Generalized-PPP, therefore, is the interrelationships among the various 
output disturbances. This suggests that it is convenient to apply the common trends 
representation developed in Stock and Watson (1988) to the system. This means that the 
vector of forcing variables, , can be represented by a single common stochastic trend, 
j),. Thus, y, can be represented as: 
'2\ 
'12 
'22 
'32 
'13 
'23 
'33 
>'1 
A 
yi 
.K.  
(3.33a) 
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or 
yt = (3.33b) 
Substituting (3.33a) into (3.31), the behavior of the real exchange rate in the system is 
determined by: 
where a^j ,  i  = 1,2,3, is defined analogously to a,, in (3.32). An important implication of 
(3.34) is that a linear relationship of the two real rates is stationary. More generally, as long 
as the rank (5) < (/w -1) in the case of 5 is the (/« + 1) x (w + 1) matrix, there exists a linear 
combination of real rates which is stationary. Furthermore, the cointegrating vector will be 
unique if the rank (6) is equal torn- 1. To express this argument, it is useful to reform (3.33) 
such that: 
(3.34) 
-^12 ~ (3.35) 
where 
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Equation (3.35) shows that the two real exchange rates are cointegrated in the sense of Engle 
and Granger (1987), where p is the cointegrating scalar which is a combination of goods 
market demand parameters. 
In the system of the /w + 1 country world, (3.34) can be extended to the case of m 
independent bilateral real exchange rates. Equation (3.34) becomes; 
R, = kY, (3.36) 
where R is the (AW x 1) vector of independent real exchange rates and A is the (/w x /n + 1) 
vector of cointegrating parameters, which are functions of the goods market demand 
parameters, and Y is the ((/w + 1) x 1) vector of stochastic trends. The resulting long-run 
equilibrium relationship, which is called Generalized-PPP, may be formed such that: 
^12( = +/^14'^I4( + • • • + (3.37) 
where i?,,. where i = 2,3, . . . ,m, are the bilateral real exchange rates in period t between 
country 1 (as a base country) and country /; and /?,, are the parameters of the cointegrating 
vector. 
In terms of the anti-log, (3.37) can be rewritten as; 
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1 
Ul 
1 p» [ 
3 
1 
L J L J L P. J 
P\m 
(3.38) 
where Pn is the price of country i in period t and £,,, is the nominal exchange rate between 
country i and the base countiy in period t. 
Equations (3.37) and (3.38) offer the notion that the real exchange rates between two 
countries is a weighted average of real exchange rate of the countries in the currency area in 
which the weights are functions of the goods market demand parameter, and not traditional 
"trade weights." The special case is when all are zero; then, Generalized-PPP becomes the 
traditional long-run relationship among domestic prices, foreign prices, and the exchange rate. 
Review of Empirical Study 
Before discussing the empirical results of various studies, it is important to consider 
the method of computing PPP itself The value of parity relies upon the kind of price index 
selected in computation. It will vary with the weighting pattern of the price measures as well. 
Different weighting schemes for the countries' price level will, in general, lead to different 
parities, none of which can be expected to equal the "true" parity, which equalizes all 
individual commodity prices internationally. This condition exists even if the price measures 
refer to traded goods alone and there are no trade restrictions or transportation costs and no 
imperfection in the arbitrage process. 
115 
With regard to the choice of prices indices, Samuelson (1964) argued that the relative 
export price index is not appropriate for computing.PPP. If the real exchange rate is 
interpreted as the relative price of importable goods in terms of exportable goods, the 
existence of money neutrality will rule out changes in the real exchange rate. Another 
argument against the use of the export price index in computing PPP relates to the degree of 
competitiveness of countries in the world market. The average export price of a country may 
continue to be aligned to international trends in order to maintain export market share, even 
though domestic costs have moved up relative to those in other countries. 
The alternative of using a unit labor cost is also considered by some economists. This 
method would appear to remedy more completely the defect of using export price. 
Combining data for hourly wages and output per man-hour should emerge as reliable 
information on PPP, which is as an equilibrium relationship. At the conceptual level, it would 
be desirable to have information on total factor costs and productivity rather than on just the 
major factor of production (Thygesen, 1978). In the Ricardian framework, Samuelson (1964) 
pointed out that production cost parity is not acceptable because such an index includes the 
borderline goods that are likely to be intermediate between broad limits. However, these 
borderline goods should not always to be in the middle as a consequence of demand shocks. 
The shift in borderline goods will cause a change in real and nominal exchange rates. 
The GDP deflator is considered to be appropriate in measuring PPP because the GDP 
deflator is the most broadly based and uniform as calculated price index. However, it is not 
free of problems. Regardless of availability shortcomings in the GDP deflator. Khan (1986) 
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argued that it could be the cause of major problems in the case of developing countries. The 
imputation of value added at constant prices for certain types of goods and services may not 
be sufficiently reliable for most developing countries. Moreover, the GDP deflator may 
exclude certain types of cost such as the cost of nonmanufacturing intermediate inputs in the 
manufacturing sector. Similar to the GDP deflator, the consumer price index (CPI) is also 
broadly based. There is a presumption that a formulation using CPI will offer the sharpest test 
of PPP because this index includes nontradable goods and services to a much larger extent 
than does the wholesales price index (WPI). Besides, CPI is readily and quickly available in 
nearly all countries on monthly, quarterly, and annual bases. In fact, CPI is often the only 
reliable price index available in developing countries. As with the other measures, CPI also 
has problems, particularly for developing countries. It is a meaningful proxy only for short-
run change in relative cost. It does not directly reflect the profitability of the primary 
producing sectors and its coverage tends to be concentrated in urban areas of the countries 
(Khan, 1986; Thygesen, 1978). 
Another candidate for using price index to calculate PPP is WPI. Some of the 
conceptual difficulties also apply to this price index, which measures heavily weighted prices 
of tradable goods. WPIs, however, give considerably greater weight to domestic cost 
elements so that conformity to a parallel price trend in different countries cannot be 
interpreted mainly as the result of efficient commodity arbitrage. This price index covers not 
only currently traded export goods, but also import-competing goods and a wide variety of 
goods that are potentially tradable. It is legitimate to consider WPIs as a useful candidate 
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series for measuring PPP (Thygesen, 1978). In the presence of money neutrality, however, 
any kind of price index such as the GDP deflator, \VPI, CPI, and others would not matter. 
Tests of whether PPP is supported by the evidence on floating exchange rate regimes 
have been conducted in various ways. One way to investigate PPP is to test the validity of 
commodity arbitrage as a component of PPP by computing PPP for highly desegregated price 
indices. A second way is based on the hypothesis that the real exchange rate should be 
constant over time and independent of nominal exchange rate movement if PPP holds. Some 
studies use regression analysis to test the relative and absolute versions of PPP. And recently, 
most studies have applied time-series econometrics to test the validity of PPP (McDonald, 
1989). 
Two divergent views are still in question about the PPP hypothesis. The first is the 
random walk PPP hypothesis, and the second is the PPP long-run phenomenon. New findings 
in statistical methods of testing such as unit root and contegration tests force economists to 
reconsider previous empirical studies. Conventional tests of PPP, in general, ignore the fact 
that the level of the spot exchange rate and domestic and foreign price indices are typically 
nonstationary. This fact could lead to unacceptable resuhs because standard critical values 
based on a normality distribution assumption are inappropriate for nonstationary variables. 
Adler and Lehman (1983) examined the long-run PPP hypothesis using the Martingale 
Model of real exchange rate. They argued that expectation form has a significant role in the 
validity test of the relative form of PPP. Deviations from PPP will follow a martingale if an 
expectation is rational. And, empirically, deviations are cumulative and persist for long 
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periods of time and appear to cycle irregularly around parity. Adler and Lehman's study was 
conducted using monthly data for exchange rates qnd CPI as well as annual data for ten 
industrial countries. They also used annual WPI. Their findings give strong evidence to 
reject the long-run PPP phenomenon in both monthly and annual data. 
Recognizing the nonstationary properties of variables, Enders (1988) and Corbae and 
Ouliaris (1988) used unit root and cointegration tests for testing the validity of PPP. Enders 
studied the validity of PPP under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes between the United 
States and major U.S. trading partners such as Canada, Germany, and Japan in the form of 
WPI, using monthly data. His results of the autoregressive integrated moving average 
(ARIMA) tests and cointegration tests give mixed support for the PPP hypothesis. In the 
Bretton Wood and flexible exchange rate periods, the point estimates of the long-run real 
exchange rate for all countries studied from ARIMA tests did not significantly differ fi-om 
unity. And point estimates indicated that real exchange rates are convergent, but standard 
errors are sufficiently large so that it is not possible to reject the random walk hypothesis. 
From cointegration tests, point estimates of long-run real rates are far fi-om unity. However, 
strong evidence of cointegration between US and Japanese price levels were found for the 
Bretton Wood period, while cointegration between US-Canadian price levels had weak 
support. 
Corbae and Ouliaris (1988) found that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can not 
be rejected for all countries studied. They concluded that this violates the long-run absolute 
version of PPP. Their study used the Canadian dollar, German deutsche mark, Italian lira. 
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Japanese yen, and UK pound against the US dollar, and monthly CPI data. Using the same 
method as Enders, and Corbae and Ouliaris, Kim and Enders (1991) found that there was little 
evidence supporting the stationary hypothesis of real exchange rates for Pacific Rim nations. 
Their most interesting finding was that money shocks cause temporary, not permanent, 
changes in real exchange rates. 
Patel (1991) examined the validity of the absolute version of PPP. Besides using the 
Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration method to test for PPP, he also applied the Stock and 
Watson (1988) method. Real exchange rate was computed based on WPI for six industrial 
countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Japan. Patel selected these countries by assuming that PPP would likely hold for 
developed, relatively fi-ee market economies. His results provide support for the random walk 
PPP hypothesis. Interestingly, he brought forth the question about the source of shocks that 
create departures fi-om PPP. His conjecture was that the shocks might be nonmonetary in 
origin, such as related to the "Dutch disease" phenomenon. Fisher and Park (1991) tested the 
validity of the weak version of PPP based on WPIs and CPIs. They concluded that relative 
PPP describes the behavior of almost all the major currencies, but the stationary hypothesis of 
real exchange rate was rejected. Disequilibrium adjustment occurs in the foreign exchange 
market, not in the goods market. 
Enders and Hum (1991a, 1991b) found that there are long-run equilibrium 
relationships among the real exchange rates of many industrialized nations when the United 
States is the base country. In the case of Japan as the base country, Generalized-PPP holds 
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for each of the Pacific Rim nations when combined with four large nations. For the large 
countries alone, Generalized-PPP does not hold. This result shows that interdependency 
among the Pacific Rim nations with large countries is weak but significant. 
Whereas the empirical studies discussed above support the random walk PPP 
hypothesis, some economists have also documented support for the PPP long-run 
phenomenon. Hakkio (1984) reexamined PPP theory in a multiple exchange world. He 
argued that many of the empirical studies that support the random walk PPP hypothesis use a 
bilateral real exchange rate model that ignores international interdependency. He suggests 
estimating PPP using a system estimation to account for the correlation of error terms across 
countries and for serial correlation within countries. Real exchange rates for his study were 
computed based on an absolute version of PPP using CPIs for the British pound, Canadian 
dollar, French fi-anc, and Japanese yen, all against the US dollar. His study fails to reject that 
PPP holds in several currencies simultaneously. 
In response to the negative results obtained in some empirical studies such as Hakkio 
(1986), Abauf and Jorion (1990) argued that such results reflect the poor power of the test 
rather than evidence against PPP. To support their argument, they chose to use the same data 
Adler and Lehman (1983) used for their study. Abauf and Jorion proposed to extend the 
Dickey and Fuller (1979) unit root test to a system of univariate auto regression, estimatation 
jointly by generalized least squares such as the seemingly unrelated regression estimated 
method. The simulation was conducted to derive an empirical distribution. Their results 
suggest that the first autoregression coefficient approximately equals 0.98 - 0.99 for monthly 
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data over the floating exchange rate period. A 50 percent over-appreciation of a currency 
with respect to PPP would take between three to five years to be cut in half, whereas a period 
of three years is needed for such a reversal in the case of annual data over the period 1900-
72. Therefore, PPP might be held in the long run. 
The attention in the prsent empirical study has moved to the investigation of the long 
run PPP phenomenon. PPP does not provide an explanation for short-run movements in 
exchange rate, as is the generally accepted consensus. The economic rationale for this failure 
is that over a short period of time, large shocks and structural change effects in the economy 
may shift real exchange rates from their long-run equilibrium positions. Self-correcting 
mechanisms built into the economy help produce a proportionality between the exchange rate 
and relative price over time. For this reason, some economists tend to study the behavior of 
real exchange rates in the long run. 
Huizinga (1987) applied two procedures to measure long-run movements in real 
exchange rates and to determine if these movements differ from those predicted by the 
random walk model. The first is the spectral procedure. The second is the regression 
procedure, which is used to compute estimates of serial correlation for the change in real 
exchange rates over certain time spans. Real exchange rates are formed using CPIs for ten 
industrial country currencies. Moreover, the study was conducted in a univariate and also in a 
multivariate, framework. Huizinga's findings support theory that PPP holds in the long run. 
In addition to evidence on the long-run mean-reverting behavior of real exchange rates, he 
found no evidence to support the contention that long-run movement of real exchange rates is 
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restricted by permanent real shocks, as some theories suggest. The notion that long-run 
movements of real exchange rates reflect those of nominal exchange rates also received no 
support from the data. 
Enders (1989) applied unit roots and the cointegartion method in testing the validity of 
PPP for the period before World War I in the case of the United Kingdom and the United 
States. For the greenback and gold standard periods, real exchange rates were convergent, 
although the gold standard allows for convergence at a greater significance level. An 
interesting result is that PPP held during a period in which there was substantial real economic 
grovi^h and limited money growth; that is, inflation was under control. These results were 
supported by Diebold, Husted, and Rush (1991), who studied deviations from parity using a 
long-memory model such as the Autoregressive Fractional Integrated Moving Average 
(ARFIMA (p,d,q)) representation. This model allows for subtle forms of mean reversion. 
Their study used annual real exchange rates based on both CPIs and WPIs for six European 
countries during the gold standard era. 
Kim (1990) found different results for different forms of real exchange rates. Using 
the cointegration technique, he rejected the hypothesis that real exchange rates follow a 
random walk, except for the case of the Canadian dollar, Japanese yen, and British pound. In 
combination with CPI, estimation of error correction models suggests that deviations from 
PPP significantly affect exchange rates in all cases where cointegration is confirmed. 
Instead of the Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, Whitt (1992) applied Sims' test for the 
presence of a unit root. Whitt's test is based on the Bayesian posterior odds ratio and is 
designed to discriminate between a unit root and a large but stationary autocorrelation 
coefficient. This test was applied for monthly CPI data from a flexible exchange regime alone 
and then for annual CPI and WPI data for the Bretton Wood and flexible exchange rate 
periods. All Whitt's results show that Sims' test consistently favors the stationary, not the 
random walk, hypothesis. These results are different Kim's findings for the case of using CPI 
to calculate PPP. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE UNIT ROOT, COINTEGRATION TESTS WITH 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
As discussed in the previous chapter, studies of PPP have reported mixed resuhs. 
Some studies support PPP, while others show departures from PPP. In light of the mixed 
empirical findings that consist of both acceptance and rejection of PPP, the importance of the 
time-series properties of such deviations as well as those of the variables themselves are of 
interest to this study. The attention of this study to the validity of the PPP hypothesis focuses 
on investigating the long run properties of PPP. 
The long-run equilibrium of real exchange rates entails a system of co-movements 
among real exchange rates. In this context, only a stable equilibrium is of interest because 
unstable equilibria will not persist, given that there are stochastic shocks to the economy. 
This leads to the statistical concept of equilibrium, which states that an equilibrium 
relationship /(x,, Xj) = 0 holds between two variables x, and x^ if the amount of 
E, = /(x„, Xj,) by which actual observations deviate from this equilibrium is a median-zero 
stationary process. That is to say, the "error," or discrepancy, between two outcomes and the 
postulated equilibrium has a fixed distribution, centered on zero, that does not change over 
time. Because this error represents shocks that are constantly occurring and affecting 
economic variables, however, in a real economic system there is no systematic tendency for 
this error to diminish over time. It would fall away to zero only if the shocks were to ease. 
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This statistical concept of equilibrium, therefore, holds automatically when applied to series 
that are themselves stationary. 
This chapter investigates such long-run relationships on real exchange rates to study 
the validity of PPP and Generalized-PPP. Most empirical studies about the validity of PPP 
and Generalized-PPP do not account for structural change. The misspecification problem 
from structural breaks, however, has been an issue related to stationary investigations such as 
the unit root test. As shown by Perron (1989), a structural break may make an otherwise 
stationary variable appear to be a unit root process. In this context, it is important to account 
for structural change in studying the validity of PPP and Generalized-PPP in the economic 
system. Besides the lack of consideration of structural change, most studies of PPP and real 
exchange rates have been related to developed countries. The presumption that initiated this 
trend is that PPP works well in a relatively free market economy. However, this does not 
mean that the concept only applies to developed countries. The following presents further 
study of the relationship of PPP and Generalized-PPP (1) for Indonesia's economy in relation 
to its trading partners, (2) among Indonesia's trading partners, and (3) among the members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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Tests of Purchasing Power Parity 
To test the PPP relationship in the Indonesian economy, the unit root test in the 
presence of structural change was applied. The methodologies that follow for the unit root 
test are those of Perron (1989), 
The Unit RootTest and Real Exchange Rates 
To test the PPP hypothesis, rewrite (3.3) in the econometric model as: 
E,P*-(pP,=s, (4.1) 
where £,is the rupiah price of the foreign currency in time i, P/is the foreign price in time t, 
P, is the Indonesian price in time t, s, is a stochastic disturbance that represents deviation 
from PPP, and ^ is a constant. 
The long-run PPP hypothesis requires that E,P' equals P,, which implies that (p = 1 
and 5, is stationary with a mean equal to zero. All E, P*, and P are endogenous variables 
that are jointly determined. This leads us to consider reformulating PPP in terms of the real 
exchange rate to preclude the possibility of using an instrument variable in estimating (4.1). 
Rearranging (4.1) gives: 
E,P; I P, = (p+s„ (4.2a) 
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and 
r, (4.2b) 
where r, is the real exchange rate and is a stochastic disturbance that represents the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium value. In this form, long-run PPP 
holds if is stationary. ^ is a constant defined as the long-run value of the real exchange 
rate. 
Now, suppose that is an indeterministic covariance stationary stochastic process. 
By the Wold decomposition theorem, j,, has an infinite order moving average representation 
that can be approximated by a finite autoregressive representation under certain conditions. In 
the case that is a finite autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA (n, 0, 0)), the 
underlying process for the real exchange rate movement, therefore, is suggested by; 
where is a serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance with zero mean. Given this 
specification, the long-run properties of PPP require that all characteristic roots of (4.3) lie 
within the unit circle. 
This study tests whether real exchange rates follow stationary processes. 
Consideration is given to the fact that using standard critical values based on a normality 
(4.3) 
128 
distribution assumption is inappropriate for nonstationary variables. Dickey and Fuller (1979, 
1981) introduced methodology for testing a unit root in the ARJMA representation and 
provided critical values for such tests in the case of nonstationaiy time series with multiple 
roots. The application of this test was improved when Said and Dickey (1984) proposed a 
generalization of the Dickey-Fuller procedure. Said and Dickey, however, yield test statistics 
with the same asymptotic critical values as those tabulated by Dickey and Fuller. This test 
can be applied to models in which the orders of the ARIMA polynomials in the error process 
do not need to be identified. However, the procedure requires that error processes are free of 
serial correlations. Phillips (1987) and Phillips and Perron (1988) have offered a more general 
procedure for testing a unit root in a time-series model in which the restrictions on error 
processes are such that serial correlation is relaxed. 
Within the regression model framework, the change in one or more of the parameters 
indicates a structural change. Misspecification problems associated with a structural break 
have been related to unit root tests. The methods developed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, 
1981), Phillips (1987), and Phillips and Perron (1988) are unable to detect such problems 
(Perron, 1989). As Perron (1989) showed, a structural break may make an otherwise 
stationary variable appear to be a unit root process. In the presence of structural change, he 
proposed a formal statistical test of the null hypothesis for the unit root in the spirit of 
"intervention analysis." 
Perron considers three different alternatives for testing unit roots in the presence of 
regime shifts. The first regression is used to test unit roots in time-series models in the 
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presence of a one-time jump in the mean of a unit root process. The second ahemative tests 
in the presence of a change in intercept, and the thjrd tests in the presence of a one-time jump 
in both the mean and the intercept of a unit root process. All three tests can be presented 
formally in terms of the level of real exchange rate (/?). 
Let the presence of a structural change in the Indonesian economy at time t be 
/ = T+1. For the first alternative test, consider the null hyphotesis of a one-time change in the 
mean of a unit root process against the alternative hypothesis of a one-time jump in the 
intercept of a trend stationary process. Formally, the null and alternative hypotheses are: 
where R is the log of real exchange rate (r); £), is a dununy variable such that D, = 1 if 
t= T+1, and zero otherwise; x, is a dummy variable such that x, = 1 for / > T, and zero 
otherwise; and /ig, «(,, , and /? are parameters of the null and alternative hypotheses. 
The second alternative considers the null hypothesis of a permanent shift in the drift 
term against the alternative of a change in the slope of the trend. In this case, the null and 
alternative hypotheses are: 
(4.4a) 
and 
(4.4b) 
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//„: R, = Mo +^,-1 +/"iA + (4.5a) 
and 
• Rt = Ma +P\t + A A + (4.5b) 
where = 1 if t ) r ,  and zero otherwise. Equation (4.5a) implies that the | sequence is 
generated by A/?,  = / /„+£,  up to  per iod t=r ,  and by A/?,  =  ( / ig  +  / i , )  +  £,  as  / )  r .  
D3 = / - r for O and zero otherwise. From (4.5b), the slope of the trend is 
/? ,  for  /  < r  and ( /? ,  +  yff j )  for  / )  r .  
The third alternative combines the two cases above. Formally, the null and alternative 
hypotheses are: 
•^0 • ^ ~ Mo A /^2 A (4.6a) 
and 
R,= +P^t +^2A + (4.6b) 
where D^, D^, D^, and x, are as defined above. 
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In pursuing the test, the raw series {/?,} is first detrended according to one of the 
ahematives, in first (I), second (II), or third (III). "Let {i?,'}, i = I, II, III, be the residuals fi-om 
a regression of R, as follows: 
For/• = 1, R,=fi^+pt + +R, (4.7a) 
F o r =  I I ,  R^=-+ R, (4.7b) 
For /• = III, R,=fi^ +P^t ^-PtPt, + + R, (4.7c) 
Furthermore, let a' be the least squares estimator of ci in the following regression : 
r; = +e, i = I, II, III t = 1,2,...r (4.8) 
where under the null hypothesis of a unit root, the theoretical value of or' = 1. In the case that 
the residuals (e,) are identically and independently distributed, the limiting distribution of 
depends on the proportion of observations occurring prior to the break, X-r/T, where T\s 
the total number of observations. The critical values for alternatives I, II, and III are 
presented in Perron (1989) in Tables IV, V, and VI, respectively. 
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For the case that the residuals, e,, are serially correlated, the extensions are necessary. 
Two approaches are possible. One is to follow thejnethod suggested by Phillips (1987) and 
Phillips and Perron (1988). The other is to use the method suggested by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979, 1981) and Said and Dickey (1984). The latter approach includes the application of the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. This framework was formed by the regression; 
k 
AR; = a'RU + + e, / = I, II, m (4.9) j=i 
where ARj = - R',_^, and lag k is sufficiently large for e, to be serially uncorrelated. The 
limiting distributions for in this case, then, are the same as when the errors are identically 
and independently distributed and regression (4.8) is used in the test. 
Data 
Having presented the method used to test the unit root for Indonesian real exchange 
rate time-series data in the presence of structural change, it is time to explain how the series 
are constructed. Three different series for Indonesian real exchange rates were constructed 
for this study. The first series (series I) was constructed by multiplying the foreign WPI by 
the rupiah price of the foreign currency and then dividing by the IndonesianWPI. The 
justification for constructing the real exchange rate in this way is discussed in the previous 
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chapter. Instead of using the Indonesian WPI as was done in the first series, the second series 
(series II) was constructed using the Indonesian wholesale price excluding the oil price. The 
intention was to observe the behavior of the Indonesian real exchange rate when it does not 
account for oil price. As mentioned in Chapter 2, oil exports were once a major component 
of total Indonesian exports, but this role has been reduced by policy reforms. The real 
exchange rate for the third series (series III) was constructed using the nominal exchange rate 
with respect to each country's foreign WPI and the Indonesian CPI. All price data are 
normalized to be 100 as of January 1985. Using monthly data from International Financial 
Statistics, the real exchange rate for seven of Indonesia's major trading partners—the United 
States, Germany, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—were 
constructed for all three data series. The sample period is January 1974 through October 
1992. 
Empirical Results 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the structural change in the Indonesian economy 
started with the change in Indonesia's exchange rate system that accompanied with the 
adjustment of the rate. This condition justifies the choice of the first ahemative test of Perron 
(1989) in investigating the validity of PPP in this study. An augmented Dickey-Fuller test was 
used with the detrended the series. A lag of one was chosen for all the tests ensuring that 
disturbances are serially uncorrected. The point of structural break was set at March 1983. 
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Table 4.1. The Perron unit root test in the presence of structural change. 
Model •. r,= i^^+pT+ a^x, +r, Ar, = 0^/-
k 
1=1 
Real Exchange Rate Series I Series II Series III 
k X k X h k X 
United States 1 0.48 -2.49 1 0.48 -3.42 1 0.48 -3.05 
Germany 1 0.48 -1.62 1 0.48 -1.98 1 0.48 -2.10 
Japan 1 0.48 -1.82 1 0.48 -2.23 1 0.48 -2.05 
South Korea 1 0.48 -2.41 1 0.48 -2.63 1 0.48 -2.79 
Philippines 1 0.48 -l.Ti 1 0.48 -3.35 1 0.48 -3.34 
Singapore 1 0.48 -3.14 I 0.48 -3.60 I 0.48 -2.94 
Thailand 1 0.48 -2.14 1 0.48 -2.83 1 0.48 -2.97 
Note; The critical value for X, = 0 .4 with a significance level of 5 % is -3.72, while for >. = 0 .5 with a 
significance level of 5 %, the critical value is -3.76 (Table IV b in Perron, 1989). 
The results of the unit root test of the real exchange rate for each country in the three 
series are reported in Table 4.1. The null hypothesis that the real exchange rate is a unit root 
process cannot be rejected at the 5 % significance level for all real exchange rates in all three 
data series. This means that the PPP hypothesis does not hold in all the countries studied. 
The Test of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity 
So far, the research shows that the bilateral real exchange rates of interest to this study 
exhibited nonstationary stochastic processes. This result was expected and predicted by the 
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theory of Generalized-PPP. This stage, then, leads to an investigation of whether Generalized-
PPP holds in the group of countries hypothesized to constitute an optimum currency area. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the theory of Generalized-PPP holds when there exists at least 
one stationary linear combination of the various bilateral real exchange rates in a particular 
group of countries. 
The theory of Generalized-PPP, therefore, implies that more than one stationary linear 
combination of various bilateral real exchange rates could exist for the countries that 
constitute an optimum currency area, as defined by Mundell (1968). This implication means 
that the procedure for testing the validity of Generalized-PPP must address the issue of 
multiple cointegrating vectors. This leads to elimination of procedures such as the two-step 
procedure for testing for the existence of cointegration suggested by Engle and Granger 
(1987). The methods based on the cointegrating rank, however, are appropriate. One 
commonly used method is Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure (Johansen, 1988, 1991). 
The issue of structural change has been of interest to many economists. In 
investigating the PPP relationship, Ballasa (1964) has argued the issue of structural change 
(e.g., changes in the supply and demand relationship) as one reason for purchasing power 
disparities. Another argument that brings out this issue within macroeconomics is the so-called 
Lucas critique, which discusses parameter changes. The idea is that the parameters of 
macroeconomic models are determined by the expectations of economic agents involved in 
forming future economic policies. If policies change, so do the expectations and related 
parameters. Therefore, the presence of structural change in the economic system must be 
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accounted for in investigating the validity of Generalized-PPP and PPP, if they exist. 
Otherwise, the procedure could lead to misspecification problems. 
This study applies Johansen's method, which accounts for structural change in the 
economy of a base country in constructing a bilateral real exchange rate. Related studies 
about the validity of Generalized-PPP, such as Enders and Hum (1991a, 1991b), also used 
Johansen's procedure. Those investigations, however, did not consider the issue of structural 
change. 
This study attempts to test for Generalized-PPP in specified groups of countries in the 
presence of structural change. First, the description of the econometric model is presented 
and applied to the discussion of the groups of countries studied. Then, a discussion of the 
cointegration test for Generalized-PPP and diagnostic tests for error terms in the model are 
discussed. 
Econometric Model' 
To test for Generalized-PPP, assume that the ^-dimensional time-series real exchange 
rates ) fit a vector autoregressive representation (VAR), such that: 
+ . . . + + C + tpD, + e, / = 1,2,. . .,T (4.10) 
' For more discussion about cointegration. see Banerjee A, J.J Dolado, J.W Galbraith and D.F Henry (1993). 
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where is an independently identically normal distributed /J-dimensional vector with zero 
mean and covariance matrix are vectors of bilateral real exchange rates, 
C is a vector of the constants, and D, is a dummy variable that accounts for structural change. 
Considering that the bilateral real exchange rates used for this study are all 
nonstationary processes in the presence of structural change, the VAR system in (4.10) can be 
expressed in first-difiference form as: 
Econometric model (4.11) is a multivariate version of the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
model for testing unit roots. In model (4.11), the matrix n, as defined in (4.12), plays a key 
role in cointegration. We can eleborate on three distinct cases with respect to the rank of the 
n matrix such that; ^ 
Fy A/^_y + + C + + f, (4.11) 
where A = (l-Z,) 
r,. =-( / - ;7z- , - .  .  .-TTj), 7 = 1,. . .,k-\ 
(4.12) 
^Example for cases (I) and (II). Let n = 2. If ;r2 = 0 and ;r, = /, then (/ - - ;r,) = 0. In this case, 
all elements of R, are unit root processes, and (/ - ~ ^2) However, if 7?^ = Oand 
={p,,. • jpi), where Pj {1 V/, j = \, . . . , k, then(/-;r, -^2) 'S full rank and all 
element of are stationary AR(1) process. 
- K  n .  
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(i) rank {n) = n, full rank, any linear combination of will be stationary. 
(ii) rank (;r) =0, matrix of zeros, any linear combination of r, will be a unit root and 
therefore nonstationary. 
(iii) 0 < rank {k) =r<xi, there exist (n x r) matrices and fi such that t: = ap . 
In this case, rank of k, r, is the number of linearly independent cointegrating relations 
among variables in r,. 
In case (iii), the matrix n is expressed as the product of two (w x r) matrices, 
o( and p such that k - afi . Although lsR^ is stationary and is nonstationary as a vector 
process, this study assumes that the r linear combinations of P R, are stationary. Therefore, 
the r columns of p are cointegrating vectors, and it can be said that the vector process R, is 
cointegra ted wi th  cointegra t ing vectors  p.  
An econometric model, then, can be used to test the validity of Generalized-PPP. The 
main hypothesis to be considered is the hypothesis of r cointegration vectors: 
Yi:7i=ap (4.13) 
where and P are « x r matrices. Furthermore, in the case of 0 < r < n, the estimation of a 
and P will lead to the construction of Generalized-PPP for the real exchange rates of interest 
to this study. 
Testing for the hypothesis in (4.13) and estimating the cointegrating vectors (a and p) 
are accomplished by following Johansen's maximum likelihood procedure. Following this 
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procedure, consider (4.12) and regress both AR, andi^.^ on (a/?",.,, . . . , A/?,_t^,,£),,l) to 
obtain residuals R^, and R^, respectively. Letting q, = , . . . , ,D\ ,1'), then: 
k-\ 
R^^AR^-'ZW., 
(sl 
(4.14) 
where (i",,. . (=1 /V(=l (4.15) 
and 
jt-i 
(4.16) 
r Y r Y' 
where =[ I 
•.(=1 /V(=l / (4.17) 
The likelihood function, then, takes the form: 
L{a,fi,Q) = exp|-^(i^,-aj3Rt,) -a/^R^l (4.18) 
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For fixed (3, regress on to obtain; 
and 
:[p)=-s,j[iss^py 
£x^) = 5„-s../?(^s„ysrvs.. 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
where = T' /,y = 0,/r. 
/=i 
Consequently, (4.18) can be expressed as; 
(4.21) 
to (4.22) 
Maximizing (4.22) with respect to /? corresponds to minimizing the generalized variance ratio; 
(4.23) 
This minimization can now be translated into a generalized eigenvalue problem and solved;^ 
— 0  (4.24) 
^From the theory of canonical correlation, an expression of the form | /?'() /? |/| y3M, | can be 
minimized by solving the equation |/?A/| - | = 0 • 
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where A. is given by solving: 
|-W«-«"o.S..|=0 (4.25) 
The complete set of eigenvectors is given, then, by solving: 
~ ® = 1>2, . . . ,n (4.26) 
subject to normalization: 
V'S^V = I (4.27) 
A 
P is given by the corresponding eigenvectors for r largest eigenvalues such that: 
.,vj (4.28) 
A 
and a and other estimate parameters are found by inserting fi into the above equation; for 
example, (4.20) and (4.21). 
The statistically significant cointegration vectors under the hypothesis in (4.14) can be 
proceeded by applying likelihood ratio tests as suggested by Johansen, such that: 
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(4.20) 
and 
(4.21) 
The distribution of or the trace statistic, is given under the hypothesis that there are r or 
less cointegrating vectors, against the alternative hypothesis that there are n cointegrating 
vectors. The , or maximal eigenvalue statistic, tests the hypothesis that there are r 
cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r + 1 cointegrating vectors. Both these 
statistics, however, and have nonstandard distributions. The distributions are 
multivariate versions of the Dickey-Fuller distribution. Critical values for the above statistics 
have been tabulated by Johansen and Juselius (1990) for values of n between 1 and 5 and by 
Osterwold-Lenum (1992) for values of n between 1 and 11. 
One of the issues raised by the theory of Generalized-PPP is that of an optimum 
currency area. The existence of a group of countries that constitutes a currency area depends 
on the degree of interrelationship among the countries in one economic community. The 
interrelationship itself could be considered as the effect of regionalization and economic 
interaction. The countries that belong to ASEAN have these characteristics. 
The Country Groups 
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ASEAN—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore—was 
established in August 1967. Brunei was admitted in 1984. Economic issues were not 
originally the first objective of ASEAN. Nevertheless, the idea of an ASEAN free trade area 
(ASEAN-FTA) was discussed in ASEAN ministry meetings in recent years. Finally, after 
many delays, the association endorsed the ASEAN-FTA development program in 15 years and 
the Common EflFective Preferential TariflF (CEPT) on selected products, proposed by Thailand, 
and by Indonesia, respectively, at the January 1992 summit meeting. One reason this group of 
countries postponed implementing the ASEAN-FTA may have been the low importance of 
interregional trade, despite the reality that the countries have similar exports of primaiy 
commodities and manufacturing goods. Table 4.2 provides a summary of ASEAN trade 
performance for 1960-90. It is clear from Table 4.2 that while the share of intraregional trade 
is not insignificant, it declined in the 1970s and has remained stable since then. External trade, 
where the United States, Japan, and Germany are the major trading partners showed a big 
jump in the 1970s . However, it declined slightly in the 1980s. This late external trade 
performance, together with increased emphasis on trade regionalization such as the North 
Table 4.2. Changes in trade-to-GDP ratio: ASEAN countries (percent) 
Period Total External Trade Intraregional Trade 
1960-70 9.4 3.6 5.8 
1970-80 27.6 23.6 4.0 
1980-90 23.9 19.3 4.5 
Source: de la Torre and Kelley (1992). 
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American Free Trade Agreement and the European Economic Community, may have push the 
ASEAN to review the idea of an ASEAN-FTA. . 
In this study, therefore, it is argued that Generalized-PPP could be valid for the 
ASEAN groups, the ASEAN group and each major trading partner, and the group of 
majortrading partners with each ASEAN country. The availability of data, however, excludes 
of Malaysia and Brunei from the study. Malaysia does not publish wholesale price data, and 
Brunei was omitted because the country did not join ASEAN until 1984. In addition, the 
validity of Generalized-PPP is examined for Pacific Rim countries. Thus, South Korea was 
added to the ASEAN group as representative of the Pacific Rim countries. There are two 
reasons for choosing this country. First, South Korea resembles the ASEAN members 
(except the Philippines in recent years) in terms of high economic growth performance and 
tight trade relationships with ASEAN members. Second, South Korea and the ASEAN 
countries are all members of Southeast Asia Central Banks (SEACEN) 
Lag-Length Test 
Two important assumptions in model (4.11) are independence over time and normality 
of disturbance terms. In this section, the choice of lag length in the VARs for all country 
groups is determined by applying Sims' (1980) procedure. Sims has argued that the 
conventional likelihood ratio test for determining lag length has some shortcomings when it is 
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applied to the VAR system. As an alternative, he has suggested a modified likelihood ratio test 
statistic such that: 
Z(r) = (7'-c)(ln|n^|-|Q„|) (4.22) 
where T is the number of observations, c is the total number of regression coefficients 
estimated divided by the number of equations, and |Qfl| and |Qy| are determinants of 
covariance matrices of restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. Under the null 
hypothesis model, the statistic L{T) converges to where the degree offi-eedom {dj) 
is the number of linear restrictions. 
For each system, the VAR model was estimated with lag lengths of 4 versus 6, 9 
versus 6, and 12 versus 9, and the shortest lag length k was chosen for all equations in the 
system that were left with white noise residuals. Tables 4.3a, 4.3b, and 4.3c report the results 
of the optimal lag-length tests. For all three data series, the null hypothesis for the VAR of 6 
versus 4 lag length is rejected, and the same result is obtained for the VAR of 9 versus 6 lag 
length. 
The null hypothesis for the VAR of 12 versus 9 lag length was not completely 
rejected. In addition, the Durbin-Watson values for all equations in the system for all series 
were around 2. Based on these results and the fact that the error terms are not serially 
correlated, the VAR system with a lag length of 12 is used in analyzing the validity of 
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Table 4.3. Lag-Length Test. 
a. Data Series I 
Group /a 6 vs 4 9 vs 6 12 vs 9 /b 
ASEAN 20.62 (0.98) 47.53 (0.72) 22.19(1.00) 
USRE-ASEAN 34.44 (0.99) 81.51 (0.99) 42.78 (0.99) 
JARE-ASEAN 34.19(0.99) 76.22 (0.93) 35.92(1.00) 
GERE-ASEAN 27.89 (0.99) 61.36 (0.99) 42.90(1.00) 
KORE-ASEAN 34.61 (0.99) 61.63 (0.99) 35.95 (1.00) 
SIRE-MATRAD 27.53 (0.99) 59.57 (0.99) 53.24(1.00) 
PHRE-MATRAD 38.94 (0.99) 69.14(0.98) 46.36(1.00) 
THRE-MATRAD 27.61 (0.99) 48.85 (0.99) 46.86(1.00) 
KORE-MATRAD 26.77 (0.99) 50.31 (0.99) 61.42(1.00) 
b. Data Series II 
Group /a 6 vs 4 9 vs 6 12 vs 9 /b 
ASEAN 18.84 (0.99) 45.52 (0.72) 22.70(1.00) 
USRE-ASEAN 35.11 (0.99) 27.22 (0.99) 46.62(1.00) 
JARE-ASEAN 30.26 (0.99) 83.08 (0.82) 37.68(1.00) 
GERE-ASEAN 22.52 (0.99) 71.30 (0.97) 40.23 (1.00) 
KORE-ASEAN 32.21 (0.99) 69.03 (0.98) 34.93 (1.00) 
SIRE-MATRAD 27.85 (0.99) 58.61 (0.99) 59.97(1.00) 
PHRE-MATRAD 39.66 (0.99) 57.39 (0.99) 65.11 (1.00) 
THRE-MATRAD 26.99 (0.99) 72.38 (0.96) 61.83 (1,00) 
KORE-MATRAD 26.16(0.99) 60.54 (0.99) 79.36 (0.99) 
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Table 4.3. (continued) 
c. Data Series III 
Group /a 6 vs 4 9 vs 6 12 vs 9 /b 
ASEAN 26.51 (0.87) 46.56 (0.75) 30.01 (0.99) 
USRE-ASEAN 32.48 (0.99) 69.34 (0.98) 64.64(1.00) 
JARE-ASEAN 40.62 (0.99) 73.88 (0.95) 49.72(1.00) 
GERE-ASEAN 39.11 (0.99) 82.08 (0.84) 52.95 (1.00) 
KORE-ASEAN 34.91 (0.99) 64.84 (0.99) 53.22 (1.00) 
SIRE-MATRAD 44.96 (0.96) 65.07 (0.99) 64.11 (1.00) 
PHRE-MATRAD 36.36 (0.99) 79.15 (0.89) 60.41 (1.00) 
THRE-MATRAD 27.82 (0.99) 48.39 (0.99) 47.20(1.00) 
KORE-MATRAD 24.84 (0.99) 48.31 (0.99) 64.11 (1.00) 
/a. The ASEAN variable consists of real exchange rates for the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. MATRAD consists of real exchange rates for the United States (USRE), Japan 
(JARE), and Germany (GERE). KORE stands for the South Korean real exchange rate. For 
all these real exchange rates, Indonesia is the base country. 
^ Numbers are sample statistics oiL(T)\ numbers in parentheses are marginal significance 
levels. 
Generalized-PPP for this study. The other consideration in choosing this lag length was that 
the data used in this study are monthly data. 
Empirical Results 
The validity of Generalized-PPP was investigated for the country groups using the 
three data series used in analyzing PPP. Besides investigating the validity of Generalized-PPP, 
the use of data series I, II was intended to search for any indications of the importance of oil 
and gas prices in Indonesia's exchange rate determination and the competitiveness of 
Indonesian manufactured goods excluding oil in worid markets. Data series III was used in 
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addition to the other two series to study whether the specified real exchange rates, based on 
WPI and CPI, support Generalized-PPP. In this eippirical investigation March 1983 is 
considered the point of structural break in Indonesia, as was done in the study of PPP. 
For each system, the cointegration test based on the methodology discussed above was 
used to examine the existence of Generalized-PPP. The first attempt investigated whether the 
ASEAN countries constitute a currency area in the sense implied by Generalized-PPP. The 
second studied the influence of major trading partners on ASEAN real exchange rates. 
The ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Case 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the cointegraton test for real exchange rates among the 
ASEAN countries for all three data series. The trace test statistic rejects the null hypotheses of 
r = 0 for data series I and III and cannot reject the null hypothesis r = 0 for data series 11 at 
the 5 % significance level. The null hypothesis of r < 1 for series I and HI cannot be rejected 
at 5 % significant level. These results give us the preliminary conclusion that the system has 
one stationary linear relationship for both series I, and III and no stationary long run linear 
relationship for series II. 
Based on the lambda max test statistic, the null hypothesis of r = 0 for series III can be 
rejected, while for series I, and II, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5 % 
significance level. The null of r = I cannot be rejected for series III at the 5 % significance 
level. These results only support the existing of one cointegration relationship only for series 
III. If we compare the results of both test statistics, the results are inconsistent with respect to 
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the series I. Since one test statistic has supported the existence of one cointegration 
relationship for series I, it is concluded that the grpup of ASEAN real exchange rates, based 
on data series I and III, have a single cointegrating vector. This means that ASEAN real 
exchange rates based on the WPI and CPI give empirical support for the validity of 
Generalized-PPP. 
Table 4.4 Cointegration test for the ASEAN real exchange rates. 
Data ^trace '^max 
Null r = 0 r< 1 r < 2  r = 0 r = \  r = 2 
Series I 37.209 19.713 4.819 17.495 14.896 4.817 
Series II 33.263 16.700 5.049 16.562 11.651 5.049 
Series III 45.102 17.226 A.GIA 21.SI 6 13.151 4.074 
C V/a 
5% 34.91 19.96 9.24 22.00 15.67 9.24 
/a.Critical values (CV) are based on Table 1* in Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
Another implication of these results is that the way real exchange rates are constructed 
affects support for the validity of Generalized-PPP. Consider the case between series I and 
series II. Excluding oil price from the WPI in constructing real exchange rates results in 
I 
rejection of Generalized-PPP. One conjecture for this result is that oil might play a significant 
role in linking the ASEAN economy. As the base country in constructing the real exchange 
rates, Indonesia is the only major country exporting oil and gas. This could be an empirical 
indication that oil price has a major influence on Indonesia's exchange rate determination. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, the role of oil and gas revenue on Indonesia's current account and 
government revenues has been very significant. 
Cointegration tests for ASEAN real exchange rates based on series I and III provide 
empirical support for the conclusion that there exists a linear combination of ASEAN real 
exchange rates that is stationary. Based on this empirical support for the validity of 
Generalized-PPP, we constructed Generalized-PPP for the ASEAN countries. To construct 
and interpret the relationship of bilateral real exchange rates within this group (e.g., the 
relationship of the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate to Thailand and the Philippine real 
exchange rates) with respect to Indonesia, the estimated cointegration vector of p must be 
normalized based on the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate. In general, the resuhs 
presented are based on the empirical study using data series I; however, some of the 
discussion is based on all three data series. Table 4.5 reports the long-run equilibrium 
relationships for ASEAN real exchange rates based on data series I. 
According to the theory of Generalized-PPP, the relationship of ASEAN real 
exchange rates can be formed, in general, as: 
+ A:,/,/n = 2,3,4; k^l^m (4.23) 
where y0's are long-run relationships based on cointegrating vectors as shown in Table 4.5 and 
is a stationary stochastic disturbance term. If bilateral real exchange rates, which are 
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formed in terms of natural logarithms, are defined as the relative prices, then p can be 
interpreted as the long-run elasticity of demand for imports of Indonesian products. 
The relationship of the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate to other real exchange 
rates in the group can be constructed following (4.23) for data series I as: 
R,, = 0.2482 + 0.2943 (4.24) 
Equation (4.24) shows that the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate increases by 0.2482 
percent in response to a 1 percent change in the Thailand/Indonesian real exchange rate, given 
that the Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate remains constant. In other words, the 
Singapore/Indonesian relative price increases by 0.2482 percent as result of a 1 percent 
increase in Thailand's import demand for Indonesian goods. Another relationship is that a 1 
percent increase in the Philippines/Indonesian relative price will cause the 
Singapore/Indonesian relative price to increase by 0.2943 percent. This result shows that 
changes in import demand for Indonesian goods in Thailand and the Philippines do not really 
affect Singapore/Indonesian relative prices. For other relationships in this group, however, 
the inverse occurs. The 1 percent change in Singapore's import demand a 4.0289 percent 
increase in Thailand/Indonesian relative price and a 3.3981 percent increase in the 
Philippines/Indonesian relative price. 
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Table 4.5. The long-run equilibrium relationship of ASEAN real exchange rates: Series I. 
SIRE • THRE PHRE 
SIRE 0.2482 0.2943 
THRE 4.0289 -1.1856 
PHRE 3.3981 -0.8434 
Interpreting a as the speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium (Johansen 
and Juselius, 1990) allows the of study how fast each real exchange rate reacts to a deviation 
from Generalized-PPP in the ASEAN real exchange rate group. The values of a for all three 
real exchange rates are listed as; 
SIRE THRE PHRE 
a 0.006 0.001 0.001 
These results cleariy show that the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate makes a faster 
adjustment than do the other two real exchange rates. The Thailand and Philippines real 
exchange rates have the same speed of adjustment to a deviation in Generalized-PPP. The 
sign of a was positive for all cases. This result signals that a deviation in Generalized-PPP 
could be caused by the appreciation of real exchange rates. Overall, the adjustment speeds of 
real exchange rates for any deviation from the long-run stationary relationship are relatively 
slow in this group. 
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The Influences of Major Trading Partners 
The ASEAN countries are relatively small in comparison with their major trading 
partners. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that the events in large countries influence the 
behavior of the real exchange rates of ASEAN countries. Enders and Hum (1991b) report 
that the influences of large-country events are significant to the forcing variable of real 
exchange rates, such as the real income processes of each Pacific Rim nation. This study 
examines the influence of major trading partners on ASEAN countries, but incorporates the 
concept of structural change in the base country (Indonesia). In addition, the study examines 
the behavior of each major trading partner's real exchange rate in relation to the real exchange 
rates for the ASEAN group. This study was motivated by the fact that the ASEAN countries, 
in general, have similar commodity exports to the same major trading partners. 
Table 4.6 reports the cointegration test for real exchange rates for the ASEAN group 
and each major trading partner. Using the lambda trace test statistic for series I, we can reject 
the null hypotheses of r = 0 and r < 1 (against the alternative that r > 1 and r > 2, respectively) 
at the 5 percent significance level for the South Korea-ASEAN group and at 10 percent 
significant level for the United State-ASEAN, and Japan-ASEAN groups. The null 
hypotheses of r = 0 can be rejected, while the null hypotheses of r = 1 cannot be rejected at 
the 5 percent significance level for the United State-ASEAN, Japan-ASEAN, and Germany-
ASEAN groups. The null hypothesis of r < 2 against r > 2 cannot be rejected for the South 
Korea-ASEAN group groups at both the 5 percent significant levels. These results suggest 
that there exist at least one cointegrating vectors at the 5 percent significance level in all the 
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groups of real exchange rates studied and at least two cointegrating vectors at the 10 percent 
significant level. 
Lambda max test statistics, however, give inconsistent results compared with those 
from the lambda trace test. The null hypotheses of r = 0 (against the alternative that the /• = 1) 
cannot be rejected at the 5 percent significance level, but the null hypothesis of r = 0 for the 
United State-ASEAN group can be rejected at the 10 percent significance level; the value of 
the lambda max statistic for the Japan-ASEAN group is borderline for rejecting the null 
hypothesis of r = 0 at the 10 percent significance level. According to results fi-om both the 
lambda trace and the lambda max statistics, it can be concluded that there is only one 
cointegrating vector in both the United State-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN groups, while for 
the other two groups there are no long-run stationary relationships among real exchange rates 
in the system. 
The validity of Generalized-PPP for the same groups is also tested using data series II. 
This empirical study supports the results fi-om series I. Noting that ASEAN real exchange 
rates have no long-run stationary relationship, it is clear that the United States and Japan as 
major trading partners significantly influence the ASEAN economy, while Germany and South 
Korea do not. 
The results of the cointegrating test using data series III are slightly different. The null 
hypothesis of r = 0 (against r > 1 and r = 1) using lambda trace and lambda max test statistics 
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can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level for all groups. Both statistics, however, give 
inconsistent results in the case of the null hypotheses of r < 1 and r =1 for the United State-
ASEAN real exchange rate group. For the Japan-ASEAN and Korea-ASEAN real exchange 
Table 4.6 Cointegration test for the ASEAN group and each of the major trading partners, 
rates, both statistics can reject the null hypothesis of r = 0 at 5 percent significant level. 
However, they consistently cannot reject the null of r < 1 and r = 1 at the 5 percent 
Table 4.6 Cointegration test for the ASEAN group and each of the major trading partners. 
Group ;; ^trace max 
Null r = 0 r< 1 r<l r < 3  r = 0 r = \  r = 2 r = 3 
Series I 
USRE-ASEAN 59.779 32.769 15.911 3.766 27.011 16.857 12.145 3.766 
JARE-ASEAN 59.802 34.605 14.702 6.384 25.197 19.902 8.317 6.384 
GERE-ASEAN 54.979 31.009 16.772 4.666 23.970 14.237 12.105 4.666 
KORE-ASEAN 57.584 36.925 17.702 4.804 20.658 19.223 12.890 4.804 
Series II 
USRE-ASEAN 58.922 33.134 14.827 3.212 25.788 18.306 11.615 3.212 
JARE-ASEAN 66.764 41.540 17.239 7.662 25.224 24.301 9.577 7.662 
GERE-ASEAN 53.796 34.841 18.528 4.648 19.315 15.953 13.879 4.648 
KORE-ASEAN 57.032 35.164 15.884 5.074 21.867 19.281 10.809 5.074 
Series III 
USRE-ASEAN 66.458 30.947 8.822 1.432 35.511 22.125 7.389 1.432 
JARE-ASEAN 67.868 31.909 12.426 4.421 35.958 19.483 8.005 4.421 
GERE-ASEAN 75.520 40.697 15.092 3.765 34.824 25.605 11.326 3.766 
KORE-ASEAN 71.659 29.650 9.633 3.522 42.009 20.017 6.111 3.522 
CV/a 
5% 53.65 34.91 19.96 9.24 28.14 22.00 15.67 9.24 
10% 49.65 32.00 17.85 7.52 25.56 19.77 13.75 7.52 
/a Critical values are based on Table 1* in Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
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significance level. The null of r < 2 and r = 2 cannot be rejected at 5 percent sugnificant level 
for the German-ASEAN real exchange rates. 
The empirical studies of the validity of Generalized-PPP using all three data series, 
therefore, give mixed results for all the groups. However, the results are consistent enough to 
support the existence of single long-run stationary relationships among real exchange rates for 
the United States-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN groups. This result leads to the conjecture that 
the importance of Germany and South Korea in the ASEAN economy is less than that of the 
United States and Japan. The dynamics of both the United States and Japanese influence on 
the ASEAN economy are discussed in the next chapter. 
The above resuhs above can be interpreted by forming a Generalized-PPP for both the 
United States-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN groups. First, a general representation of 
Generalized-PPP is formed for both groups. The existence of long-run stationary 
relationships and the same number of countries in both groups allow Generalized-PPP to be 
formed as: 
^kt ~Pm^u P\n^\ni k,l,m,n - 2,3,4,5 (4.25) 
where ^ is a stationary stochastic disturbance and j3's are the long-run equilibrium 
relationships among real exchange rates within the group. As before, fi's can be interpreted in 
terms of long-run elasticity among the relative prices. 
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Consider the United States as a major trading partner of all ASEAN countries, 
whereas the United States-ASEAN group constitutes a currency area in the Generalized-PPP 
sense. Assume that all the countries have similar export goods. Therefore, it is natural to think 
that Indonesia determines the United State/Indonesian relative price from the Indonesian 
perspective based on Indonesia's competitiveness among ASEAN countries. In following this 
argument, the long-run relationship of United State/Indonesian real exchange rates with other 
real exchange rates in the currency area is: 
= -\.2527r,. +0.8016;2rAa, +0.6534;?^^^, (4.26) 
This long-run relationship tells us that Indonesia will adjust the United State/Indonesian 
relative price by 0.816 percent for each 1 percent increase in the Thailand/Indonesian relative 
price, given that other real exchange rates remain constant. The United State/Indonesian 
relative price also increases by 0.6534 percent for each 1 percent increase in the 
Philippines/Indonesian relative price, given that other real exchanges remain constant. 
However, in response to a 1 percent increase in Singapore/Indonesian relative price, Indonesia 
decreases the United State/Indonesian relative price by 1.2527 percent. This result can be 
interpreted such that a 1 percent increase in Singaporean import demand for Indonesian goods 
causes Indonesia's competitiveness in the US market to decline by 1.2527 percent. Therefore, 
this result seems to suggest that Indonesia prefers the Singaporean market to the US market. 
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How fast each of the real exchange rates in this currency area adjust to a deviation in 
Generalized-PPP is an important issue in this relationship. The speed of adjustment can be 
judged from the following values of a: 
USRE SIRE THRE PHRE 
a -0.009 -0.100 -0.008 -0.007 
The speeds of adjustment for all the real exchange rates are very similar, but relatively slow. 
Interestingly, the adjustments move in the same direction, that is, bringing down the real 
exchange rate long-run relationships. In other words, the results signal that deviations in 
Generalized-PPP come from depreciation of all real exchange rates in this currency area. 
The next step is to study the Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate long-run relationship 
with ASEAN group real exchange rates. Generalized-PPP for this currency area with respect 
to the Japanese real exchange rate is formed such that: 
= -0.4596/?,, -0.0141^,,, +1.9910;?,,, (4.27) 
This long-run relationship again supports the importance of the Singaporean market to the 
Indonesian economy. However, Indonesia seems to prefers the Japanese market over the 
Singaporean market. The weight of how much the Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate adjusts 
to a 1 percent increase in the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate is smaller that the 
weight of the United State/Indonesian real exchange rate response to the same change. Our 
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conjecture for explaining this result is that the Japanese market could be more stable than the 
US market in term of the Indonesian economy witlj respect to a change in Singaporean 
market. 
The speed of adjustment of real exchange rates in this currency area to a deviation 
from the long-run stationary relationship, again, is expressed in values of a such that: 
JARE SIRE THRE PHRE 
a -0.001 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011 
It is clear from these values that the Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate adjusts faster 
than do the other real exchange rates. Overall, however, all the real exchange rates adjust very 
slowly. One interesting finding here is that the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate is 
more sensitive than the Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate to a deviation in Generalized-
PPP. This result is the same as in the case of the United State-ASEAN group. Thus, the sign 
of a gives an indication that deviation in Generalized-PPP is caused by the depreciation of the 
real exchange rates in this currency area. 
The influence of large country events on the behavior of Pacific Rim nations' real 
exchange rates are significant (Enders and Hum, 1991b). This study reinvestigates this issue 
following the Enders and Hum (1991b) strategy, but includes structural change in the model, 
uses three data series, and applies the research to the ASEAN countries and South Korea. 
The validity of Generalized-PPP is examined in the group of major trading partners 
with each ASEAN and the South Korean real exchange rates. Table 4.7 reports results of the 
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cointegration test for the major trading partners and each ASEAN group of real exchange 
rates and for the major trading partners and South Korea group of real exchange rates. First, 
consider the results from the use of data series I. Using lambda trace test statistics, every 
group's (the Philippines-, Singapore-, Thailand-, and South Korea-major trading partner) real 
exchange rate suggests the existence of three cointegrating vectors in each group at the 5 
percent significance level. The lambda max test statistics do not support these results. Based 
on the lambda max statistic, all groups that included each of the ASEAN countries have only 
one long-run stationary relationship at the 5 percent significance level, while the South 
Korea/major trading partner system has two cointegrating vectors at the same significance 
level. Therefore, these results indicate that all groups have at least one cointegrating vector, 
which implies that Generalized-PPP is valid for all groups in this study. This result, then, 
supports the finding of Enders and Hum (1991b). 
The cointegration test results for data series II and III promote a different suggestion. 
Using lambda trace and lambda max test statistics, the results suggest the existence of two 
long-run stationary relationships for the Singapore-, Thailand-, and South Korea-major 
trading partner real exchange rate groups. The Philippines-major trading partner group real 
exchange rate has only one long-run relationship at the 5 percent significance level. This 
result implies that all three data series support the validity of Generalized-PPP in all groups. 
For consistency, the results from data series I are presented with respect to the long-
run stationary relationships of all the groups studied. The following discussion focuses on the 
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Table: 4.7. Cointegration test for the MATRAD group and each ASEAN and South Korean 
Group 'race iiax 
Null r = 0 1 r < 2  r < 3  r = 0 r= 1 r = 2 r = 3 
Series I 
MATRAD- PHRE 60.128 37.519 18.300 4.890 22.609 19.219 13.410 4.89 
MATRAD- SIRE 86.446 44.164 26.826 11.67 42.282 17.337 15.157 11.67 
MATRAD- THRE 72.210 40.703 20.916 8.130 31.507 19.787 12.786 8.130 
MATRAD- KORE 88.693 47.654 22.464 6.657 41.038 25.190 15.807 6.657 
Sehes II 
MATRAD- PHRE 85.091 46.894 24.452 10.50 38.197 22.442 13.956 10.50 
MATRAD- SIRE 73.973 30.899 17.018 3.625 43.073 13.881 13.393 6.626 
MATRAD- THRE 85.439 47.493 18.399 5.625 37.946 29.099 13.285 5.109 
MATRAD- KORE 105.19 58.276 17.580 5.199 46.906 40.696 12.381 5.199 
Series III 
MATRAD- PHRE 73.538 35.395 17.883 6.182 38.143 17.512 11.700 6.182 
MATRAD- SIRE 82.246 40.096 15.976 1.464 42.150 24.117 14.514 1.464 
MATRAD- THRE 69.391 42.514 17.461 3.910 26.877 25.053 13.551 3.910 
MATRAD- KORE 79.387 43.192 13.189 4.308 36.195 30.003 8.881 4.308 
C.V/a 
5% 53.65 34.91 19.96 9.24 28.14 22.00 15.67 9.24 
/a Critical value is based on l able 1* in Osterwald-Lenum (1992) 
relationship of ASEAN and South Korean real exchange rates with those of all major trading 
partners (the United States, Japan, and Germany). This method allows the search forhow the 
relative price of each ASEAN country and South Korea behave in comparison with the 
behavior of relative prices in the major trading partners with respect to Indonesia. For this 
purpose, a general representation of Generalized-PPP was constructed for all groups such 
that: 
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^IIK ~ P\t^\h'^Pxm^xmt ^ ~ 2, 3, 4, 5 (4.28) 
k ^ l ^ m ^ n  
where ^ is a stationary stochastic disturbance, and yf?'s are the long-run equilibrium 
relationships among real exchange rates in a certain currency area in the sense of Generalized-
PPP. p can also be interpreted in terms of long-run elasticity. To construct this long-run 
relationship, cointegrating vectors from each group must be normalized. 
First, the long-run relationship of the Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate with 
the real exchange rates of all major trading partners is examined with respect to Indonesia. 
The Generalized-PPP for this group can be formed as: 
This long-run relationship shows that a 1 percent increase in the United State/Indonesian real 
exchange rate causes a 1.5471 percent decline in the Philippine/Indonesian real exchange rate, 
given that other real exchange rates in the system are constant. A 1 percent increase in the 
Germany/Indonesian real exchange rate also causes a 1.3077 percent decrease in the 
Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate. However, a 1 percent increase in the 
Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate causes a 2.4052 percent increase in the 
Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate. 
R,,,=-\.S^5\R^, + 2A052Rj,-\.'i011Ra, (4.29) 
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The speeds of ad justment from a deviation in Generalized-PPP are presented as values 
of a as: 
USRE JARE GERE PHRE 
a -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.007 
This result shows that the German and United State real exchange rates have faster rates of 
adjustment, but overall the speed of adjustment is relatively slow. The sign of a indicates that 
deviation of Generalized-PPP comes from the depreciation of real exchange rates in the 
group. 
The Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate relationship with the major trading 
partner real exchange rates gives a different representation. The long-run relationship with 
respect to the Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rate can be formed as: 
R,. = -0.3925/?ys -0.2745/?^„ +0.7410/^, (4.30) 
This equation shows that a 1 percent increase in the United State/Indonesian relative price, 
given other relative prices, causes a 0.3925 percent decrease in the Singapore/Indonesian 
relative price. The same direction of relationship occurs between Japan/Indonesian and 
Singapore/Indonesian relative prices. A 1 percent increase in the Japan/Indonesian relative 
price causes a 0.2745 percent decrease in the Singapore/Indonesian relative price. These 
results support our eariier findings about the behavior of the real exchange rates for each 
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major trading partner/Indonesia in tiie ASEAN real exchange rate group. The results support 
the conclusion that Singapore is also major trading partner for Indonesia and that Singapore's 
role is of almost the same importance as the US and Japanese markets are to the Indonesian 
economy. 
The reaction of each real exchange rate to a deviation from Generalized-PPP can be 
judged from values of a as: 
USRE JARE GERE SIRE 
a -0.005 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 
From this result, it is clear that the Singaporean and Japanese real exchange rates are more 
sensitive than the US and German real exchange rates to a deviation from a long-run 
relationship in this currency area. The result also indicates that a deviation in Generalized-PPP 
results from depreciation of real exchange rates in the system. 
The Thailand/Indonesian real exchange rate relationship with the real exchange rate of 
the major trading partners can be presented as: 
R,,^.=0.3SSSR^s-0.6123RJ^ + 0.9036R^^ (4.31) 
This long-run relationship shows that a 1 percent increase in United State/Indonesian 
competitiveness causes a 0.3888 percent increase in Thailand/Indonesian competitiveness, 
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given the level of other competition in the system. A 1 percent improvement in 
Japan/Indonesian competitiveness causes a 0.6723, percent decrease in Thailand/Indonesian 
relative price. This direction of relationships again are consistent with the result when the 
United State/Indonesian and Japan/Indonesian real exchange rates were studied against the 
ASEAN group real exchange rates. A 1 percent increase in Germany/Indonesian 
competitiveness causes an increase of 0.9036 percent in the Thailand/Indonesian relative price. 
The way real exchange rates adjust to a deviation from a long-run relationship among 
real exchange rates within the system is explained by the value and the sign of a such that; 
USRE JARE GERE THRE 
a -0.001 0.006 0.000 0.003 
These speeds of adjustment tell us that the Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate is the most 
sensitive to a deviation in Generalized-PPP, whereas the German real exchange rate is 
insensitive. The sign of a indicates that a deviation in Generalized-PPP is caused by a 
depreciation of the US real exchange rate and by the appreciation of the Japanese, Thailand 
and German real exchange rates. 
Lastly, the South Korea/Indonesian real exchange rate relationship with the real 
exchange rates of the major trading partners is presented as: 
R^^=0M74J^s~0.\644R,^+0.3946E^^ (4.32) 
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The result shows that the responses of the South Korean real exchange rate to a 1 percent 
increase in the US and Japanese real exchange rates, given that the other real exchange rates 
in the system are constant, are a 0.0874 percent increase and a 0.1644 percent decrease. This 
small change could indicate that South Korea is not a major competitor for the Indonesian 
market with respect to the US and Japanese markets. However, South Korea could be a 
competitor for the German market based on the large response in South Korea's real 
exchange rate to a 1 percent change Germany's real exchange rate. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The empirical studies applying Perron's (1989) unit root test in the presence of 
structural change do not support the validity of PPP for Indonesia with respect to other 
ASEAN countries and South Korea or to Indonesia's major trading partners such as the 
United States, Japan, and Germany. The null hypothesis of the unit root for all real exchange 
rates in which Indonesia was used as the base country cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent 
significance level. These results are as expected and predicted by the theory of Generalized-
PPP. 
Generalized-PPP was the focus of this study. Based on Johansen's (1988, 1990) 
maximum likelihood procedure for cointegration testing, Generalized-PPP holds in the 
presence of structural change for the ASEAN group; the United State-ASEAN; Japan-
ASEAN; and the Philippines-, Singapore-, Thailand-, South Korea-major trading partners real 
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exchange rates. It follows that each of these groups of countries constitutes a currency area in 
the sense of Generalized-PPP. In other words, eacji group is one unit of the economy. 
The influence of major trading partners on the economies of each of the ASEAN 
countries, South Korea, and the ASEAN group is significant. This result supports Enders and 
Hum (1991b). To investigate how these major trading partners influence the ASEAN 
countries and South Korea, this study examines the dynamic interrelationships among the real 
exchange rates while accounting for long-run relationships and structural change. First, 
however, the study estimates error correction models for all real exchange rates as a short-run 
dynamic model. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS OF GENERALIZED 
PURCHASING POWER PARITY AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG REAL 
EXCHANGE RATE IN A CURRENCY AREA 
The cointegration test for some groups of real exchange rates —the ASEAN group, the 
ASEAN-and South Korea-major trading partners groups—support the validity of Generalized-
PPP. The existence of cointegration vectors in the system makes it feasible to form an error 
correction model for the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP. This means that the long-
run relationship will be accounted for in the estimation of Generalized-PPP in the short run. 
This study examines interrelationships among real exchange rates in this currency area. 
Typical analyses other than causality tests used for a system of equations such as VAR are 
impulse responses and forecasting error variance decomposition (FEVD), which measure the 
dynamic interactions among the variables in the system. The empirical support for a currency 
area in the sense of Generalized-PPP is important for this study because it lets us interpret the 
system as an economic system. 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, the error correction model of Generalized-
PPP is presented. This is followed by discussions of impulse responses and FEVD. The 
succeeding sections discuss the econometrics and empirical findings for this research. Finally, 
the summary and some conclusions are presented. 
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The Short-run Dynamics of Generalized Purchasing Power Parity 
To study the short-mn dynamics of Generalized-PPP, an error correction model is 
formed and estimated. The important issue in the error correction model is the inclusion of 
the long-run relationship in the estimated model. A dynamic model constructed with 
differences in nonstationary variables might be misspecified and not helpful because potentially 
valuable information about the relationship between the level of variables, which is likely to be 
related to a steady-state or long run equilibrium relationship, is lost. 
One of the most important results in cointegration analysis is the Granger 
representation theorem (Granger, 1981; Engle and Granger, 1987). The theorem states that if 
a set of variables is cointegrated of order (1, 1), there exists a valid error correction 
representation of the data. This argument means that the validity of Generalized-PPP implies 
the existence of an error correction model. 
The Econometric Model 
The short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP are determined by the vector error 
correction models. Reconsider the VAR system in (4.11) and rewrite it in the form: 
= ;r,A/^_, + . . . + +C+(pD, + s, (5.1) 
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where all specifications for this model are the same as for (4.11). Here, p' is a matrix 
representing the cointegration relationship such that P'R, is stationary. However, the 
representation of model (5.1) also suggests that deviations from the equilibrium relationship 
form a stationary process. By letting be EC,, we can construct our econometric 
model fi-om (5.1) as: 
+ . . . +n|^_^^^lJR,_^-YEC^+C+<j>D, + (o^ (5.2) 
Model (5.2) is the vector error correction model for Generalized-PPP that will be estimated. 
y measures the force of adjustment in reacting to deviations fi'om the long-run relationship. 
EC, is the error correction factor for the model. In this model, the real exchange rates in the 
currency area are specified such that they change over time as a fiinction of four components: 
(a) deviations fi'om the r long-run stationary relationships, (b) past change in all real exchange 
rates in the system, (c) a purely deterministic component, and (d) a stochastic disturbance. 
Empirical Results 
Three groups of vector error correction models are estimated in the present study. The 
groups are the ASEAN, the ASEAN and each major trading partner in which only the US and 
Japanese real exchange rates are considered, and the major trading partners and each ASEAN 
real exchange rates. Data series I was tested for this study. 
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The ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Cases 
Table 5.1 reports the estimated error correption models for the case of the ASEAN 
real exchange rates. The results show that some of the parameters estimated are not 
significant. This result is not surprising because there are so many parameters in the system. 
The Durbin-Watson (D-W) values are around 2 for all the models and indicate that errors are 
not serially correlated. 
The empirical evidence supports the importance of the error correction variables. They 
are all significant. The Philippine real exchange rate model shows that parameter estimates of 
the error correction variable has a significance level of 10 percent, whereas the significance 
levels of the parameter estimated for error correction variables in the other two models are 
almost 0 percent. In contrast, the dummy variable that represents structural change in the 
models is not significant. This variable has significance levels of 52 percent, 12 percent, and 
27 percent for the Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines real exchange rate models. These 
findings seem to weaken the case for the importance of the structural change dummy variable 
in the model. However, this can be considered a weak rejection because the error correction 
variables, which are based on the existence of structural change are all significant in all the 
models at the conventional level. 
The adjustment of the real exchange rate to a deviation fi-om Generalized-PPP is 
expressed in the parameter estimate of the error correction variables. The first equation, in 
which the Singaporean real exchange rate is the dependent variable, shows that approximately 
Table 5.1. Error correction model: The ASEAN real exchange rate. 
Model Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASIRE ASIRE 0.0579 -0.1836 -0..1474 -0.0195 -.1433 -0.3969* 
ATHRE -0.1898 0.1111 0.1463 -0.2386 0.0122* 0.2520 
APHRE -0.0200 -0.0105 -0.0226 -0.1146 -0.0185 0.0300 
C 1.0978* 
DT 0.0033 
EC 0.0091* 
ATHRE ASIRE 0.0038 -0.0809 -0.0956 0.0371 -0.0447 -0.2472* 
ATHRE -0.0931 0.0917 0.0978 -0.2411* -0.1512 0.1642 
APHRE -0.1249 -0.1203 -0.1521* 0.0147 0.0302 -0.1198 
C 1.1018* 
DT 0.0086 
EC 0.0091* 
APHRE ASIRE 0.1220 -0.0732 -0.2427 -0.0459 -0.1780 -0.3464* 
ATHRE 0.1562 0.1837 0.0876 -0.3404* 0.0739 0.2598* 
APHRE -0.3879* -0.1344 -0.0114 0.2439* -0.0209 -0.12446 
C 0.6153* 
DT 0.0072 
EC -0.0051* 
Note; Parameters estimated with * have less than or equal to a 10 percent marginal significance 
level. 
173 
7 8 9 10 n 12 SE D-W 
-0.3618* -0.0517 -0.2586* -0.0825 -0.3793 0.1749 0.0359 1.9854 
0.2771* 0.0359* -0.0026 -0.1346 0.1917 -0.0607 
-0.1006 -0.0876 0.1381 0.1235 0.0227 -0.0739 
-0.1965 -0.0869 
0.1086 0.1007 
-0.1649 -0.1588 
-0.3035 -0.0859 
0.0521 -0.0600 
0.0435 0.0357 
-0.2629 0.1012 
0.1911 0.0864 
-0.0200 -0.1830 
0.0367 1.9906 
0.0211 -0.1962 -0.2102 -0.1055 -0.2346 0.0582 0.0447 2.0067 
0.1641 0.1792 -0.0109 -0.0264 0.1675 0.0629 
-0.3206* -0.0250 0.2205* 0.1025 0.0293 -0.0627 
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1 percent of the deviation from long-run stationary equilibrium was adjusted within one 
month. The same result was found for the Thailanjl real exchange rate model, whereas the 
slowest adjustment was performed by the Philippines real exchange rate model. In addition, 
the direction of the adjustments brings real exchange rates up. In other words, deviations 
from Generalized-PPP in the short run for this group are caused by appreciation of real 
exchange rates in the system. Based on the value of the standard errors of the dependent 
variables, the Singaporean real exchange rate is the most stable in the system. The Thailand 
real exchange rate is more stable than the Philippine real exchange rate. 
The ASEAN and each Major Trading Partner Real Exchage Rate Cases 
As mentioned, only the United State-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN real exchange rate 
groups support Generalized PPP is to hold. Table 5.2 reports the empirical results of the 
error correction models with parameter estimates for the US, Japanese and Singaporean real 
exchange rate models. 
First, the research considers the US-ASEAN group. Again, some of the parameter 
estimates are not significant. However, the error correction and dummy variables have almost 
0 percent significance levels for both the US and Singaporean real exchange rate models. 
These findings support the importance of the structural change dummy and error correction 
variables in the models. The D-W values, which are around 2.0 for both models, indicate that 
errors in the models are not serially correlated. In addition, the standard errors of the 
Table 5.2. Error correction model: Major trading partner and ASEAN real exchange 
Rates. 
Model Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
AUSRE AUSRE -0.3707* -0.1192 -0.1449 -0,0908 , 0.0850 -0.2329 
ASIRE 0.0982 -0.1535 -0.1495 0.0014 -0.1613 -0.2248* 
ATHRE 0.1024 0.1723 0.1387 -0.1377 -0.0112 0.2832* 
APHRE -0.0222 -0.0352 -0.0244 0.0268 -0.1087 -0.0248 
C 1.9024* 
DT 0.0319* 
EC 0.0097* 
ASIRE AUSRE -0.4807 -0.2798 -0.2353 -0.0916 0.0944 -0.2866 
ASIRE 0.1492 -0.2081 -0.1417 -0.0426 -0.2223* -0.3289* 
ATHRE 0.0196 0.3210* 0.2431 -0.1715 -0.0226 0.4292 
APHRE 0.1022 0.0216 0.0607 0.1479 -0.0346 0.0267 
C 2.0754* 
DT 0.0313* 
EC 0.0106* 
AJARE AJARE -0.0013 -0.0196 0.1519 0.1694 0.2628* -0.1115 
ASIRE -0.0796 -0.0573 -0.1080 -0.0516 -0.0052 -0.1525 
ATHRE -0.0170 0.2117 -0.0526 -0.3694* -0.1209 0.3496* 
APHRE -0.1172 -0.1890* -0.0716 0.0153 -0.2442* -0.1368 
C 0.0239 
DT 0.0148 
EC 0.0005 
ASIRE AJARE 0.0790 -0.0409 0.1297 0.1289 0.1415 0.0297 
ASIRE 0.1010 -0.0609 -0.0684 0.0430 -0.1048 -0.2153 
ATHRE -0.1615 0.1588 0.0888 -0.2895* -0.0329 0.1620 
APHRE -0.1154 -0.1065 -0.1293 0.0245 -0.1031 -0.0597 
C 0.2681* 
DT 0.0276* 
EC 0.0054* 
Note: Parameters estimated with * have less than or equal to a 10 percent marginal 
significance level. 
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7 8 9 10 11 12 SE D-W 
0.0995 -0.1491 0.0928 -0.0596 -0:0647 0.1219 0.0338 1.9611 
-0.2874* -0.1687 -0.3821* -0.2107 -0.3361 0.0395 
0.0575 0.2389 -0.0041 0.0570 0.1976 -0.0533 
-0.1207* -0.1121 0.0958 0.0861 0.0633* -0.0707 
0.3005 -0.0842 -0.0174 0.0253 -0.3354 0.1098 0.0359 1.9482 
-0.4345* -0.1179 -0.3115* -0.2039 -0.3769* 0.1435 
0.1341 0.0950 0.0315 -0.1306 0.4040 -0.1625 
-0.1783 -0.0434 0.1218 0.1586 0.0819 -0.0310 
-0.0219 0.2367* 0.0471 0.0001 0.0728 0.2175 0.0410 1.9728 
-0.0538 -0.0769 -0.1838 0.0107 -0.1521 -0.0353 
0.1827 -0.1511 -0.1430 -0.2072 0.0434 -0.1521 
-0.2535 -0.0921 0.1412 0.1078 -0.0962 -0.1005 
-0.0359 0.1716 -0.0225 0.0603 0.1007 0.0975 0.0359 1.9796 
-0.1652 0.0515 -0.0179 0.1126 -0.2009 0.0516 
0.2052 -.0742 -0.0802 -0.2864* 0.0289 -0.1383 
-0.2046* -0.2038 0.0242 0.0346 -0.0859 0.0017 
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dependent variable in the US real exchange rate model are smaller than those of the 
Singaporean real exchange rate model. This finding provides evidence that the US real 
exchange rate is more stable than the Singaporean real exchange rate. 
The US and Singaporean real exchange rates are relatively slow to adjust to a 
deviation from the long-run relationship in the short run. The US real exchange rate adjusts 
by about 1 percent within one month of a deviation from the long-run stationary equilibrium. 
The speed of adjustment by the Singaporean real exchange rate is slightly faster, but is not 
greatly different from the US real exchange rate adjustment. Both real exchange rates 
adjusted in the same direction, pulling the real exchange rate up. 
The estimation of the Japan-ASEAN real exchange rate model gives interesting 
results. The Singaporean real exchange rate model is more stable than the Japanese real 
exchange rate model. If we compare this result to previous findings, we might conclude that 
the US/Indonesian real exchange rate model is the most stable in the systems. The implication 
of this finding could be related to how Indonesia has dealt with stabilization policy. Thus, it 
might be more appropriate for Indonesia to target the United State/Indonesian relative price 
than the Japan/Indonesian relative price. 
In addition to the above results, the data do not support the importance of the error 
correction variable or the structural change dummy variable in the Japanese real exchange rate 
model. The parameter estimate for the dummy variable has a significance level of 28 percent, 
while the error correction variable shows an 84 percent significance level. In contrast, the 
Singaporean real exchange rate gives a convincing result with respect to both of these 
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variables. The parameter estimate of the dummy and error correction variables have 3 
percent and 4 percent significance levels, respectively. In addition, the D-W values for both 
models are around 2. This finding suggests that the Singaporean real exchange rate model 
could be the appropriate model for this system. 
The Major Trading Partners and each ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Cases 
We study the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP for the case involving the group 
of major trading partners with each ASEAN and the South Korean real exchange rates. 
Because all these groups support the validity of Generalized-PPP, the existence of error 
correction is ensured in the models. This discussion, however, focuses on the effects of the 
major trading partner real exchange rates on each ASEAN country's real exchange rate. 
Specifically, the following discussion considers how ASEAN/Indonesian relative prices rely on 
major trading partner/Indonesian relative prices. This is the reverse of the previous section, 
which investigated how United State/Indonesian and Japan/Indonesian relative prices were 
influenced by ASEAN/Indonesian relative prices. This study is reasonable if we recall how 
Indonesia determines relative prices with respect to the United States and Japan, with ASEAN 
countries as competitors. Table 5.3 reports the error correction models with the parameter 
estimates. 
We first consider the group of major trading partners and Singaporean real exchange 
rates. Of interest in this case is the study of the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP with 
respect to the Singaporean real exchange rate. The importance of the structural change 
Table 5.3. Error correction model: Major trading partner and each ASEAN or South 
Korea real exchange rate. 
Model Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ASIRE AUSRE -0.1533 0.1171 0.1.315 0.0636 0.2691* 0.1649 
AJARE -0.0616 -0.2283* 0.0012 0.0523 0.0588 -0.0147 
AGERE 0.1408 0.2586* 0.0501 -0.0948 0.0243 0.0169 
ASIRE -0.1158 -0.3291* -0.2365 -0.1731* -0.4701* -0.3359* 
C 1.2794* 
DT 0.0505* 
EC 0.0118* 
ATHRE AUSRE -0.3312* -0.1453 0.0349 0.1919 -0.0505 -0.1612 
AJARE -0.0650 -0.0119 -0.0603 0.2022* 0.2765* 0.0846 
AGERE 0.1836 0.0567* 0.1154 -0.0856 -0.0999 -0.0058 
ATHRE 0.0214 0.0319 -0.1537 -0.4239* -0.1666 0.01987 
C -0.3535 
DT 0.0115 
EC 0.0034 
APHRE AUSRE 0.2448 -0.0794 -0.1138 -0.2276 -0.0205 -0.0788 
AJARE -0.1456 -0.0173 -0.1304 0.1146 0.1605 0.1135 
AGERE 0.1519 0.1400 0.2351* -0.2320* -0.1113 -0.0906 
ATHRE -0.4181* -0.2123* -0.1494 0.1179 -0.1131 -0.1887 
C 0.4231 
DT 0.0142* 
EC 0.0022 
AKORE AUSRE 0.0996 0.0354 0.1337 -0.0440 0.0923 0.1044 
AJARE -0.1610 0.1742 0.0431 0.1505 0.2625* -0.0167 
AGERE 0.2444* -0.1148 0.1001 -0.1375 -0.1159 0.0723 
AKORE -0.2859* -0.1804 -0.3790 -0.1356 -0.2902* -0.2019 
C -0.3869* 
DT 0.0029 
EC 0.0047* 
Note: Parameters estimated with * have less thanor equal to alO percent marginal significance 
level. 
7 8 9 10 11 12 SE D-W 
0.4425* -0.0593 0.1906 0.0014 '0.1231 0.0954 0.0359 1.8973 
-0.1739 0.0389 -0.3471* -0.2281* -0.1369 0.1219 
0.1789* 0.0102 0,2455* 0.0814 0.2442* -0.2482* 
-0.6644* -0.1512 -0.2812* -0,0427 -0.4559* 0.0237 
0.1056 -0.0437 0.0689 0.1080 -0.0610 -0.0661 0.0367 1.9843 
-0.1197 0.2555* -0.0848 -0.1007 -0.1321 0.1146 
0.1930* -0.0374 0.0653 0.1411 0.1783 -0.0651 
-0.2988* -0.2099 -0.1079 -0.2104 -0.0323 0.0210 
0.2164 -0.1692 -0.0779 -0.1566 -0.1981 -0.1737 0.0448 1.9984 
0.2537* 0.5037* 0.0506 0.2608* 0.0159 0.1355 
-0.1973* -0.1707 0.0040 -0.2139* 0.0701 0.03746 
-0.4062 -0.1631 0.0359 0.0849 0.0939 0.0263 
-0.1103 -0.0673 -0.0390 -0.0088 0.0870 -0.1245 0.0370 1.9989 
-0.0221 0.3316* -0.1099 0.1262 0.0031 0.0923 
0.0007 -0.0650 0.1333 -0.0958 0.0757 0.0189 
-0.0284 -0.2145 0.0197 -0.0557 -0.1820 0.0744 
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dummy and error correction variables is supported by the empirical results. The parameter 
estimates of both the dummy and error correction .variables have almost 0 percent significance 
levels. The parameter estimate for the error correction variable shows that the Singaporean 
real exchange rate adjusts by 1.2 percent after one month to a deviation from long run 
equilibrium caused by the appreciation of real exchange rates in the system. The model is less 
stable compared with the US real exchange rate model. However, the Singaporean model is 
slightly more stable than the other two models in the system. 
The study of the group of major trading partners and the Philippines real exchange 
rates gives different results. The importance of the structural change dummy variable is 
supported by the data; however, the findings show weak support for the error correction 
variable, which has a 15 percent significance level. This model is less stable than the 
Singaporean real exchange rate model. The Thailand real exchange rate model constructed to 
study the major trading partner and Thailand real exchange rates did not support the existence 
of the structural change dummy and error correction variables. The significance levels for the 
variables were 16 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The Thailand real exchange rate 
model is shown to be less stable than the Singaporean real exchange rate model. 
Lastly, the above result are compared with results from a study of the major trading 
partner and South Korean real exchange rates. In this case, the existence of the error 
correction variable can not be rejected at the 9 percent significance level, and the importance 
of the structural change dummy variable is not supported by the data. In addition, the South 
Korean real exchange rate model is less stable than the Singaporean real exchange rate model. 
The adjustment parameters estimated for the Philippines, and Thailand real exchange 
rates for a deviation from Generalized-PPP are veiy low. In addition, the Thailand real 
exchange rate adjustment seems to bring the real exchange rate down in response to the 
depreciation of real exchange rate. The Philippines real exhange rate, however, has the same 
direction of adjustment as the Singaporean real exchange rate and moves to push the real 
exchange rate up. 
The adjustment of the South Korean real exchange rate in response to a deviation from 
Generalized-PPP is also very slow. However, it moves in the same direction as the Philippine 
and Singaporean real exchange rate adjustments. These results suggest that the 
Singapore/Indonesian, Philippines/Indonesian, and South Korea/Indonesian real exchange 
rates tend to appreciate in the United State/Indonesia, Japan/Indonesia, and 
Germany/Indonesia group. This result indicates that Indonesia tends to make export goods 
more competitively for the US and Japanese market than do the other ASEAN markets, and 
the South Korea market, but the reverse is true for the Thailand market. 
The Interrelationships among Real Exchange Rates in the Currency Area 
The validity of Generalized-PPP for some groups of countries leads to the question of 
how the real exchange rates in the system are interrelated. Common methods of investigating 
the interrelationships among variables in a dynamic model are impulse response and (FEVD). 
In this study, impulse responses can show how one real exchange rate responds over time to a 
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surprise movement (shock) in itself and/or in other real exchange rates in the system. FEVD 
shows the amount of forecasting error the model allows in response to surprise movements in 
each real exchange rate in the system. In other words, the degree of exogeneity to a set of 
bilateral real exchange rates can be estimated by calculating the percentage of the /7-period-
ahead forecast error variance of one real exchange rate produced by an innovation in another 
real exchange rate. 
This method of studying dynamic interaction among variables in one system was first 
introduced by Sims (1980). Related to the issue of long-run stationary relationships, 
Lutkepholl and Reimers (1992) argued the importance of impulse responses and FEVD 
analysis of cointegrated systems. This method is appropriate for analyzing interrelationships 
among real exchange rates in a system in which Generalized-PPP holds. 
The background for impulse responses and FEVD analysis is discussed in the next 
sections, followed by a discussion of the results. 
Impulse Response Analysis of a Cointegrated System 
Let's reconsider the VAR model (4.10). For simplicity, the model can be rewritten 
such that:' 
. . . + (5-3) 
' For more discussion about impulse response and forecast error variance decomposition see Lutkepohl (1993). 
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where e, is an independently identically normally distributed w-dimensional vector with zero 
mean and covariance matrix D.. Assume that A/^ ^ is stationaiy, and that; 
has all its roots outside the complex unit circle except for the possibility that some roots are 
unity. This assumption implies that: 
may be singular, that is to say of rank r<n. 
Now assume that r { n .  This assumption implies that model (5.3) represents a 
cointegrating system. To relate impulse responses to this cointegrating system, consider the 
VAR system (5.3). First, the model must be constructed in such a way that the residual of this 
model is uncorrected. For this purpose, decompose the white noise covariance matrix 
such that Qj = iVAW, where A is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements and fVis 
a lower triangular matrix with a unit diagonal. This decomposition is obtained from the 
Choleski decomposition of ^ = PP' by having a diagonal matrix D which has t.ie same 
diagonal as P and defining JV = PD~^ and A = DD'. 
Pre-muhiplying (5.3) by W~^ gives: 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
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W-'R,=A,R,.,+ ... +A,R,_, + 9, (5.6) 
where / = !,.. .,k and i9, = (i9„,. . . ,.9„,):= W'^e^ has diagonal covariance 
matrix E( S , s/jifV'} =  A. Adding (/„ - W '^)R , to both sides of (5.6) gives 
R^= AqR, + A^R,_^+ . . . +A^R,_^ + 9i (5.7) 
where A Q= I W ~ \  Because Wis a.  lower triangular matrix with a unit diagonal, the same is 
true for W'^; then: 
' 0 0 0 o' 
®21 0 0 0 
.«„1 a„2 ®n.n-l 
is a lower triangular matrix with zero diagonal. To get impulse response 9^, we solve system 
(5.7) for R, such that: 
A^R,_^+ ...  +(/„-Aq} A;^R,_;^+(/„ -  AQ) i9, (5.8) 
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Note that A^) ^ = W = PD~^. This finding shows that the instantaneous effect of one 
standard deviation shock (9^, of size one standard deviation) to the system is represented by 
the elements of WD = P= 9 because the diagonal elements of D are the standard deviations of 
the components of . Then 6^ can be found by tracing these effects through the system. 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Consider impulse responses that are performed in terms of a moving average 
representation such that: 
CO 
(5.9a) 
and 
(5.9b) 
1=0 
are uncorrected and have unit variance where the components of Q, = (^y,,, . . . 
= and a;, 
The optimal /i-step forecast error for this moving average, then, is: 
fc- l  h- l  
R ,.h -
1=0 i=0 
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A-l 
( 5 1 0 )  
1=0 
Let the ww-element of 0, be ,, then the /j-step forecast error of thecomponent of R, is 
h-\ 
Rj.Hh-Rutih) = T\djuO}u.h-i + • • • 
isO 
h'\ 
~ S(^j7,0^U+/i ^;7,A-l^;.t+i) (^-H) 
Therefore, the forecast error of thecomponent potentially consists of innovations of all 
other components of R, as well. Noting that co„ , are uncorrelated and have variance one, 
then the mean square error (MSE) of Rj^ih) is: 
Hence, 
1=0 
(5.12) 
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This equation can be inteqireted as the contribution in variable / to the forecast error variance 
ox MSE of the A-step forecast of variable j. e, is the column of /„. The forecast error 
variance components are then calculated by dividing (5.12) hyMSe{^R.,{h)^ = . that 
1=0 ;=i 
is; 
= IMSE[R,P)) (5.13) 
1=0 
which is the proportion of the /j-step forecast error variance of variable j that accounts for 
innovations in variable k. The way the forecast error variance is decomposed into components 
is accounted for by innovations in the different variables, or real exchange rates, of the 
currency area. 
Empirical Results 
Econometric model (5.2) is the model estimated in this study. The order of variables 
in estimating FEVD and impulse responses is crucial. This relates to the orthogonalization of 
the error term. By placing one variable in the first place, the assumption is made that this 
variable is exogenous to the system. On the other hand, the last variables in the system 
become dependent on all the variables, so that it does not have an influence on the other 
variables by construction. 
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In this study, the innovations in major trading partner real exchange rates are assumed 
to enter the smaller-country real exchange rate equations. This means that a major trading 
partner's real exchange rate innovation influences a smaller country's real exchange rate, but 
the smaller country's real exchange rate innovation affects only its own real exchange rate. In 
the case where the United States, Japan, and Germany are all in the system, all possible orders 
are estimated. The order of the US and Japanese real exchange rates suggest similar results, 
as does the order where the German real exchange rate is in first place. In the following 
discussion, we present only the results from the order of the US and Japanese real exchange 
rates. The FEVD results are presented, followed a discussion about the by impulse responses. 
The study uses only data series I for the country group of interest. 
The ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forecasting Error Variance Decomposition Table 5.4 presents the variance 
decomposition of the real exchange rates for all ASEAN countries. The Singaporean real 
exchange rate explains most of its own forecast error variance. The Philippine real exchange 
rate also accounts for most of its own forecast error variance, but is not as strong as the 
Singaporean real exchange rate. The Singaporean real exchange rate account for 93.93 
percent, 86.80 percent, 84.15 percent, and 83.06 percent whereas the Philippines real 
exchange rate accounts for55.49 percent, 55.50 percent, 54.66 percent, and 54.37 percent of 
its own forecast error variance at 6, 12, 18, and 24 months, respectively. On the other hand, 
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Table 5.4. Forecast error variance decomposition of ASEAN real exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in 
in h ASIRE ATHRE APHRE 
ASIRE 2 0.0317 98.33 1.64 0 . 0 3  
3 0.0319 97.69 2.24 0.07 
4 0.0321 96.75 3.16 0.09 
6 0.0329 93.93 4.62 1.45 
12 0.0352 86.80 10.25 2.95 
18 0.0365 84.15 12.47 3.48 
24 0.0369 83.06 13.23 3.71 
ATHRE 2 0.0333 60.19 38.64 1.17 
3 0.0335 60.19 38.38 1.43 
4 0.0339 60.20 37.54 2.26 
6 0.0346 58.93 38.61 2.46 
12 0.0359 56.58 37.14 4.28 
18 0.0372 56.97 35.99 7.07 
24 0.0376 56.65 36.11 7.24 
APHRE 2 0.0412 39.35 4.06 56.59 
3 0.0412 39.37 4.22 56.41 
4 0.0417 40.67 4.21 55.12 
6 0.0427 39.16 5.35 55.49 
12 0.0444 38.67 5.83 55.50 
18 0.0450 38.98 6.36 54.66 
24 0.0451 38.93 6.70 54.37 
the Thailand real exchange rate explains only about 40 percent of its own forecast error 
variance. The results suggest that the movement in the Singaporean real exchange rate is 
explained strongly by its own past innovations. These results are supported by the findings 
from FEVD when the orders start with the Thailand and Philippine real exchange rates. 
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respectively. The results of FEVD show that variance decomposition of the Singaporean real 
exchange rate to a shock in itself appears to increase over time. Therefore, the Singaporean 
real exchange rate appears to be exogenous in the system. 
An innovation in the Singapore real exchange rate accounts for about 60 percent and 
40 percent of the forecast error variance in the Thailand and Philippines real exchange rates, 
respectively. The Thailand real exchange rate explains only 13.23 percent and 6.70 percent of 
the forecast error variance in the Singaporean and the Philippines real exchange rates. 
Furthermore, the Philippines real exchange rate influence seems very low for both 
Singaporean and Thailand real exchange rate innovations. A shock in the Philippines real 
exchange rate only accounts for about 3.71 percent of the Singaporean and 7.24 percent of 
the Thailand real exchange rate forecast error variances. In contrast, the Singaporean real 
exchange rate shows strong feedback in reaction to shocks in the Thailand and Philippine real 
exchange rates. Thailand and Philippine feedbacks to a shock in the Singaporean real 
exchange rate are relatively low. This result indicates that the Singaporean real exchange rate 
is the leading variable in the system. 
Impulse Response Function From the study discussed above, the Singaporean real 
exchange rate was found to have a strong influence on other real exchange rates in the system 
as well as on its own movements. This result motivated the focus of the present study on 
investigating the effects of a typical shock in the Singaporean real exchange rate on the 
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Figure 5.1. Singapore real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Singaporean 
real exchange rate. 
0.036 
0.030 
0.024 
0.018 
0.012 
0.006 
0.000 
-0.006 
-0.012 
Figure 5.2. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the Singaporean real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.3. Philippine real exchange rate responses to ashock in the Singaporean real 
exchange rate. 
Thailand and Philippine real exchange rates and on itself. The impulse response functions for 
the Singaporean, Thailand and the Philippines real exchange rates with respect to a shock in 
the Singaporean real exchange rate are displayed in Figures 5.1 through 5.3. The estimated 
two standard error bounds are depicted as dashed lines. 
Figure 5.1 plots responses of the Singaporean real exchange rate to a typical shock in 
itself For the first 12 months, impulse responses fluctuated below the original level and 
continue to cycle after a six-month period from positive to negative. However, the overall 
response is quite stable. The impulse seems to reach its long-term position in the sense that it 
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remains almost constant if no further shocks hit the system after 26 months from the original 
shock. The effects of the shock do not have a permanent effect on the real exchange rate. 
The plot of the Thailand real exchange rate response to a typical shock in the 
Singaporean real exchange rate is presented in Figure 5.2. It is clear that the shock does not 
have a permanent effect on the Thailand real exchange rate. The impulse, however, 
fluctuates within a relatively wider range in the first year and becomes more stable after 20 
months. The response approximately reaches its long-term position after 28 months from the 
initial shock. The shock clearly has a transitory effect. 
Figure 5.3 shows that the effect of a shock in the Singaporean real exchange rate on 
the Philippines real exchange rate is very weak. The effect is also not permanent, but it 
continues for about 18 months after the initial shock. The results seem to suggest that 
Singapore/Indonesian relative prices do not have a significant influence on 
Philippines/Indonesian relative prices. This could imply that bilateral trading between 
Indonesia and Singapore is independent from bilateral trading between Indonesia and the 
Philippines. 
The ASEAN and Each Major Trading Partner Real Exchange Rate Cases 
There are two cases of interest in the present study. The first is the group of United 
State-ASEAN real exchange rates, and the second is the group of Japan-ASEAN real 
exchange rates. FEVD and impulse responses are examined for both cases. 
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The United State-ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Table 5.5 reports FEVD for this 
group. It is clear from these results that the US real exchange rate accounts for most of its 
own forecast error variance. After 24 months, it still explains 80 percent of its own forecast 
error variance. The Singaporean, Thailand, and the Philippines real exchange rates explain 
only 34 percent, 21 percent, and 39 percent their own forecast error variance after 24 months, 
respectively. 
The response of the US real exchange rate to a shock in other real exchange rates is 
also strong. The feedback responses of the US real exchange rate in reaction to the shock in 
the Singaporean, Thailand and Philippines real exchange rates are about 49 percent, 66 
percent, and 44 percent, respectively, after 24 months, whereas feedback responses of the 
Singaporean, Thailand and Philippine real exchange rates to a shock in the US real exchange 
rate are 10 percent, 5 percent and 4 percent for the same period. These empirical findings 
suggest that the US real exchange rate is exogenous to the system. 
From the long-run relationship of this group, the US real exchange rate has an inverse 
relationship with the Singaporean real exchange rate. This result leads to a study of FEVD 
with the order Singapore, the United States, Thailand, the Philippines real exchange rates. 
The behavior of the Thailand and the Philippines real exchange rates with respect lo the other 
two real exchange rates are similar. The results with respect to the US and Singaporean 
relationship are interesting. US real exchange rate feedback to a shock in the Singaporean 
real exchange rate is 14 percent, compared to a 10 percent Singaporean feedbacks in response 
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Table 5.5. Forecast error variance decomposition of the US and ASEAN real exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportion? of forecast error variance/i 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in 
in h AUSRE ASIRE ATHRE APHRE 
AUSRE 2 0.0301 99.28 4.42 0.26 0.03 
3 0.0304 98.12 1.05 0.78 0.04 
4 0.0307 97.21 1.49 1.18 0.11 
6 0.0314 94.96 1.99 1.98 1.06 
12 0.0329 87.79 4.72 4.58 2.91 
18 0.0343 81.63 8.75 5.37 4.25 
24 0.0349 79.11 10.25 6.11 4.53 
ASIRE 2 0.0306 67.65 31.69 0.00 0.66 
3 0.0310 66.04 31.55 1.76 0.65 
4 0.0313 64.91 31.21 3.20 0.68 
6 0.0320 62.88 31.02 4.28 1.81 
12 0.0345 55.17 32.15 8.61 4.07 
18 0.0364 50.02 34.27 9.94 5.77 
24 0.0370 48.89 34.56 10.15 6.40 
ATHRE 2 0.0332 79.07 1.20 19.65 0.07 
3 0.0336 77.96 1.45 20.07 0.52 
4 0.0339 77.72 1.48 20.07 0.72 
6 0.0345 76.74 1.50 20.91 0.85 
12 0.0357 72.91 3.15 21.58 2.35 
18 0.0370 68.03 6.17 20.50 5.30 
24 0.0375 66.46 7.15 20.69 5.69 
APHRE 2 0.0386 55.09 0.39 0.54 43.98 
3 0.0390 54.14 0.43 2.15 43.27 
4 0.0396 53.19 2.53 2.18 42.10 
6 0.0404 51.68 3.29 3.05 41.97 
12 0.0436 46.43 4.05 8.95 40.56 
18 0.0446 44.78 6.09 9.35 39.77 
24 0.0449 44.56 6.54 9.42 39.47 
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to a US shock. The US real exchange rate accounts for 32 percent of its own forecast error 
variance, compared with 35 percent for the Singaporean real exchange rate after 24 months in 
the previous order. Another difference is that Singapore response to its own shock increases, 
whereas the US response to its own shock decreases over time. These findings suggest that 
the US and Singaporean real exchange rates could be exogenous to the system. However, 
because the United States is a major trading partner for Singapore and Indonesia, it can be 
argued that the US real exchange rate is a leading variable in the system. 
Impulse response function The impulse response functions for the United State-
ASEAN real exchange rates are presented in Figures 5.4 through 5.7. Figure 5.4 plots the 
response of the US real exchange rate to a typical shock in itself The impulse is not 
permanent, but it continues for about 16 months after the initial shock. Initially the response is 
positive, then it becomes negative for about a 9-month period of time. After staying positive 
for about six month, the response approximately reaches its long-term position. 
The Singaporean real exchange rate response to a typical shock in the US real 
exchange rate is displayed in Figure 5.5 Even though the response is initially positive, it 
fluctuates mostly within a negative area for about 12 months and then starts to move positive 
again. After that, the response cycles for a seven-month period, staying in both positive and 
negative regions. A long-term position is reached after 24 months. The shock has a transitory 
effect on the Singaporean real exchange rate. In addition this response is more volatile than 
that of the US real exchange rate to the same shock in the first years. 
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Figure 5.4. US real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real exchange 
rate. 
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Figure 5.5. Singapore real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.6. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.7. Philippine real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.6 shows the responses of the Thailand real exchange rate to a standard error 
shock in the US real exchange rate. Because the response moves from its origin and back 
again to its origin, the impulse has a transitory effect on the Thailand real exchange rate. The 
effect continues for about 20 months after the initial shock. This response period is longer 
than that of the US real exchange rate, but shorter than that of the Singaporean real exchange 
rate with respect to a shock in the US real exchange rate. Moreover, the response is 
dominated by positive impulses, which is the reverse of the case for the Singaporean real 
exchange rate. 
From Figure 5.7, it is clear that the effects of the shock on the Philippine real exchange 
rate are not permanent. The responses are very weak, especially during the first four months, 
but it continues for about 22 months before reaching its long-term position. Because the 
response is predominatly in the negative region, it is rational to state that the response is 
negative. These resuhs suggest that the United State/Indonesian real exchange rate does not 
have a strong influence on the Philippines/Indonesian real exchange rate. In other words, the 
results signal that Indonesia might not consider the Philippines as a competitor in facing the 
US market. 
The Japan-ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forcast Error Variance Decomposition Table 5.6 shows FEVD for the Japan-
ASEAN group. It is clear from the results that the Japanese, Singaporean, and Philippine real 
exchange rates account for most of the forecast error variance; however, they are behave 
201 
differently. The Japanese, Singaporean and the Philippines real exchange ratesexplain about 
75 percent, 48 percentand 56 percent their own forecast error variance after 24 months. The 
Thailand real exchange rate accounts for only 32 percent of its own forecast error variance 
after 24 months. This means that movements in the Thailand real exchange rate are mostly 
explained by changes in the other real exchange rates in the system. 
Japan's feedback in response to typical shocks in other real exchange rates in the 
system are quite strong. This feedback is 37 percent, 36 percent, and 17 percent for shocks 
in the Singaporean, Thailand, and Philippine real exchange rates. This result suggests that the 
influence of Japan/Indonesian relative prices is strong in determining Singapore/Indonesian 
and Thailand/Indonesian relative prices. However, the influence is weak for the 
Philippine/Indonesian relative prices. Feedback in the Singaporean, Thailand and the 
Philippines real exchange rates accounts for only 10.25 percent, 6.11 percent, and 4.53 
percent, respectively, of the Japanese real exchange rate forecast error variance. 
FEVDs are also studied for real exchange rates with the order Singapore-Japan-
Thailand-the Philippines. This study is motivated by the finding of the long-run relationships 
in the previous chapter. Singaporean and Japanese real exchange rate influences are almost 
the same with the results using the previous order. However, the Japanese real exchange rate 
response is less than the Singaporean real exchange rate response in comparison with the 
Singaporean real exchange rate response to the Japanese real exchange rate in the previous 
order. This result indicates that the Japanese real exchange rate is a leading variable in the 
system. 
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Table 5.6. Forecast error variance decomposition of Japanese and ASEAN real 
exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in: 
in h AJARE ASIRE ATHRE APHRE 
AJARE 2 0.0339 91.61 1.38 0.11 0.84 
3 0.0342 96.09 1.41 0.97 1.52 
4 0.0345 94.40 2.86 1.23 1.50 
6 0.0366 85.55 6.02 3.90 4.52 
12 0.0388 79.20 7.54 7.02 6.22 
18 0.0396 76.31 8.87 8.21 6.61 
24 0.0399 75.30 9.38 8.51 6.81 
ASIRE 2 0.0314 43.89 53.69 1.46 0.95 
3 0.0315 43.63 53.31 2.07 0.99 
4 0.0317 43.51 52.89 2.19 1.41 
6 0.0328 40.93 51.84 4.40 2.83 
12 0.0349 39.37 49.22 7.27 4.13 
18 0.0359 37.65 47.79 7.96 6.60 
24 0.0364 36.83 47.77 8.14 7.25 
ATHRE 2 0.0326 39.54 23.30 34.00 3.16 
3 0.0327 39.27 23.37 33.76 3.59 
4 0.0329 38.81 23.27 33.31 4.61 
6 0.0341 36.78 23.50 34.61 5.11 
12 0.0355 37.04 24.26 32.68 6.01 
18 0.0359 36.49 24.53 32.22 6.76 
24 0.0362 36.10 24.72 32.15 7.03 
APHRE 2 0.0391 17.78 17.37 3.13 61.72 
3 0.0393 17.58 17.95 3.15 61.32 
4 0.0399 17.43 19.51 3.42 59.63 
6 0.0415 17.04 19.43 4.65 58.88 
12 0.0438 17.71 21.40 4.47 56.42 
18 0.0456 16.89 21.51 4.60 57.00 
24 0.0463 16.60 22.16 5.00 56.23 
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Overall, these empirical findings show that the US real exchange rate is more powerful 
than the Japanese real exchange rate in explaining .its own forecast error and in influencing the 
ASEAN real exchange rates. In addition, the responses by the Thailand and Philippines real 
exchange rates to the Japanese real exchange rate shock are stronger than those to the US real 
exchange rate shock. 
Impulse Response Function In Figures 5.8 through 5.11, the effects of a typical 
shock in the Japanese real exchange rate on itself, and on the Singaporean, Thailand and 
Philippines real exchange rates are displayed. From Figure 5.8, it is clear that the impulse 
effects on the Japanese real exchange rate are not permanent. The Japanese real exchange 
rate is volatile for the first nine months and more stable after that. The response 
approximately reaches its long-term position 16 months after the initial shock. This response 
pattern is different firom that of the US real exchange rate in response to a shock in itself The 
US real exchange rate responsepattem is more stable. However, the effects of a shock in both 
systems continue for the same period of time. 
Figure 5.9 plots the Singaporean real exchange rate response to a standard error shock 
in the Japanese real exchange rate. The initial response is negative. Because negative 
response dominates positive response, the Singaporean real exchange rate has a net negative 
response to a shock in the Japanese real exchange rate. This response is the reverse of the 
response with respect to a shock in the US real exchange rate in addition to being more 
volatile, This finding seems to support the finding of a long-run relationship and FEVD. 
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Figure 5.8. Japanese real exchange rate response to a shock in the Japanese real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.9. Singaporean real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.10 Thailand real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.11 The Philippines real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.10 displays the Thailand real exchange rate response to a typical shock in the 
Japanese real exchange rate. After initially being negative, the response moves to a positive 
region and then cycle again. The response is significant in the first ten months but less volatile 
than that of the Sinagaporean real exchange rate. Moreover, the impulse has a transitory 
effect, which continues for about 18 months after the initial shock. Compared to the response 
of this real exchange rate to a shock in the US real exchange rate, this response is less volatile 
and the initial response has a different direction. 
The Philippine real exchange rate response, shown in Figure 5.11, is initially negative 
and then moves to the positive region. It reaches its negative peak at the fifth month and its 
positive peak at the tenth month after the initial shock. The shock has a transitory effect, 
which continues for approximately one year. The response seems to reach its long-term 
position after that. If we compare this response to that wdth respect to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate, this response is less volatile but stronger especially in the first four months. 
This resuh seems to suggest that United State/Indonesian relative prices have weaker 
influence on the movement of Philippines/Indonesian relative prices than on the movement of 
Japan/Indonesian relative price. 
Major Trading Partners and Each ASEAN Real Exchange Rate Cases 
This section explains how each of the ASEAN real exchange rates behaves in the 
major trading partner group of real exchange rates. The movements of the major trading 
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partners' real exchange rates are also of interest to this study. The South Korean real 
exchange rate is included as representative of the Pacific Rim fi-om Asia but outside ASEAN. 
The Major Trading Partner and Singapore Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Table.5.7 presents FEVD for the 
group of US-Japanese-German-Singaporean real exchange rates. Both the US and Japanese 
real exchange rates explain most of their own forecast error variance. For instance, the US 
real exchange rate accounts for 78 percent and the Japanese real exchange rate accounts for 
51 percent of its own forecast error variance after 24 months. The German and Singaporean 
real exchange rates, however, account for only 36 percent and 32 percent, respectively, of 
their ovm forecast error variance after 24 months. These patterns of behavior are similar 
when the order of variables in the system is changed to Japan-the United States-Germany-
Singapore. 
The behavior of each real exchange rate based on the other real exchange rates in the 
system explains how strongly one real exchange rate influences the others. The US real 
exchange rate shows strong feedback in the Japanese, German, and Singaporean real 
exchange rates, accounting for 30 percent, 27 percent, and 48 percent of their respective 
forecast error variances after 24 months. The Japanese real exchange rate shows a significant 
(24 percent) feedback response only in Germany's forecast error variance. Its feedback in 
forecast error variance for the US and Singaporean real exchange rates are slightly low at 7 
percent and 10 percent after 24 months. Feedback in Singapore's real exchange rate is 
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Table 5.7. Forecast error variance decomposition of major trading partner and 
Singaporean real exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in 
in h AUSRE AJARE AGERE ASIRE 
AUSRE 2 0.0295 98.27 0.05 1.64 0.03 
3 0.0299 96.47 0.27 1.63 1.63 
4 0.0302 95.55 0.37 1.81 2.26 
6 0.0309 92.10 1.29 3.53 3.08 
12 0.0327 83.47 5.77 4.17 6.59 
18 0.0337 79.44 6.56 5.09 8.91 
24 0.0341 78.02 6.84 5.60 9.52 
AJARE 2 0.0340 34.87 60.01 1.20 3.92 
3 0.0397 34.37 57.92 2.24 5.47 
4 0.0350 34.19 57.46 2.84 5.49 
6 0.0363 34.40 54.50 5.42 5.67 
12 0.0390 31.73 53.02 6.66 8.59 
18 0.0403 30.54 52.02 7.69 9.75 
24 0.0407 30.53 51.32 8.18 9.97 
AGERE 2 0.0357 30.64 24.02 42.32 3.02 
3 0.0368 30.76 22.73 41.20 5.30 
4 0.0369 30.75 23.04 40.92 5.28 
6 0.0378 30.18 22.69 40.77 6.36 
12 0.0406 27.75 24.39 37.22 10.63 
18 0.0423 26.82 24.55 36.88 12.09 
24 0.0431 27.50 23.99 35.99 15.52 
ASIRE 2 0.0294 67.76 3.58 3.12 25.54 
3 0.0304 64.15 4.67 4.51 26.67 
4 0.0306 63.75 4.64 4.50 27.10 
6 0.0313 61.42 4.43 6.03 28.12 
12 0.0340 53088 8.76 6.74 30.62 
18 0.0368 48.74 10.01 9.17 32.08 
24 0.0379 48.12 10.22 9.43 32.23 
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Stronger than feedback in the Japanese and German real exchange rates in response to a shock 
in the US real exchange rate. In response to a Japanese real exchange rate shock, Singapore's 
feedback is stronger than that of Germany. Furthermore, Singapore's real exchange rate 
accounts for 15 percent of Germany's real exchange rate forecast error variance. 
Interestingly, the attitude of Singapore's feedback for all other real exchange rates increases 
over time. 
The US real exchange rate consistently shows strong feedback in response to other 
real exchange rates in the system when the order of variables is Japan-the United States-
Germany-Singapore. In addition, the US real exchange rate response to a shock in the 
Japanese real exchange rate is higher than the feedback of the Japanese real exchange rate 
response to a shock in the US real exchange rate when they have the same place in variable 
order. The Singaporean and German real exchange rates did not show significantly different 
responses compared with the findings for the previous order of variables. 
This empirical evidence suggests that the feedback of the US real exchange rate is 
exogenous and has stronger influence in the system than does the Japanese real exchange rate. 
The role of the Singaporean real exchange rate is also significant, especially compared to the 
role of the German real exchange rate. The US real exchange rate could be regarded as a 
leading variable in the currency area. 
Impulse Response Function The impulse response function is estimated for the 
group of US-Japanese-German-Singaporean real exchange rates. The order is based on the 
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Figure 5.12. Singaporean real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.13 Singaporean real exchange rate response to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.14 Singaporean real exchange rate response to a shock in the German 
real exchange rate. 
0.030 
0.025 
0.020 
0.015 
0.010 
0.005 
0.000 
N/ \ 
-0.005 
-0.010 
Months 
Figure 5.15 Singaporean real exchange rate response to a shock in the Singaporean 
real exchange rate. 
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results of the FEVD study. The focus of the present study, however, is to investigate how the 
Singaporean real exchange rate responds to a shock in major trading partner real exchange 
rates. This focus is a little different from the focus of the FEVD study above. Figures 5.12 
through 5.15 plot the responses of the Singaporean real exchange rate to a shock in the US, 
Japanese, and German real exchange rates and to a shock in itself 
Figure 5.12 illustrates that a typical shock in the US real exchange rate has a 
transitory effect on the Singaporean real exchange rate. The effects continue for about 22 
months after the initial shock. The impulse response to this shock is volatile in the first 12 
months, and the initial response is negative. The response reaches its negative peak in the 
eighth month and its positive peak in the fourteenth month. In addition, negative response 
dominates positive response. 
Figure 5.13 displays the response of the Singaporean real exchange rate to a shock in 
the Japanese real exchange rate. Again, the initial response is negative. The response 
increases after two months but decreases slightly again in the fourth month. After the eighth 
month, it starts to move to a positive region and becomes volatile. It is clear that the shock 
has a transitory effect which lasts for about 22 months after the initial shock. This response is 
stronger in attitude compared with the response of this real exchange rate with respect to a 
shock in the US real exchange rate. 
The response of Singapore's real exchange rate to a shock in the German real 
exchange rate is different in attitude to the response of Singapore's real exchange rate with 
respect to the US and Japanese real exchange rates. The response to a shock in the German 
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real exchange rate is relatively stronger and also more volatile, especially in the first year. The 
plot of this is presented in Figure 5.14. The initial.response is negative and directly reaches its 
negative peak, but then reaches its positive peak at the tenth month. Overall, negative 
response dominates positive response. The shock has a transitory effect on Singapore's real 
exchange rate and lasts for about 22 months. 
Figure 5.15 plots the response of the Singaporean real exchange to a shock in itself 
Again, the initial response is negative, but it starts from a positive region. The response is 
relatively volatile, reaches its negative peak in the eighth month, and reaches its positive peak 
in the fourteenth month after the initial shock. The shock has no permanent effect. 
Nevertheless, it lasts for about 26 months, which is longer than the effects on Singapore's real 
exchange rate with respect to shocks in the US, Japanese, and German real exchange rates. 
The Major Trading Partner and Thailand Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition FEVD of the group of US-Japanese-
German-Thailand real exchange rates is presented in Table 5.8. Both the US and Japanese 
real exchange rates have similar behavior to the case of the United State-Japan-Germany-
Singapore order. The pattern of variance decomposition for the German real exchange rate is 
identical as well. However, the US and Japanese real exchange rates account for about 2 
percent more of Germany's forecast error variance in this group than that of the previous 
group. 
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Variance decomposition for the Thailand real exchange rate is dominated by US real 
exchange rate feedback response. This pattern is similar to that of the variance decomposition 
for the Singaporean real exchange rate, but the former is more significant. Feedback 
responses of the German real exchange rate to other real exchange rates, overall, are stronger 
than that of Thailand real exchange rate. This result suggests that Thailand's real exchange 
rate is less powerful compared to Singapore's real exchange rate relative to the real exchange 
rate of major trading partners. In other words, Thailand/Indonesian relative prices are mostly 
determined by major trading partner/Indonesian relative prices, whereas Singapore/Indonesian 
relative prices are less reliable. 
The US real exchange rate exhibits consistent behavior when the order of real 
exchange rate variables is Japan-the United States-Germany-Thailand with respect to its own 
and other real exchange rate forecast error variances. However, the Thailand real exchange 
rate accounts for 19 percent (compared to 21 percent in the previous order) of its ov^ 
forecast error variance after 24 months. The US real exchange rate explains 14 percent of 
Thailand's forecast error variance. If we compare this result to the feedback response of the 
Japanese real exchange rate when it has the same place as the US real exchange in the order 
(8 percent), it is clear that the United State/Indonesian real exchange rate has more influence 
than the Japan/Indonesian real exchange rate in determining the Thailand/Indonesian real 
exchange rate. 
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Table 5.8. Forecast error variance decomposition of major trading partner and 
Thailand real exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in: 
in: h AUSRE AJARE AGERE ATHRE 
AUSRE 2 0.0304 97.17 0,99 1,42 0.42 
3 0.0305 97.07 1.02 1,47 0,43 
4 0.0307 96.10 1.51 1,57 0.83 
6 0.0316 91.17 3.39 3.37 2.06 
12 0,0333 83.09 8.23 4.43 4.25 
18 0.0336 82.26 8.34 4.83 4.34 
24 0.0337 81,82 8.32 5.28 4.56 
AJARE 2 0.0339 39,80 58.52 1.64 0.03 
3 0.0342 39,11 57.44 3.24 0.20 
4 0.0346 38.61 56.96 3.36 1.07 
6 0.0363 37.32 52.72 5,21 4.74 
12 0.0390 33.55 52.12 7,23 7.10 
18 0.0403 32.65 50.39 9.16 7.79 
24 0.0406 32.40 49,68 9.64 8.27 
AGERE 2 0.0368 34.13 23,45 42.26 0.16 
3 0.0371 33.95 23,22 42.54 0.29 
4 0.0373 33.58 23.88 41,98 0.55 
6 0.0388 31.69 23.70 40,61 4.00 
12 0,0411 29,90 25.46 38.08 6.55 
18 0.0421 29,17 25.41 38.40 7,02 
24 0,0423 28,93 25,21 38,28 7,58 
ATHRE 2 0.0327 77.42 0,88 2.08 19,61 
3 0.0327 77.41 0,88 2,16 19,55 
4 0.0329 76,64 0,87 2.67 19.81 
6 0.0342 72,05 2,49 4.11 21.35 
12 0.0359 66,10 6,34 6.23 21.41 
18 0.0363 64,85 6,87 6.86 21.43 
24 0.0365 64,52 6,87 7.15 21.45 
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Impulse Response Function The Thailand real exchange rate responses to a 
shock in the major trading partner real exchange rate was estimated based on the following 
order of real exchange rate variables: the United States-Japan-Germany-Thailand. This order 
is based on the results from the FEVD study above. Figure 5.16 plots the response of 
Thailand's real exchange rate to a shock in the US real exchange rate. The effect of the shock 
is not permanent. It is clear, however, that the shock has a transitory effect which lasts for 
about ten months. After that, the response has approximately reaches its long-term position. 
The response is not quite volatile, and the movement is mostly in the negative region. This 
attitude is quite different from those of Singapore's real exchange rate responses to the same 
shock. The significant differences are the direction of initial response, the frequency of 
fluctuations, and the long life of the effect on the real exchange rate movement. From these 
results, it is clear that the effects of a shock last longer in the Singaporean real exchange rate 
than in the Thailand real exchange rate. This result implies that a shock in the United 
State/Indonesian relative price has longer-lasting influence on the Singapore/Indonesian 
relative price than on the Thailand/Indonesian relative price. 
The Thailand real exchange rate response to a typical shock in the Japanese real 
exchange rate is displayed in Figure 5.17. The response seems two months late compared 
with the response of this real exchange rate to shock in the US real exchange rate. Frequency 
of fluctuation in this case is less, but wider in range. Moreover, it is stronger. Effects of the 
shock last quite long—about 22 months—which is longer than the effects of a shock in the US 
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Figure 5.16. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.17. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.18. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the Germany 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.19. Thailand real exchange rate response to a shock in the Tailand real 
exchange rate. 
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real exchange rate last. Therefore, the results imply that the Japan/Indonesian relative price 
has a longer-lasting influence on the Thailand/Indonesian relative price than does the 
US/Indonesian relative price. Compared to the effects of the same shock on Singapore's real 
exchange rate, this response lasts for the same period of time. Singapore's real exchange 
response directly reaches its negative peak, whereas the ThailanJ*real exchange rate is late to 
respond by about two months and reaches its negative peak in the fourth month after the 
initial shock. 
A shock in the German real exchange rate has a transitory effect on the Thailand real 
exchange rate and lasts for about 22 months (see Figure 5.18). The response to the shock is 
negative and less volatile in the first 12 months. The frequency of fluctuations is similar to 
those of this real exchange rate with respect to a shock in the Japanese real exchange rate, 
especially in the first nine months, but different to those with respect to the US real exchange 
rate. Singapore's real exchange rate is more volatile. The similarity in responses is that they 
reach their long-term position at almost the same time. 
The response of Thailand's real exchange rate to a shock in itself is presented in Figure 
5.19. The effect is not permanent, but it has a transitory effect which lasts for about 14 
months. The response is less volatile compared to that of Singaporean real exchange rate to a 
shock in the Thailand real exchange rate. The significant difference is that the effect of the 
shock has less persistence in the Thailand real exchange rate. 
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Table 5.9. Forecast error variance decomposition of major trading partner and the 
Philippines real exchange rates. ; 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in 
in h AUSRE AJARE AGERE APHRE 
AUSRE 2 0.0296 97.67 0.13 2.13 0.07 
3 0.0298 97.22 0.14 2.45 0.19 
4 0.0300 96.68 0.27 2.54 0.50 
6 0.0305 91.19 2.26 3.95 2.60 
12 0.0331 82.51 7.35 5.40 4.73 
18 0.0336 80.50 8.19 6.07 5.26 
24 0.0338 80.30 8.34 6.06 5.30 
AJARE 2 0.0337 35.59 62.23 1.74 0.44 
3 0.0342 35.27 60.53 3.41 0.77 
4 0.0346 35.52 59.79 3.81 0.77 
6 0.0367 35.07 55.14 4.84 4.28 
12 0.0391 33.26 55.14 6.48 5.12 
18 0.0404 32.58 55.01 6.97 5.44 
24 0.0407 32.96 54.65 6.95 5.44 
AGERE 2 0.0365 31.42 23.11 43.25 2.22 
3 0.0371 31.92 22.39 43.13 2.56 
4 0.0375 31.82 22.89 42.29 2.99 
6 0.0384 31.55 23.25 41.26 3.94 
12 0.0408 30.76 25.32 38.36 5.56 
18 0.0418 30.22 25.98 37.50 6.29 
24 0.0421 30.17 26.14 37.31 6.38 
APHRE 2 0.0377 53.74 0.38 0.79 45.08 
3 0.0382 53.95 0.93 1.35 43.77 
4 0.0386 53.63 0.92 2.50 42.94 
6 0.0404 49.63 1.23 5.99 43.15 
12 0.0434 45.39 5.63 7.74 41.23 
18 0.0444 44.44 6.63 8.53 40.40 
24 0.0446 44.38 6.88 8.52 40.22 
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The Major Trading Partner and the Philippines Real Exchange RateCase 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition FEVD was examined for the real 
exchange rate variables of the order the United States-Japan-Germany-the Philippines. Table 
5.9 presents the empirical results for this study. The US and Japanese real exchange rates 
show the same behavior as in the previous case studies. The behavior of the German and 
Philippine real exchange rates are identical to those of the German and Thailand real exchange 
rates in the previous case study. The Philippine real exchange rate, however, explains more of 
its own forecast error variance (40 percent) compared to those of the Singaporean 
(32percent) and Thailand (21 percent) real exchange rates after 24 months. This result seems 
to suggest that bilateral trade between the Philippines and Indonesia is a little different from 
bilateral trade Singaporeand Indonesia and Thailand and Indonesia. 
The US real exchange rate again shows strong influence on the other real exchange 
rates in the system when we study FEVD for the real exchange rate variables for the group 
Japan-the United States-Germany-the Philippines. The Philippine real exchange rate, 
however, explains less of its own forecast error variance in this system, accounting for only 34 
percent compared to 40 percent in the previous order. The feedback responses of the US and 
Japanese real exchange rates account for 38 percent and 21 percent, respectively, of the 
Philippine real exchange rate forecast error variances. If we compare these results to those of 
the previous order, there is a big difference. The US and Japanese real exchange rates explain 
44 percent and 7 percent of the Philippines real exchange rate forecast error variance, 
respectively. These results indicate that the United State/Indonesian relative price has a 
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Stronger influence than does the Japan/Indonesian relative price in the movement of the 
Philippines/Indonesian relative price. 
The empirical evidence, overall, supports the US real exchange rate as an exogenous 
variable to the system. The Japanese real exchange rate also has a strong influence on the 
ASEAN real exchange rates. Therefore, it is clear that both the US and Japanese real 
exchange rates play significant roles in determining relative prices between the ASEAN 
countries and Indonesia. The US real exchange rate, however, seems more powerful in 
explaining ASEAN relative prices. Furthermore, the Germany/Indonesian relative price does 
not show a significant influence in determining relative prices in this currency area. 
The Philippine real exchange rate seems more independent than the Singaporean and 
Thailand real exchange rates. The Philippine real exchange rate explains its own movement to 
a greater degree and gives less feedback in response to the movement in the real exchange 
rates of its major trading partners. Based on overall results, however, it might be more 
reasonable to conclude that the Singapore/Indonesian relative price plays a greater role in 
determining the United State/Indonesian, Japan/Indonesian, and Germany/Indonesia relative 
prices. 
Impulse Response Function The present impulse response study is for a system 
with real exchange rate variables of the order the United States-Japan-Germany-the 
Philippines. As before, this study focuses on the influence of the major trading partner real 
exchange rates on the Philippine real exchange rate. Figure 5.20 plots the response of the 
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Figure 5.20. Philippines real exchange rate response to a shock in the US 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.21. Philippine real exchange rate response to a shock in the Japanese real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.22. Philippine real exchange rate responses to a shock in the German real 
exchange rate. 
0.032 
0.024 
0.016 
0.008 
0.000 
-0.008 
-0.016 
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 
Months 
Figure 5.23. The Philippines real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Philippine 
real exchange rate. 
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Philippines real exchange rate to a typical shock in the US real exchange rate. The effect of 
the shock is not quite significant. Nevertheless, it lasts for about 16 months. The behavior of 
this response is similar to that of the Thailand real exchange rate, but is less volatile and shovk^s 
less persistence than that of the Singaporean real exchange rate with respect to the same 
shock. This means the United State/Indonesian relative price has a lesser and shorter influence 
on the Philippines/Indonesian relative price. This finding supports the results of the FEVD 
study. 
The response of the Philippine real exchange rate to a shock in the Japanese real 
exchange rate is displayed in Figure 5.21. The shock has a transitory effect on the Thailand 
real exchange rate, which lasts for about 14 months. The impulse response reaches its 
negative peak at the fourth month and is relatively strong. The pattern of response is slightly 
different fi^om that of the Singaporean and Thailand real exchange rates with respect to the 
same shock. For all three responses, the Thailand real exchange rate response is more stable 
than the other two responses. If we compare this response to that of the Thailand real 
exchange rate with respect to the shock in the US real exchange rate, the former is more 
volatile but reaches its long-term position in the same time. 
Figure 5.22 presents the Philippine real exchange rate response to a typical shock in 
the German real exchange rate. The effect of the shock is also transitory and lasts for about 
22 months after the initial shock. The response, which is initially positive, is volatile for the 
first eight months and more stable after that. The attitude of this response is different than 
that of the Philippine real exchange rate with relation to shocks in the US and Japanese real 
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exchange rates. Compared to the Singaporean and Thailand real exchange rate responses to 
the same shocks, however, this response moves cyclically between positive and negative 
regions, whereas the other two are dominated by a negative response for the first eight 
months, but the responses are shorter. The possible interpretation of this result is that the 
Germany/Indonesian relative price has a relatively weak influence on the 
Philippines/Indonesian relative price. 
The shock in the Philippine real exchange rate has no permanent effect on the 
exchange rate itself This is clear from the plot presented in Figure 5.23. The response is very 
volatile and seems similar to the behavior of the Singaporean real exchange rate in response to 
a shock in itself It is significantly different firom the real exchange rate response with respect 
to shocks in the US, Japanese, and German real exchange rates. The most important 
difference is that this response is stronger and lasts longer. This result suggests that the 
Philippines/Indonesian relative price mostly influences itself In other words, it is the most 
independent of the ASEAN real exchange rates when they are grouped with major trading 
partner real exchange rates. 
The Major Trading Partner and South Korean Real Exchange Rate Case 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Table 5.10 reports FEVD for the 
group of the United States-Japan-Germany-South Korea. Both the US and Japanese real 
exchange rates show identical patterns of behavior, as in the case of the group of major 
trading partners and each ASEAN real exchange rate. The South Korean real exchange rate 
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accounts for 21 percent of its own forecast error variance, which is less than the Singaporean 
real exchange rate accounts for. Moreover, the feedback response of the South Korean real 
exchange rate is weaker than that of the Singaporean real exchange rate. Therefore, the 
empirical evidence shows that the Singapore/Indonesian relative price is a leading variable for 
Indonesia in determining relative prices with respect to the major trading partners. In other 
words, we find more support for considering that Singapore is also a major trading partner for 
Indonesia. 
The same pattern was given by the study of FEVD for real exchange rate variables in 
the system of Japan-the United States-Germany-South Korea. Consistently, the US real 
exchange rate shows major influences on all real exchange rates in the system. With respect 
to the German real exchange rate, the South Korean real exchange rate has a smaller feedback 
response in the US and Japanese real exchange rates. It is clear, then, that the South Korean 
real exchange rate depends on all major trading partner real exchange rates. 
Impulse Response Function The impulse response function is studied for a system 
with the order of the United States-Japan-Germany real exchange rates. Figure 5.25 clearly 
shows that the effects of a typical shock in the US real exchange rate on the South 
Korea/Indonesian real exchange rate is very weak. The results seem to suggests that the 
United State/Indonesian relative price has no influence in determining 
the South Korea/Indonesian relative price. This response is quite different from that of the 
Singaporen real exchange rate response to a shock in the US real exchange rate. 
228 
Table 5.10. Forecast error variance decomposition of the major trading partner and South 
Korean real exchange rates. 
Forecast Forecast Standard Proportions of forecast error variance h 
error horizon error periods ahead accounted for by innovations in 
in: h AUSRE AJARE AGERE AKORE 
AUSRE 2 0.0305 96.71 0.71 2.50 0.07 
3 0.0305 96,66 0.72 2.53 0.08 
4 0.0308 95.50 0.95 2.66 0.87 
6 0.0316 91.19 3.46 4.47 0.88 
12 0.0329 85.14 7.97 5.73 1.15 
18 0.0332 84.37 8.30 6.02 1.31 
24 0.0334 83.86 8.36 6.11 1.67 
AJARE 2 0.0340 58.12 58.12 1.84 0.73 
3 0.0343 57.18 57.18 3.03 0.97 
4 0.0348 56.17 56.17 3.41 2.56 
6 0.0362 54.86 54.86 5.54 2.86 
12 0.0383 54.05 54.05 7.61 3.75 
18 0.0394 53.39 53.47 7.86 4.09 
24 0.0395 52.74 52.74 7.95 4.55 
AGERE 2 0.0367 33.45 23.47 42.91 0.16 
3 0.0373 32.94 22.93 43.39 0.74 
4 0.0379 31.96 23.21 42.10 2.72 
6 0.0388 30.57 25.05 41.56 2.81 
12 0.0407 29.37 26.28 39.56 4.80 
18 0.0414 29.10 26.52 39.00 5.38 
24 0.0416 29.10 26.28 39.00 5.62 
AKORE 2 0.0325 75.01 0.67 2.87 21.45 
3 0.0329 73.75 1.26 3.84 21.15 
4 0.0334 72.84 1.50 4.35 21.32 
6 0.0341 70.83 2.49 5.84 20.84 
12 0.0354 66.42 6.42 6.44 20.72 
18 0.0357 65.62 7.08 ~ 6.55 20.75 
24 0.0359 65.23 7.13 6.79 20.85 
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The effects of a shock in the Japanese real exchange rate on the South Korean real 
exchange rate, however, are relatively significant. .Figure 5.26 shows that the impulse 
fluctuates but does not have a permanent effect. Compared to the Singaporean real exchange 
rate response to the same shock, this response is more stable and reaches its long-term 
position earlier. From this finding, we might conclude that the influence of the Japanese real 
exchange rate on the South Korean real exchange is weaker than its influence on the 
Singaporean real exchange rate. 
Figure 5.27 shows the response of the South Korean real exchange rate to a shock in 
the German real exchange rate. The shock has a transitory effect. The response is volatile for 
the first 12 months, and approximately reaches its long-term position after 20 months. The 
behavior of this response is different than that of the Singaporean real exchange rateto the 
same shock. The initial response in the present study is positive; however, it is weaker and 
less volatile. 
Theresults show a weak response in the South Korea real exchange rate to a shock in 
itself The movement of the impulse, plotted in Figure 5.28, is quite stable and stays within a 
small range. Nevertheless, the effects of the shock last for about 20 months. This response is 
significantly different from that of the Singaporean real exchange rate to the same shock. 
Overall, the responses of the South Korean real exchange rate to itself and to shock in 
other real exchange rates in the system are weak and approximately reache their long-term 
position in a relatively short period of time. These responses are all different from those of the 
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Figure 5.24. South Korean real exchange rate responses to a shock in the US real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.25 South Korean real exchange rate responses to a shock in the Japanese 
real exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.26. South Korean real exchange rate responses to a shock in the German real 
exchange rate. 
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Figure 5.27. South Korean real exchange rate responses to a shock in the South 
Korean real exchange rate. 
Singaporean real exchange rate to the some shocks. These results might suggest that the 
South Korea/ Indonesian relative price for Indonesia in facing competition in the United State, 
Japan and Germany as well as in South Korea, and Singapore. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, we studied the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP and 
interrelationships among real exchange rates in a specific currency area in the presence of 
structural change. The study of the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP is pursued by 
estimating an error correction model, and interrelationships among real exchange rates are 
estimated by estimating FEVD and impulse response functions. 
The empirical results of the error correction models mostly support the importance of 
structural change dummy and error correction variables, ahhough a few of the models reject 
both variables at the same time. The rejections, however, do not weaken the importance of 
both variables since some of the models in the system support them—for instance, the case of 
the Japanese and Singaporean real exchange rate models in the system of the Japanese, 
Singaporean, Thailand and Philippine real exchange rates. 
From the study of FEVD and impulse response functions, the movement in the real 
exchange rates of ASEAN countries and South Korea are influenced by shocks or surprises in 
major trading partner real exchange rates. An interesting result is that the US real exchange 
rate has a stronger influence than the Japanese real exchange rate. Among the ASEAN real 
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exchange rates, the Singaporean real exchange rate shows stronger influence. In addition, the 
US and Singaporean real exchange rates show strong influences in the system of the US-
ASEAN real exchange rates. Also the Japanese and Singaporean real exchange rates shows 
strong influences in the system of Japan-ASEAN real exchange rates. 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Indonesia is representative of the world's growing economies and earned a reputation 
for its willingness to undertake liberal economic reforms during the 1980s. Reforms for 
stabilization and market-oriented trade and industrial policies that were introduced 
continuously have created a more outward-looking economy. Significant structural change, 
starting in March 1983, began with liberalization of the exchange rate system. Because policy 
changes in the Indonesian economy were implemented in all economic sectors and 
continuously adjusted, March 1983 was chosen as the breaking point for the Indonesia 
economy. This date is accounted for throughout the empirical study. 
One of the primary aims of this research is to investigate the validity of PPP and of 
Generalized-PPP in the presence of structural change for the ASEAN countries and their 
major trading partners in which Indonesia is as a base country. The Unit root test in the 
presence of structural change suggested by Perron (1989) was applied. The test indicated that 
the bilateral real exchange rates of ASEAN countries~the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand— and their major trading partners—Germany, Japan, and the United states— were all 
nostationary processes for the period January 1974 to October 1992. For all real exchange 
rates, Indonesia was used as the base country. The test was conducted using data on real 
exchange rates constructed by WPI, WPI without oil for Indonesia, CPI, and the nominal 
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exchange rate of Indonesia with all the countries studied. These result, as expected, did not 
support the validity of PPP, but led to the investigation of the validity of Generalized-PPP. 
Cointegration test for the validity of Generalized-PPP in the presence of structural 
change are presented. Empirical results support the validity of Generalized-PPP for the 
ASEAN; the United States-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN groups; and the major trading 
partners and each ASEAN country and the South Korea real exchange rate groups. The of 
the long-run relationship in every group that constitutes a currency area in the sense of 
Generalized-PPP suggests that deviation in Generalized-PPP is mostly from the tendency of 
real exchange rates to depreciate. 
Because Generalized-PPP held for some groups of real exchange rates, those groups 
of countries can be interpreted as an economic system that constitutes as currency area. This 
result provides a justification for estimating the short-run dynamics of the Generalized-PPP 
and for investigating interrelationships among real exchange rates within the system. Most 
empirical evidence from the study of the short-run dynamics of Generalized-PPP support the 
importance of the error correction and structural change dummy variables. 
The interrelationships of real exchange rates within each group that supports 
Generalized-PPP was studied through the estimation of FEVD and impulse response 
functions. Among ASEAN real exchange rates, Singapore's real exchange rate shows the 
strongest influence on the other real exchange rates within the group. From the studies of the 
interrelationships of the United states-ASEAN and Japan-ASEAN real exchange rates, the US 
real exchange rate is more stable than Japanese real exchange rate in response to shocks in 
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each ASEAN country real exchange rate. If the real exchange rate is interpreted as the relative 
price in Indonesia with that in the other countries, .the results tell us that Indonesia-US 
bilateral trade is more stable than Indonesia-Japanese bilateral trade, given that the ASEAN . 
countries are Indonesia's competitors for the US and Japanese markets. 
Another suggestion from the study of FEVD and the impulse response function is that 
the movements in the real exchange rates of the ASEAN countries and South Korea are 
strongly influenced by a shock in the real exchange rates of the major trading partners. An 
interesting result is that the US real exchange rate has stronger influence on the movement of 
the ASEAN and South Korea real exchange rates than does the Japanese real exchange rate. 
This result might be interpreted as a signal that the United States has more influence than does 
Japan in the economies of Pacific Rim nations. 
From this study of the long-run relationships, FEVD, and impulse response functions, 
there is evidence that Singapore's real exchange rate has more influence on the other real 
exchange rates than does the German real exchange rate. This results suggests that the role of 
Singapore's market is greater than the role of Germany's market in the Indonesia economy. In 
addition, there is some indication that Singapore's real exchange rate exhibits similar behavior, 
even though it is less strong, to shocks in the US and Japanese real exchange rates with 
respect to other real exchange rates in this study. Based on these results, the United States, 
Japan, and Singapore are all shown to be reasonable major trading partners for Indonesia. 
For further research, it might be interesting to continue this study by investigating the 
influence of the permanent and transitory components of the United states/Indonesian, 
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Japan/Indonesian, and Singapore/Indonesian real exchange rates on the trade balances of 
Indonesia with the United states, Japan, and Singapore. The permanent and transitory 
components of real exchange rates could be computed by following Blanchard and Quah's 
(1989) methodology. 
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